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1. The petitioner purchased land comprised in R.S.No. 78/2 of Dombargop measuring about 10 acres 03 guntas on 7.4.1982. The Assistant Commissioner made an order on 5.4.1991 holding that the transaction in question is hit by the provisions of Section 79A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called as 'the Act' for short) as the income of the petitioner is more than Rs. 12,000/- from non-agricultural sources. The correctness of the said order is called in question. The petitioner is also calling in question the constitutional validity of Sections 79A, 79-B and 79-C of the Act as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

The said provision came to be amended by Act 1 of 1991 i.e. (Second Amendment) Act 1991 to the effect that in the Sub-section (1) of Section 79 of the Act, for the words 'rupees twelve thousand', the words 'rupees fifty thousand' shall be substituted. By Act 31 of 1991, the Act was further amended to rectify the omission in Act 1 of 1991 so as to bring it in conformity with the amendment therein so as to read "in all the provisions of Section 79A the words 'Rs. 50,000/-' in place of words 'Rs. 12,000/-'. The Amending Act (1 of 1991) and (31 of 1991) in regard to Section 79-A is stated to have come into force with effect from 5th February, 1991.

The upshot of this discussion is that whenever an amended Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of amendment, the various unamended provisions of the Act have to be read along with the amended provision as though they are the part of it." The amended part of the provision having got incorporated into the Act the provision of Section 79A of the Act as such should be read. Section 79A of the Act has the opening words on and from the commencement of the Amended Act". The amended Act, as stated earlier, is defined to be Act 1 of 1974 which came into effect from 1.3.1974. From that date, no one can acquire an agricultural land if his income from sources other than agricultural lands is in excess of Rs. 50,000/-. If the interpretation given in Gayathri Ramaswamy's case is to be adopted, then it gives rise to two sets of transactions:-

(1) those by which from the commencement of the amendment Act, i.e. from 1.3.1974, acquired lands prior to 5.2.1991, and (2) those by which acquired lands subsequent to 5.2.1991.

But Section read as it is subsequent to amendment, does not give scope for such a construction at all. If the amended provision were to be effective from 5.2.1991, then the expression "on and from the date of commencement of Amended Act i.e. 1.3.1974." will have no meaning at all. Legislature, noticing that the Section itself has provided as to in respect of what transactions the restriction is applicable which are entered into from particular date, there was no necessity to make the same retrospective at all. We cannot attribute either ignorance to the Legislature of the opening words of Section 79A of the Act or treat the same as surplusage. Section simply stated "from the date of the commencement of the Amended Act which is 1.3.1974", those having annual income in excess of Rs. 50,000/- from non-agricultural sources cannot acquire agricultural lands. It is not a case where the Legislature classifies transactions depending upon a particular date. On the other hand, the Legislature gives rise to certain consequences that would follow if a transaction takes place after a particular date. It is only a restriction in relation to a transaction. If that is so, there is no scope for interpretation that there can be two classes of transactions. As the provision stands, the date of the commencement of the entire provision is 1.3.1974 and none other. In this view of the law, with great respect to the learned Judge who decided Gayathri Ramaswamy's case, we must say that the said case is not correctly decided and the interpretation to be placed on Section 79A of the Act is only by reference to the entire provisions of the Section as amended by Act 1 of 1991 and it must be held that the said words "Rs. 50,000/-" as always being there in the enactment because the language of the Section permits no other construction. In view of this state of law, it is unnecessary to examine the constitutional validity of the provisions raised herein. We refrain from doing so. If and when necessary, the petitioner is at liberty to raise the same. In the circumstances, the Petition stands allowed in part. The impugned order at Annexure 'K' shall stand quashed and the matter shall stand remitted to the Assistant Commissioner for fresh consideration in accordance with law and in the light of this order. Rule is absolute accordingly.