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(v) Smt.Ningamma Vs. The Tibetan Children's Village, W.A. No. 4092/2017 dated 09.04.2019.

It was held that divergent views have been taken and the matter was referred for consideration by a larger bench.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner while inviting the attention of this court to Section 95(2) of the Act and Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act submitted that both the aforesaid provision operate in different fields and the parameters for consideration of applications under both the provisions are different. It is further submitted that designated authorities under both provisions are different and therefore, the permission granted by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 95(2) of the Act cannot be construed as permission granted by the Government under Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act. It is also submitted that Section 4 of the PTCL Act begins with a non obstante clause and therefore, full effect has to be given to the provisions contained in Section 4(1) of the PTCL Act. It is urged that Section 4(1) of PTCL Act cannot be construed in the manner which defeats the object of Section 95(2) of the Act and vice versa. It is also urged that origin of the land alone is the criteria. It is contended that if on interpretation of Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act, which is a social welfare legislation, the interpretation, which leans in favour of the object of the Act has to be preferred. It is therefore, submitted that order of conversion passed under Section 95(2) of the Act by the Deputy Commissioner would not take away the "granted land" from the purview of the PTCL Act. It is also urged that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly and it is not permissible to create a legal fiction by interpretation. It is also urged that definition of the expression "granted land" under Section 3(i)(b) of PTCL Act is exhausted and therefore, the expression 'granted land' cannot be construed to mean only agricultural lands. In support of aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on decisions of Supreme Court in 'STATE OF TAMILNADU AND OTHERS VS.

K.SHYAMSUNDAR AND OTHERS', (2011) 8 SCC 737 and 'BHUWALKA STEEL INDUSTRIES LIMITED AND ANOTHER VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS', (2017) 5 SCC 598.

6. Learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that PTCL Act is a special law which prevails over the general law viz., the Act. It is further submitted that even if the land is converted under Section 95(2) of the Act, the same continues to be 'granted land' for the purposes of PTCL Act and the rights conferred under the special enactment cannot be taken away. It is also urged that granted land does not lose its character, as granted land merely because a permission for diversion of the land under Section 95(2) of the Act is granted. It is also contended that the permission granted under Section 95(2) of the Act cannot be construed as permission granted by the Government under Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act and the expression 'granted land' is not restricted only to agricultural land.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.3 submitted that PTCL Act is a law relating to agrarian reforms. When the grantee under the PTCL Act himself makes an application for conversion of the land, the Deputy Commissioner decides the aforesaid application with reference to the guidelines prescribed in Circular dated 07.06.1999 and the Deputy Commissioner while granting the permission for diversion of the land ensures that there is no violation of Section 4 of PTCL Act. Therefore, the permission granted under Section 95(2) of the Act has to be construed as permission under Section 4(2) of PTCL Act. It is pointed out that Section 95(2) of the Act provides for rejection of application for conversion if the same is likely to defeat the provisions of any law and while passing the order of conversion, the Deputy Commissioner is required to take into account the various provisions of law including Section 4 of the PTCL Act and therefore, by reference to de facto doctrine, it is urged that order of conversion shall be deemed to be order of prior permission under Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act. It is further submitted that such an interpretation is in public interest and would safeguard the innocent purchasers. It is also urged that definition of the word 'granted land' under the PTCL Act is restricted only to agricultural lands and not to converted lands and the definition has to be read in the light of doctrine of Noscitur a sociis. It is also contended that once an order of conversion is passed by the Deputy Commissioner, it takes away the "granted land" from the purview of PTCL Act. It is also urged that there is no divergence of opinion with reference to the issues, which has been referred by the learned Single Judge for consideration of this bench. In support of aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on decisions in 'GOKARAJU RANGARAJU VS. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH', (1981) 3 SCC 132, 'MAHARASHTRA UNIVERSITY OF HEALTH SCIENCES VS. SATCHIKITSAPRASARAK MANDAL', (2010) 3 SCC 786 and in 'N.NANJAPPA VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS', (2011) 4 KCCR 2502.

(D) In the instant case, the statute namely PTCL, specifically provides that the permission for transfer/acquisition by transfer in respect of any granted land cannot be made except after obtaining prior approval of the Government. Thus, the transfer/ acquisition by transfer in granted land has to be made in the manner prescribed under Section 4(2) of the Act i.e. the special enactment and an order of conversion passed by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 95(2) of the Act granted to an occupant of the land to use the land for purposes other than agriculture, cannot be construed as fulfillment of requirement under Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act. It is also noteworthy that competent authorities under both the provisions viz., Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act and under Section 95(2) of the Act are different, viz., the State Government and Deputy Commissioner respectively. The object and purpose of both the provisions contained in different enactment is entirely different. The scope of enquiry under both the provisions is entirely different. Both the aforesaid provisions operate in different fields. However, as we have already held that once the land is diverted, the same ceases to be a 'granted land' under the provisions of the PTCL Act. Therefore, in case of a diverted land, the requirement of obtaining the permission under Section 4(2) of the Act does not arise as the permission has to be obtained only in respect of 'granted land' and the land on conversion no longer remains 'granted land'. Therefore, the issue whether an order of conversion passed by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue act, 1964 can be construed as prior permission by the Government satisfying the requirements under Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act does not arise in case of diverted lands. The aforesaid issue is therefore, answered accordingly.