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1. The defendant in O.S.No. 454 of 1975 on the file of the City Civil Judge, Madras, is the petitioner in this revision. The respondent is the plaintiff decree-holder. The defendant admittedly was let into possession of the premises in question as a tenant. The tenancy was terminated and the plaintiff laid the suit for ejectment of the defendant. Apart from other contentions,, the defendant raised a plea that the suit for ejectment is not maintainable in view of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 hereinafter referred to as the Act. The plaintiff counteracted this defence of the defendant by stating that the building was completed only in March, 1970 and as per Section 30(i) of the Act, nothing in the Act shall apply to any building for a period of five years from the date on which the construction is completed and notified to the local authority concerned. The first Court countenanced this case of the plaintiff. The suit came to be heard in January, 1976 and was, in fact, disposed of on 19th January, 1976, and by that time, the five year period of exemption under Section 30(i) of the Act had lapsed. Hence, the defendant put forth a contention that a decree as such could not be passed. This contention of the defendant was also rejected by the first Court. The defendant appealed in A.S.No. 247 of 1976, which Was heard and disposed of by a Bench of this Court, consisting of Ramanujam and Sethuraman, JJ. The defendant repeated the very same contention that the period of exemption had lapsed and the inhibition with regard to eviction of tenants will come into play. The learned Judges considered it unnecessary at that stage to go into the question as to whether : any decree that may be passed in the suit is executable or not in view of the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, as that question will arise only at the stage of the execution after the decree is passed. The learned Judges expressing an opinion that the first court was in error in going into that question at that stage, set aside that finding of the court below, and without going into the question of the executability of the decree, the decree for ejectment was confirmed, leaving it open to the defendant to agitate the. same at the stage of execution. The appeal was ultimately dismissed. The plaintiff has levied execution in E.P.No. 2166 of 1981. of the decree for ejectment. The defendant, apart from contesting the execution for delivery of possession, took out E.A.No. 924 of 1982 under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure to declare that the decree passed in the suit is not executable in view of the provisions of the Act. The court below has dismissed E.A.No. 924 of 1982 -and consequently directed delivery of possession in E.P.No. 2166 of 1981. This revision is preferred against the order passed by the Court below in. E.A.No. 924 of 1982. The Court below relied on a pronouncement of Ratnam, J. in Arunachalam v. Kesavan Chetidar .

(a) Buildings constructed during the years 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963 are exempted from all the provisions of the said Act for a period of five years to be calculated from the dates of their completion, and.

(b) During the aforesaid period of exemption suits for ejectment of tenants in possession of those buildings were or are instituted in civil courts by the landlords against the tenants and decrees of ejectment were or are passed.

Section 13(1) of the Punjab Act stated that a tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of the Act or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of that section. The building in that case was completed in March, 1960 and the suit was filed on 14th January, 1963. However the decree for ejectment was obtained on 14th August, 1969. On 29th August, 1969 execution was levied, which was dismissed on the ground that the notification of exemption could not apply. The High Court in second appeal held that the decree was executable. The Supreme Court upheld this decision of the High Court. In that case, the suit, as stated above, was filed before the lapse of the period of exemption though the decree came to be passed after such lapse. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the decree having been passed after the lapse of the period of exemption, the exemption from the restrictions placed by Section 13 will not be available because not only the suit ought to have been filed, but the decree for eviction ought to have been obtained within the period of exemption. The Supreme Court pointed out that this contention on the face of it would lead to incongruity, or would it accepted have the effect of nullifying the very purpose for which the exemption was being given. The language of the notification was clear and what was exempted was the decree for ejectment of a tenant from the application of Section 13. Clause (b) of the notification prescribed a time during which a suit in which a decree could be passed should be filed. The decree passed in such suits were held by the Supreme Court to be executable free from the fetters imposed by Section 13. It was pointed out that the filing of the suit by itself did not confer any exemption because what was exempted from the provisions of Section 13 was the decree. The Supreme Court took note of the fact that the buildings constructed in 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963 had already been exempted from the provisions of Section 13 by two earlier notifications and found that the notifications granted exemption to decrees in suits filed within the period of exemption though the decrees came to be passed after the lapse of such period.

16. In Killick Nixon Ltd. v. V.R. Narayana Rao, Appeal No. 518 of 1973, Judgment dated 12th February, 1974 (1974)1 M.L.J.16 (S.N.) a Bench of this Court, consisting of Ramanujam and V. Ramaswami, JJ. dealt with a case where during the pendency of an appeal against a decree for ejectment, Section 30 of the Act was amended, limiting the exemption for new buildings for a period of five years only, in contract to the earlier permanent exemption of buildings constructed after the Act, and on the ground that the period of five years had lapsed, it was pleaded before the Bench that the decree ought to be set aside. The learned Judge held, following the earlier Bench pronouncements in Muhammad Sukri Sahib v. Madhava Kurupu (1949)1 M.L.J.376 : A.I.R.1949 Mad.809, Muhammadunny v. Melepurakkal Unniri (1949)1 M.L.J.452 : A.I.R.1949 Mad.765 and Thalai Vadivu Anandar v. Venugopala Chettiar that the provisions of the Act do not prevent the Civil Court from passing a decree for possession though it might not be possible to execute the same in view of the specific provisions contained in the Act, which enables a Controller to pass an order of eviction only on stated grounds. The learned Judges felt that it was unnecessary to go into the question of executability of the decree since, the validity of the decree is one thing and its executablity is another and the court while passing the decree is not concerned with the executability. Leaving open the question of executability of the decree to the execution proceedings, the learned Judges affirmed the decree for ejectment.

20. In Tottal Monthemmal Naidu v. Kottikkollan Edavaiath Nabeesa and another (1980)93 L.W. 202 Ratnam, J. dealt with a case where execution of a decree for. ejectment came to be levied after the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (1969) came into force. The decree in the first Court was obtained on 31st May, 1972, and the first appeal was dismissed on 17th November, 1973. The second appeal was dismissed by this Court on 7th November, 1977. The Pondicherry Act had come to be enforced to the area in question on 17th October, 1972. A contention that the suit itself was barred and the civil Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree In ejectment was negatived by this Court in second appeal, and the question as to whether reliance could be placed on the provisions of the Pondicherry Act was left open to the stage of execution of the decree. When the question was raised in execution, the tenant could not succeed and the executing Court held that the decree was one passed before the enforcement of the Act to the area in question, and that was no bar to the executability of the decree. On revision, Ratnam, J. after adverting to the pronouncement of the Bench of this Court in Thalai Vadivu, Anandar v. Venugopala Chettiar and of the Supreme Court in Balakrishna Rao v. Hajee Abdulla Sait held that the Pondicherry Act had come into force to the area in question long prior to the filing of the execution petition and at the time when the execution petition came to be dealt with by the executing Court, the bar against eviction of tenants except in accordance with the provisions of the Pondicherry Act had come into force and hence the decree in ejectment was not executable.