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38. Mr. P. K. Singh, however, contended that the Apex Court had not laid down that it would be actual , knowledge from which the limitation is to run. According to him, it had also included the constructive knowledge. Relying on paragraph 6 of the impugned order, he had pointed out that the petitioner had constructive knowledge with regard to the award on account of his being aware of the award in respect of plot No. 33 in the same proceeding. Therefore, the finding of the reference court that the petitioner's knowledge was to be counted from 17th April, 1989, cannot be sustained in view of the facts and circumstances of the case particularly, in view of the observation made by the Court in the order itself in paragraph 6. According to him, the conclusion arrived at in paragraph 7 does not conform to the reasoning given in paragraph 6 and as such, according to him, the said finding cannot be said to be a finding of fact free from perversity. Therefore, this Court sitting in revision had every jurisdiction to decline to accept the finding of fact of the lower (reference) court that the knowledge had started from 17th April, 1989, on account of this perversity, in view of the finding here-in-before, as well as the decision of the Apex Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), on account of the constructive knowledge of the award of the petitioner as is evident on her admission to the extent that she was aware of the award in respect of plot No. 33.

39. Before we embark upon to assess the contention of Mr. Singh, we may refer to the decision in the case of State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and another, AIR 1963 SC 1604, cited by Mr. Goyal, in this case, the decision in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra) was further clarified in the following words :

"It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandra's case. 1962 (1) SCR 676 ;A1R 1961 SC 1500 (supra) is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under Section 12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in Court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act, we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award. Looked at from that point of view, we do not think that it can be inferred from the petition dated December 24, 1954. that the respondents had knowledge of the award."

40. Thus, it is absolutely clear that the constructive knowledge does not mean mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If a notice is served under Section 12(2), then it may be said that the party had knowledge of the contents of the award. Similarly. If he is present then also he has knowledge of the contents of the award. Otherwise, it is very difficult to accept that the person had the knowledge of the award.

41. Coming back to the present case, it is an admitted position that the petitioner had obtained a certified copy of the award on 22nd April, 1989. Therefore, so far as the contents of the award is concerned, it can be said it would be from 22nd April, 1989. But then she had also contended that she came to learn about the award on 17th April. 1989, when she went to collect the award in respect of plot No. 33 which may also be taken to be a constructive knowledge of the award even with regard to the contents of the award. But then in the absence of any specific averments on the part of the opposite party or in the objection before the reference court or before this Court or in the absence of specific finding of the reference court to the extent that the petitioner had constructive knowledge of the contents of the award, this Court is not supposed to infer contrary to a concluded question of fact for arriving at a finding of fact on the basis of the observations made in paragraph 6 of the order. In as much as, the revisional court does not sit on appeal over the order impugned before it. It has to examine only as to whether the order suffers from any perversity or it suffers from any illegal exercise of jurisdiction or failure to exercise jurisdiction or any irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. Even if it is of a different opinion on the basis of the materials before it, it cannot interfere unless it comes to a finding that it suffers from perversity. Though there might be some reasoning in paragraph 6 but it is the conclusion on the basis of such reasoning, which is to be taken into account. The reasoning given in paragraph 6 is not such as to describe the conclusion arrived at in paragraph 6 as perverse. Having gone through the entire extent and text of the order and considering the totality of the same, I do not feel that there is any perversity to the extent. Mr. P. K. Singh had endeavoured to make out a case so as to interfere with the finding of the learned reference court with regard to the knowledge of the petitioner as on 17th April, 1989. Even on the basis of such reasoning, this Court may be of different, opinion still then it cannot be interfered with the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Court below. Therefore, I do find any reason to interfere with the finding of the learned Court below with regard to the conclusion that the petitioner had knowledge of the award dated 17th April, 1989. Thus, the period of limitation has to be calculated from the date of knowledge of the petitioner, i.e., 17th April. 1989, and the limitation would start running from that date and continue till six months from the said date. The reference was sought for on 3rd June, 1989 which was hardly a little more than six weeks and well within six months. As such even on merits, ft cannot be said that the reference was barred by limitations.