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We are not concerned with the second proviso. Diverse constructions are placed on the first proviso to Section 42 which alone is material for the purposes of the present petition. There are four constructions which are canvassed before us. On behalf of petitioner Shankarrao, Mr. Bobde learned counsel appearing on his behalf, contends that the "terms" referred to in the proviso are the terms as a Councilor, and the contention is that even if a person holds office fro or during any part of two consecutive terms of five years as contemplated by Section 10 (2) of the Act, the proviso will come into operation, and in the instant case notwithstanding that the respondent No. 1 was elected as the President of the Zilla Parishad for a part of the second term of Councilors of five years he having held office in two consecutive terms of five years as contemplated by Section 10 (2) he must be held to be ineligible in view of the proviso to Section 42. The same argument is put in a slightly different manner. On behalf of petitioner Shrawan by Mr. Palshikar appearing on his behalf. He argues that if a person holds the office of President during the term of five years of Councilor-ship, it is tantamount to holding the office of President for that whole term of Councillorship and since the respondent No. 1 held the office of President for a part of the second term, i.e. for the period of 12-8-1972, he must be deemed to have held the office of president for that entire term, which being the one which succeeds the first term 14-8-1962 to 12-8-`967, the condition precedent for disqualifying the respondent No. 1 for being eligible for election for the third time is satisfied. A third construction is put on the proviso on behalf of the State by Mr. Mor, learned Assistant Government Pleader, According to Mr.Mor, the proviso to Section 42 will operate only in a case where a Councilor holds office as President for two full terms of five years each as contemplated by Section 43 read with Section 10 (2) and Section 11 (1) of the Act. It is contended on behalf of the State that if a tended on behalf of the State that if a person holds office as President for a period which was short of the whole period of the terms of Councilors as defined in Section 10 (2) read with Section `11 (1), notwithstanding that these two periods may be consecutive, the proviso will not come into operation. The argument on behalf of the State no doubt supports the respondent No.1, but on an entirely different construction than the one which is canvassed on behalf of the respondent No. 1. On behalf of the respondent No. 1 what is contended is that the respondent No. no doubt held office for two terms, the first on being from 14-8-1962 to 12-8-1967, and the second one being from 21-6-1968 to 12-8-1972, but on a literal construction of the word "consecutive" these two terms cannot be said to be consecutive because the second did not succeed the first inasmuch as during the intervening period from 12-8-1967 to 21-6-1968 Dakhane was elected as the president and, therefore, there was a hiatus between the two terms during which the respondent No. 1 held office as President. We are, therefore, called upon to construe the meaning of the expression "held any such office for two consecutive terms" occurring in the first proviso to Section 42.

6. Now, when we come to Section 42, proviso, the question which needs to be considered is: When the proviso used the words or the phrase "any such office for two consecutive terms" was it intended by the Legislature that two consecutive terms must on the terms as a Councillor or as a president ? Section 42 s a whole deals with the subject of election of President and Vice-President. The proviso was no their is the original Bill but appears to have been put there by the Select Committee, and according to well established canons of construction, if there is no ambiguity we must construe the proviso by giving the words their grammatical meaning, and find the inanition of the Legislature in the section and the proviso as enacted by it. The proviso purports to debar a Councillor from being elected as president if he has held office as President for two consecutive terms. It is difficult to imagine that while dealing with the election of President a bar will be created not with reference to the consecutive periods or terms during which the councillor has held office as president but that the bar will be created with reference to holding office as a Councillor. The words "such office" clearly indicated that the Legislature contemplated that the subject of legislation under the proviso was a Councillor who had earlier held office as President. The earlier provisions quoted by us show that a person who is a Councilor has been described as a person holding the office of Councillor, and having regard to the words "he had held any such office", we have no doubt that the office with reference to the holding of which the bar was sought to be created against a Councillor was the office of president . Yet a further question arises whether the holding of such office is with reference to the term of office as councillor or it is with reference to the term of office as president as such, and it is here that the use of the word "for" becomes significant. The length of the period for which the holding of the office a s creating the bar for a fresh election is to be taken into consideration is indicated by the words "for two consecutive terms". In our view, the words "for two consecutive terms" clearly indicate the length of the period. the holding of the office of president during which acts as a bar for a Councillor to hold office as Presidient for a further period. There is not much dispute that when the Legislature used the words "two consecutive terms" , the terms must be successive, the second one following the first without a hiatus, though it is vehemently contended on behalf of petitioner shankarrao that in a given case a broken period may also become the consecutive period. We shall consider this argument a little later. In order to accept the contention which is raised on behalf of petitioner Shankarrao, we shall really have to read the words "as councillor" after the word "terms " in the first proviso to Section 42. Doing so would relay amount to legislating which is not permissible for the Court. The periods for which the President has held office as contemplated by the earlier parts are, in our view the only periods which are contemplated by the words "terms" in the first proviso to Section 42.

Now, the report from which the quotation is taken or on which the passage quoted above is based is not available. But even according to this authority it is not disputed that the word 'consecutive' is synonymous with 'successive' But what was observed in that passage is that in cases of contracts the words "consecutive days" must be given the meaning which the parties intended they should have. The Court in that case was contouring a contract which provided for publication in a paper for ten consecutive days and it was found that it was intended that the publication must be in consecutive numbers of the newspaper and though the newspaper was not published on Sunday, the publication in the newspaper on the following day it not cease to make the publication consecutive. Thus, so far as the act of publication in ten consecutive numbers of the paper was concerned, the publication was clearly consecutive because there was no publication of Sunday. The deed was, therefore, construed as providing for consecutive publication, though the words used were consecutive days. Ultimately, therefore the construction depended on the context in which the word "consecutive" was used and the intention which was gathered from the context itself. In the instant case, as we have already pointed out above, we have construed the word "term" as term of office as President, and if for the purpose of the proviso to Section 42 the second term of office as President has to be consecutive in the context of the earlier one, it must necessarily be an unbroken period of two consecutive terms of office as President. The passage relied upon is, therefore, of no assistance to the petitioners.

11. In view of the construction which we have placed, it is also not possible to accept the argument advanced by Mr. Palshikar on behalf of the other petitioner. A deeming fiction cannot be introduced by construction and it is the exclusive privilege of the Legislature to apply a deeming fiction in a given case. We cannot, therefore, by construction hold that for whatever length during the period of office as a Councillor holds the office of President, he must be deemed to have held the office of President for the entire term as a Councillor. It is difficult to imagine how when the actual holding of the office is contemplated - an office in which certain powers have to be exercised and functions performed, a Councillor can be fictional put into that office for a period longer than the one for which he had held that office. We must also reject the argument on behalf of the State, the unless a Councillor is President for two consecutive terms of five years each, the bar in the proviso to Section 42 will not operate. As we have already pointed out above, there may be cases in which a Councillor may not hold office as a Councilor for the entire period of five years, he may become a Councillor by being elected at a bye-election; and if that is so, irrespective of the fact that is so, irrespective of the fact that such a Councillor holds office as President for two consecutive terms, it will be contrary to the plain and grammatical meaning of the proviso to hold that the bar will not operate. In view of the construction which we have placed on the proviso, we must, therefore, hold that the second term of office of the respondent No. 1 as President from 21-6-1968 to 12=-8-1972 cannot be said to be a term which was consecutive with his first term from 14-8-1962 to 12-8-1967. It is no doubt likely that by bringing about an intervention of a short broken period between two fairly long terms as President, the object which is sought to be achieved by the legislature, namely, at least to see that a Councillor does not hold the office of President for too long a period, is likely to be defeated. But that again is matter for the legislature to consider. As the proviso stands today, it is impossible to take the view in the instant case that the respondent o. 1 was ineligible for being elected as President for the third term on the ground that he has held office as President for two consecutive terms as contemplated by the proviso to Section 42 of the Act. Both the petitions must, therefore, fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.