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14. In the present case, the trial court has said that the Public Prosecutor has not given his reasoning for coming to the conclusion that how the evidence was weak and, therefore, learned trial court has concluded that the Public Prosecutor did not apply his independent mind in moving the applications under Section 321 Cr.P.C. for withdrawal of prosecution.

15. Section 321 of Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, "Cr.P.C.") provides for withdrawal from prosecution with the power to the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor to withdraw criminal case under Section 321 Cr.P.C.

16. The scope of Section 321 Cr.P.C., ambit of power and manner in which it has to be exercised by the Public Prosecutor have been dealt with in several decisions by the Supreme Court. Only a few decisions rendered by the Supreme Court would be apt to quote here to throw light on the scope of Section 321 Cr.P.C. and ambit and manner of exercise of the power by the Public Prosecutor under the aforesaid section. Ultimate authority to allow withdrawal from prosecution vests with the Court and the guiding consideration must always be interest of administration of justice when deciding the question whether prosecution should be allowed to be withdrawn or not.

19. In Sheonandan Paswan Versus State of Bihar and others (1983) 1 SCC 438, the Supreme Court has held that before an application is moved under Section 321 Cr.P.C., the Public Prosecutor needs to apply his mind to the facts of the case independently, without being influenced by outside factors. Relevant paragraphs, on reproduction, read as under:-

"85. In our opinion, the object of Section 321 Cr.P.C. appears to be to reserve power to the Executive Government to withdraw any criminal case on larger grounds of public policy such as inexpediency of prosecutions for reasons of State; broader public interest like maintenance of law and order; maintenance of public peace and harmony, social, economic and political; changed social and political situation; avoidance of destabilization of a stable government and the like. And such powers have been, in our opinion, rightly reserved for the Government; for, who but the Government is in the know of such conditions and situations prevailing in a State or in the country? The Court is not in a position to know such situations."

22. Similar views have been reiterated in Sheonandan Paswan Versus State of Bihar and others (1987) 1 SCC 288 by the Supreme Court. Paragraph-73, on reproduction, reads as under:-

"73. Section 321 gives the Public Prosecutor the power for withdrawal of any case at any stage before judgment is pronounced. This presupposes the fact that the entire evidence may have been adduced in the case, before the application is made. When an application under Section 32I Cr.P.C. is made, it is not necessary for the court to assess the evidence to discover whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. To contend that the court when it exercises its limited power of giving consent under Section 32I has to assess the evidence and find out whether the case would end in acquittal or conviction, would be to rewrite Section 321 Cr.P.C. and would be to concede to the court a power which the scheme of Section 321 does not contemplate. The acquittal or discharge order under Section 321 are not the same as the normal final orders in criminal cases. The conclusion will not be backed by a detailed discussion of the evidence in the case of acquittal or absence of prima facie case or groundlessness in the case of discharge. All that the court has to see is whether the application is made in good faith, in the interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law. The court, after considering these facets of the case, will have to see whether the application suffers from such improprieties or illegalities as to cause manifest injustice if consent is given. In this case, on a reading of the application for withdrawal, the order of consent and the other attendant circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that the application for withdrawal and the order giving consent were proper and strictly within the confines of Section 321 Cr.P.C."