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5. The respondent No.1 DWB vide another office order dated 24th September, 2013 "in supersession of all previous office orders in this regard" again constituted a Managing Committee in respect of the same waqf property. The Managing Committee so constituted vide office order dated 24th September, 2013 comprises of twenty four persons and of whom the President and two other members are the same, as of the earlier Managing Committee of which the petitioners were the members.

6. The contention of the counsel for the petitioners is that though the respondent No.1 DWB, in exercise of powers under Section 67(1) of the Waqf Act, 1995, is empowered to supersede a Managing Committee but only after following the procedure prescribed in Sub-section (2) of Section

7. I may notice that Sub-section (3) of Section 67 also provides that an order under Section 67(2) of supersession of Managing Committee shall be published in the prescribed manner and only on such publication is to be binding on the mutwalli and all other persons having any interest in the Waqf. Further, under Sub-section (5) of Section 67, the new Managing Committee can be constituted simultaneously with the order under Section 67(2).

8. Section 67(4) however provides for an appeal to the Tribuanl against an order under Section 67(2). It has as such at the outset been enquired from the counsel for the petitioners, that in the light of the alternative remedy of appeal before the Tribunal constituted under the Waqf Act, how is this writ petition maintainable.

9. The counsel for the petitioners states that though the remedy of appeal is available but only against an order passed, after following the procedure prescribed in Section 67(2) supra and since the respondent No.1 DWB in the present case has admittedly not followed the said procedure, the appeal remedy is not available.

10. I tend to agree with the counsel for the petitioners.

11. The office order dated 24th September, 2013 does not state any reason for issuance thereof. In fact, the same is an order in supersession of all previous orders and not even an order of supersession of the Managing Committee earlier constituted vide office order dated 9th May, 2013, of which the petitioners were a part. The same, in my view, cannot qualify as an order under Section 67(2).

20. The High Court of Karnataka in Managing Committee, Masjid-E- Idgah, Mysore Vs. State of Karnataka 1997 SCC Online Kar 147 held that once a Managing Committee is constituted, under the legislative mandate, it can be superseded only in compliance with the requirements as envisaged under Section 67 of the Act. The stand of the Waqf Board in that case that it can at any point of time without assigning any reason whatsoever revoke its pleasure leading to a civil death of the Committee and proceed to appoint another Committee at its sweet will and pleasure was held to be in teeth of statutory provisions and to which the Waqf Board owes its existence. It was held that the Waqf Board thus cannot take upon itself any authority beyond such provisions. The counsel for the petitioner also in this respect has relied on the judgment of Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this Court in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Sk. Abdul Saleem Vs. A.P. State Wakf Board 2006 (2) ALT 76, further holding that the Waqf Board, while passing an order of supersession, is bound to record reasons and the satisfaction of the Waqf Board under Section 67(2) has to be reflected from the reasons assigned in the order of supersession. It was further held that an order of supersession of Managing Committee, which is devoid of reasons, is in violation of the principles of natural justice and constitutes a valid ground for exercising judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance in this regard is also placed by counsel for the petitioner on Mohd. Izhar Vs. Delhi Waqf Board 106 (2003) DLT 514 also holding that since the statutory provisions of Section 67(2) clearly provide for a minimum period of one month notice, that ought to have been followed because the non following of such a clear statutory provision creates a doubt in the minds of the people that principles of natural justice have been violated.