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1. These two appeals by special leave are directed against a common judgment dated September 29, 1970 passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in two writ petitions. This Judgment will dispose of both the appeals.

2. The appellant who was the petitioner before the High Court is a Hissedar in the Paigah estate of Vicar-ul-Umra. In August 1949, the Jagirs of what was previously the Hyderabad State were abolished by and under a Regulation called the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation 1358F. (No, LXIX of 1358F.) This Regulations which we shall briefly describe as the Jagir Abolition Regulations, was promulgated for the purpose of abolition of Jagirs and to provide, pending the determination of the terms of commutation, for the payment to Jagirdars and Hissedars of certain interim allowances. The Jagirs under the Regulation also included a Paigah. Section 2(e) of the Regulation defines a Hissedar as a person who is entitled to a share in the income of a Jagir according to the existing law. Section 2(f) of the Regulation states among other things that Jagir includes a Paigah. Under Section 5 of that Regulation the Government was to appoint a date for the transfer to Government of the administration of Jagirs and different dates could be appointed for different Jagirs. On the date so appointed for any Jagir the Jagirdar was to make over the management of his Jagir to the Jagir Administrator. As from the appointed date the Jagir was to be included in the Diwani and was to be administered by the Jagir Administrator. The same Regulation provides for certain payments to the Jagirdars and Hissedars by way of "interim maintenance allowances" which were to be payable until such time as the terms for the commutation of Jagirs are determined.

7. The main challenge of the appellant in his writ petitions is against certain Atiyat enquiries held in connection with his claims for commutation under the Commutation Regulation in respect of the Paigahs to which he was a hissedar. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the Atiyat courts had no jurisdiction to hold an investigation into the appellant's claims regarding commutation The substance of the appellant's contention seems to be as follows. Under the Commutation Regulation the jurisdiction to determine the sums of commutation payable to any jagirdar or hissedar belongs to the Jagir Administrator or any officer authorised by the Jagir Administrator in that behalf. How the Jagir Administrator is to make this commutation has been precisely set out in the Regulation itself. All that the Jagir Administrator has got to do in determining this sum is to follow the procedure laid down in Section 3 and also the procedure of calculation laid down in Section 4 of the Commutation Regulation. The Jagir Administrator has first to find out the 'basic annual revenue' of the jagir. For doing this he has to find out the 'gross basic sum' in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 4. Now this gross basic sum is an average annual gross revenue of a jagir for a period of ten years. Certain deduction have to be made. But what are those deductions are also already known and require no enquiry. The average under Sub-section (2) is of certain amounts of gross revenue payable by the jagirdar, to the government according to the documents of title. The field of enquiry of the Jagir Administrator is not therefore large. If the documents of title of a jagirdar show the amounts that are payable by the jagirdar the Jagir Administrator does not have to go beyond those documents of title. In the instant case, for instances, the Jagir Administrator, we are told, has been making provisional awards to the Paigah estate belonging to the appellant from the year 1953. The appellant contends that certain reports submitted by certain authorities appointed by the Nizam in in 1920 and 1926 namely the report of Glancey Commission appointed in 1920 and the report of the Reilly Commission in December 1926 have received the approval of the Nizam by a Firman of 1338F. and this Firman of 1338 F. is to be treated as a Vasikas i.e. document of title relating to the jagir. Therefore, after the promulgation of the jagir Abolition Regulation and the Jagir Commutation Regulation all that the Jagir Administrator had to do was to fall back upon the Firman of 1338F. and the Reilly Commission's report which was confirmed by that Firman for ascertaining the extent of jagirs included in the paigahs of the appellant. The Jagir Administrator would also work our from the Budgets of income and expenditure of the Paigah which had been submitted every year from 1938 till 1948 by the Accountant. Generals of the Paigahs and sanctioned by the Nizam from year to year and work out what should be the 'gross basic sum" in respect of each jagir. That being the position, the appellant contends, there is no scope for any further enquiry into any Atiyat claims under the Atiyat Enquiries Act. This in brief is the main contention urged on behalf of the appellant before us.

2. Although jagirs have been abolished, cases of inam enquiries respect of several jagirs are yet to be completed and payment of commutation sum depends on the completion of such enquiries. It is obvious that in view of the nature of there grants, such, enquiries should be held in Atiyat Courts....

9. Clearly therefore it is found necessary in respect of any claim of commutation to ascertain the extent of the jagirs, that enquiry must be carried out by the Atiyat Court in accordance with Section 3A of the Act of 1952. The jurisdiction given to the Atiyat Courts in that Act seems to be comprehensive. It is not for us to say at this stage what is the value of the Reilly Commission's report or the Firman of 1338F. for the purpose of finally determining the extent of Paigah held by the appellant. The various reports and the Firman as well as the various budgets on which the appellant relied are matters of evidence which should be placed before the Atiyat court and it is for the Atiyat Court to judge in the light of this evidence the extent of the Paigah. It is to be remembered that all these reports and even the Firman are considerably prior in time to the date with reference to which the Jagir Commutation has to he determined. Since the date of those enquiries and since 1338F. when the Nizam issued his Firman the estate could have dwindled in size. Indeed, respondents in this case contend that considerable portions of the lands covered by the Paigah of the appellant have been submered by an artificial lake and that the appellant has already received compensation in respect of those lands so that those submered lands should not be treated as part of his paigah in calculating the commutation due to the appellant. Besides, the appellant, according to the respondents, has created several sub jagirs so that the commutation in respect of the lands of the sub-jagirdars should be payable to the subjagirdars and not to the appellant. Whether these allegations of the respondents are true or not is more than we can say or should say. These questions, however, have to be decided for ascertaining the extent of the paigah for which the appellant claims commutation. There is obviously a need for investigation. It is not at all our intention to say that the evidence on which the appellant relies is either useless or non-conclusive. Whatever may be the weight of that evidence, the matter is to be decided by the special courts viz, the Atiyat Courts, which have been set up to enquire into the claims of jagirdars and hissedars. Therefore, it is to the Atiyat Court that the appellant should have gone. Indeed, an Atiyat Court has gone into the appellant's claims and has rejected a part of his claims. Being aggrieved by the decision of that court the appellant filed an appeal to the Board of Revenue and then, on an afterthought, instead of pressing the appeal before the Board of Revenue which is indeed the proper forum to adjudicate this matter, the appellant withdrew the appeal and went before the High Court and filed two writ petitions challenging among other things the authority of the Atiyat courts to enquire into the validity of the appellant's claims for commutation.