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19. The reasoning in this judgment commends itself to us, as a distinction is made between judgments which either set aside, or refuse to set aside, an arbitral award after the court applies its mind to Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, as against preliminary orders of condona- tion of delay, which do not in any way impact the arbitral award that has been assailed.

20. However, Smt. Acharya relied heavily upon the Division Bench judg- ment of the Delhi High Court in Antrix Corporation Ltd. (supra). On the facts of that case, on 28.02.2017, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court ruled that Antrix’s petition under Section 9 of the Ar- bitration Act, 1996 before the Bangalore Court was not maintainable, and that Devas’ petition under Section 9 was maintainable, the bar under Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 being inapplicable. The order also held that consequently, Antrix’s petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 before the Bangalore City Civil Court would not be maintainable, inasmuch as Devas’ petition filed in Delhi under Section 9 was filed earlier. The learned Single Judge then listed the matter for hearing on merits and directed Antrix to file an affidavit of an authorised officer, enclosing therewith its audited Balance Sheets, and Profit and Loss Accounts for the past three years. Antrix then ap- pealed against this order, to which a preliminary objection was taken, stating that this appeal would not be maintainable under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. After setting out Section 13 of the Commer- cial Courts Act, 2015 and Sections 37 and 42 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the Division Bench noticed Hamanprit Singh Sidhu (supra) in paragraph 39, without at all adverting to paragraph 10 of the judgment (which is set out hereinabove). Thereafter, the Court held as follows:

itime (supra), which this Court is in agreement with, this would also in effect be a Section 9 order as those details are sought for the purpose of adjudicating whether consequential relief could be given to Devas of securing the amount due from the arbitral award against Antrix. Moreover, this Court cannot take a doctrinaire and unbending approach in this matter, when it is clear that Antrix has suffered all but one re- maining blow through the impugned order, and there- fore, the Court should not wait till it suffers the final blow (that of the final Section 9 order) before it can assume jurisdiction over the appeal. The court's di- rection to Antrix furnish an affidavit along with the par- ticulars sought, is to aid its order with respect to a possible distraint, attachment or further such conse- quential order towards interim relief. Such an order would not be made unless the court directs this as a prelude, or important step towards the inevitable in- terim order, which would be just consequential. Therefore, the Court finds that Antrix's appeal against the impugned order is maintainable.

 44. This court also finds merit in Antrix's argument that as regards the single judge's observations that the Bangalore court cannot proceed with the matter, the impugned order is really final. It precludes in ef- fect, Antrix from proceeding with its Section 34 peti- tion before that court (in turn based on the pending Section 9 petition before that court). If Antrix were to accept the ruling, the effect would be to denude the Bangalore court of jurisdiction. It was contended-and correctly, in this court's opinion that whereas a court acts within jurisdiction in deciding whether it has or does not have jurisdiction over a cause of a matter, the declaration by it about the lack of jurisdiction of another court, based on the appreciation of the matter before the latter court is undeniably an adverse order. Allowing that to stand would prejudice Antrix for all times.”

21. It can be seen that the reasoning in this judgment would have no ap- plication to the facts of the present case. The Division Bench held that directing Antrix to file an affidavit, enclosing therewith its audited Bal- ance Sheets and Profit and Loss Account for the last three years, is it- self an interim order passed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The further reasoning of the Court that the direction to Antrix to furnish an affidavit is to aid a future interim order, which would be just consequential, does not commend itself to us. A step towards an in- terim order would not amount to granting, or refusing to grant, any measure under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The case is also distinguishable for the reason that, as regards the Bangalore Court,  which cannot proceed further with the matter, the impugned order therein is really final and would, therefore, also be appealable under Section 37. For all these reasons, this judgment is wholly distinguish- able and would not apply to the facts of the present case. We may also advert to the fact that our judgment in Kandla (supra) was deliv- ered on 07.02.2018, and was missed by the Division Bench in Antrix Corporation Ltd. (supra), as the Division Bench had reserved judg- ment on 06.12.2017, even though it ultimately pronounced the judg- ment on 30.05.2018. The judgment in South Delhi Municipal Corpo- ration (supra) was decided after reference was made to Kandla (supra), resulting in a deposit order being held to be not appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.