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3. Apart from these questions, which are on the interpretation of the particular statute, two questions of their constitutional validity have also been raised before us. The first is that Amending Act XI of 1964, under which a ceiling in respect of non-residential tenements, namely, Rs. 400 specified in Section 30 of Madras Act XVIII of 1960, was done away with, and a further section in the Amending Act (Section 3) was introduced for the abatement of certain pending proceedings, is ultra vires, as offending Article 14 of the Constitution; the argument is that, both as a matter of legislative history and in the substantial sense, the amending enactment embodies a hostile discrimination against the landlords of non-residential premises, without a reasonable basis or objective. On this aspect, even the bona fides of the amending enactment has been assailed, and it is contended that the enactment was hastily rushed through the Legislature, without the salutory procedure of a reference to a Select Committee, and in a matter of one or two days, because the concerned Minister had a personal motive to obtain the benefit of the legislation. An interpretation of Section 3 of Madras Act II of 1964 also arises, particularly in connection with the facts in Application No. 2443 of 1964 in C. S. No. 163 of 1962. The other constitutional point raised during the arguments relates to an alleged infringement of the protection afforded by Article 19 in more than one respect. The learned Advocate General relied upon Article 358 of the Constitution for the view that the provisions of Article 19 are themselves suspended during the operation of the present Proclamation of Emergency; the tenability of this view, in the context of the interpretation of Article 358 in relation to enactments prior to the Emergency such as Madras Act XVIII of 1960, is also a matter on which arguments have been addressed.

27. We now turn to the aspect of the case which relates to Article 14, and the attack on Amending Act XI of 1964 both upon grounds of hostile discrimination, and infringement of rights guaranteed under Article 19.

28. The argument based upon hostile discrimination (Article 14) will have to be considered, both for its proper appreciation and for the purpose of the imputation of mala fides against the concerned Minister, upon certain facts including the legislative history of the Amending Act XI of 1964. Upon the pleadings, as they stand, the respective parties, in W.P. No. 1124 of 1963, are not agreed on the applicability of the Amending Act at all. The terms of the lease between Messrs. Raval & Company, and the landlord are set out in the affidavit of Sri Damodaran for Messrs. Raval & Company inclusive of the original agreement that rent was to be Rs. 225 per mensem that the lease should enure till 1st May, 1969, and that the lessees should further make an annual contribution towards repairs and a sum of Rs. 230 towards property-tax. In paragraph 7 of this affidavit, the average monthly rental is claimed to be Rs. 419 which would come within the ambit of Section 30 of Act XVIII of 1960, only by virtue of the Amending Act XI of 1964. According to the affidavit for the landlords, the monthly rent is only Rs. 225 with an additional 25 per cent and hence the premises were within the scope of the 1960 Act itself . For the purpose of the argument, as based upon Article 14, we shall assume that, but for the amending Act XI of 1964, these non-residential premises will be wholly exempt from the Rent Control enactments, as argued by Sri Tiruvenkatachari. Indisputably, upon such issues of fact, concerning which there is controversy between the parties, this Court will not embark on a trial of the issue under Article 226 of the Constitution.

32. But Sri Tiruvenkatachari points out that the Statement of Objects is a repetition of the Statement of Objects in an earlier Bill LI of 1961, which had gone to the Select Committee, which committee disapproved of the deletion of Clauses (ii) and (iii) of Section 30, as was then contemplated. According to the learned Counsel this essentially implies that there is a re-classification of tenements upon higher rentals hitherto exempt from the Act, which is a hostile discrimination against the landlords of non-residential buildings. A certain document (page 35 of Volume II) is relied on to show that, though there was a demand in the Legislative Council for reference to a Select Committee, this was not complied with. The haste of the legislative process, the absence of scrutiny by the Select Committee, the repetition of the same Objects and Reasons without any fresh basis for the discrimination, are all relied upon in support of the argument. Per contra, the learned Advocate-General has placed before us the Rules of the Legislative Assembly, and pointed out that the legislative process has strictly been in order; any reference to a Select Committee has to be proposed and carried through as a resolution, and this was not done. Indeed, we are quite unable to see how this matter of the character, of the legislative process in this case, could at all be canvassed here. The Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the facts and conditions, which render a particular piece of legislation expedient and beneficial. We have been referred to an extract from Ilbert's Legislative Methods and Forms (page 222) concerning the American Method of powers of initiating legislation and of scrutiny of Bills delegated to committees. Passages from Rottschaefer's Handbook of American Constitutional Law (1939 Edition) have also been adverted to, in support of the proposition that the reasonableness of legislative action cannot be determined, " without considering the factual situation existing when the legislation was enacted" (pp. 454 to 460).

35. In the present matter, it is difficult even to appreciate the plea of hostile discrimination urged on behalf of Messrs. Raval & Company, who seek to impugn the Amending Act (XI of 1964) on this ground. Firstly, the party advancing this plea is a tenant, and it is urged that landlords were subject to this hostile discrimination; it is not a landlord who is coming forward with the plea that he has been treated differently from those similarly situated. Next, the classification of ' residential' and ' non-residential' tenancies has been adopted in many tenancy enactments and is a well-recognised and rational principle of differentiation. Actually, this has been conceded by learned Counsel. But, if this be conceded, and as the learned Advocate-General rightly stressed, hostile discrimination can be conceivably urged only if persons of this class (landlords of non-residential tenements) had been differentially treated. Certainly, the argument is sustainable, that, on the contrary, it was the 1960 Act which prescribed some differential treatment with regard to landlords of non-residential premises; this was in the sense that only landlords of premises with rentals of Rs. 400 and below were brought within the scope of the legislation