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''Whether the land in respect of which occupancy rights have been conferred in favour of a tenant under the provisions of the Kar-nataka Land Reforms Act, 1974, can be construed as "granted land" as defined under Section 3(b) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, wherever the tenant belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and thus is amenable to the jurisdiction and operation of the PTCL Act or only restricted meaning to be given in this regard?"

5. The main contention of the learned Counsels for the petitioner Mr. K. Subba Rao (Senior Counsel) and B.V. Gangi Reddy, is that once the occupancy rights have been granted in accordance with law and the sale of the land has taken place after 15 years period of prohibition, the sale transaction cannot be declared as null and void. Learned Counsels submit that the learned Single Judge in the case of Mohammed Jaffar and Anr. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., ILR 2001 Kar. 1931 has rightly considered the provisions of Sections 44, 45 and 77 of the KLR Act, whereas in Narayan Parameshwar Naik's case, supra, the learned Single Judge only on the basis of the definition of 'granted land' under Section 3(b) of the PTCL Act and applying the provisions of Section 44, has held that the land vested in the State Government, which is not correct and so also the decision of the Division Bench in Smt. Lalitha Nagappa Naik's case, supra, which has approved the Narayan Parameshwar Naik's case, supra. Learned Counsels submit that the Division Bench has given a wider meaning of the definition 'granted land' and further erred in relying on the residuary provisions of Section 2(B) of the KLR Act, and thereon referring to Sections 99, 100 and 101 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act for assigning the meaning to the word 'occupant' or 'occupancy'. Learned Counsels submit that the Division Bench erred in invoking the overriding clause under Section 11 of the PTCL Act and the approach of the Division Bench in relying on the above provisions of the above referred Acts and holding that no fault can be found either with the initiation of resumption proceedings under Section 5 of the Act or the passing of the impugned orders by the Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and the learned Single Judge. Learned Counsels submit that the learned Single Judge in Narayan Pammeshwar Naik's case, supra and the Division Bench in Lalitha Nagappa Naik's case, supra, erred in relying on Section 44 of the KLR Act and provisions of Section 11 of the PTCL Act. They submit, though Section 44 of the KLR Act deals with vesting .of lands in the State Government, in view of Section 77 of the KLR Act only the surplus lands vested in the State Government can be disposed of under certain conditions. They also submit that occupancy right granted under Section 45, after due enquiry by the Tribunal, cannot be said to be a grant by the Government but only recognition of a statutory right and therefore Sections 44 and 45 will not be applicable so as to hold the transactions null and void and in the absence of consideration of these aspects the reference has to be answered in negative.

9. Admittedly, the point in issue i.e., provisions of Sections 45 and 48 of the KLR Act has not been considered by the learned Single Judge in Narayan Parameshwar Naik's case, supra, as well as by the Division Bench in Smt. Lalitha Nagappa Naik's case, supra in holding that conferment of occupancy right would also be grant within the meaning of 'granted land' under the PTCL Act.

10. To consider the point in issue, it will be appropriate to refer the definition of words 'granted land' i.e., Section 3(1)(b) of the PTCL Act and Sections 44, 45, 48A, 55, 77 and 77A of the KLR Act:

14. Under the circumstances, it is clear that occupancy right cannot at all fall within the ambit of 'granted land' as defined under the PTCL Act. Considering the argument of the learned Government Advocate with regard to automatic vesting of land in the Government, it is seen that the vesting of land in the Government is subject to vested right of a tenant to get occupancy right and for determination of right and confer- ment of occupancy Land Tribunal, a Statutory Authority established under the Land Reforms Act, is the Competent Authority to determine the same on a tenant who was personally cultivating the land on 1-3-1974. In view of this, the occupancy right, which has been granted by the Land Tribunal, cannot be construed as "granted land" as defined under the PTCL Act. The learned Single Judge in Narayan Parameshwar Naik's case, supra and the Division Bench in Smt. Lalitha Nagappa Naik's case, supra have not considered these aspects and have wrongly come to the conclusion that the KLR Act is an agrarian reforms Act by itself would not give the tenant to get occupancy right and the argument of the learned Government Advocate on the reasoning of the said decisions, is not acceptable. Certainly, the decisions in Narayan Parameshwar Naik's case, supra and Smt. Lalitha Nagappa Naik's case, supra, are not applicable and cannot be said to be a correct law to decide the controversy in the facts of the present case, and the said decisions are liable to be reversed. On the other hand, the learned Single Judge in Mohammed Jaffar's, supra, by an elaborate order, while considering the provisions of Sections 77 and 77A of the KLR Act and has rightly interpreted them with valid reasons. Accordingly, we are satisfied with the reasons of the learned Single Judge in Mohammed Jaffar's case, supra, approve the same. On overall consideration and as discussed above, we are of the view that the land in respect of which the occupancy right has conferred under Section 48A of the KLR Act would not fall within the ambit of 'granted land' as defined under Section 3(1)(b) of the PTCL Act and answer the referred question in negative.