Bombay High Court
M/S.Kimberly-Clark Lever Private vs M.V. 'Eagle Excellence' on 13 August, 2008
Author: R.M.S.Khandeparkar
Bench: R.M.S.Khandeparkar, V.K.Tahilramani
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ADMIRALTY AND VICE ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
APPEAL NO.240 OF 2007
IN
NOTICE OF MOTION NO.2346 OF 2006
IN
ADMIRALTY SUIT NO.12 OF 2006
M/S.KIMBERLY-CLARK LEVER PRIVATE)
LTD., a Company incorporated )
under the Companies Act, 1956, )
and having its office at GAT )
Nos.934 to 937, Off Nagar Road, )
Village Sanaswadi, )
Taluka - Shirur, )
Dist. Pune - 412 208. ).. Appellants
(Org.Plaintiffs)
Vs.
M.V. 'EAGLE EXCELLENCE', )
a Foreign Flag Vessel presently )
at Nhava Sheva International )
Container Terminal along with )
her hull, tackle, machinery, )
engines, boats, apparel and )
other paraphernalia. )
All persons interested in the )
motor Vessel 'EAGLE EXCELLENCE'.).. Respondents
(Org.Defendants)
--
S/Shri Aspi Chinai, Senior Counsel with Janak
Dwarkadas, Senior Counsel, V.R.Dhond and Ashish
Kamath, Advocates i/by A.Mehata Lalji for the
Appellants.
Shri D.J.Khambata, Senior Counsel with Rahul
Narichania, K.R.Shriram and D'Souza, Advocates for the
Respondents.
--
CORAM : SRI R.M.S.KHANDEPARKAR &
SMT.V.K.TAHILRAMANI, JJ
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DATED : 13TH AUGUST, 2008
JUDGMENT :( PER SRI R.M.S.KHANDEPARKAR, J )
1. Heard at length the advocates for the parties.
Also perused the written submissions filed by the parties.
2. This appeal arises from the order dated 14th February, 2007 passed by the learned Single Judge in Notice of Motion No.2346 of 2006 in Admiralty Suit No.12 of 2006.
igBy the impugned order, the Notice Motion taken out by the respondents herein who are the of defendants in the said suit has been allowed and the bank guarantee No.3706 dated 15th June, 2006 for Rs.5,24,00,000/- furnished by the defendants is ordered to be returned to them for cancellation. The appellants are the original plaintiffs.
3. The ship m.v. Eagle Excellence was arrested pursuant to the ex parte order of arrest dated 9th June, 2006 passed in the said suit. The same was released under the order dated 11th June, 2006 upon the defendant No.1 entering appearance and furnishing bank guarantee. The plaintiffs have filed the said suit for recovery of the sum of Rs.5.15 crores and for ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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the arrest, sequestration, condemnation and sale of the defendant vessel. The claim for recovery of the amount has subsequently been amended to the tune of Rs.11,61,11,400/-.
4. On 28th July, 2006, the defendants herein took out a Notice of Motion No.2346 of 2006 praying for dismissal of the suit, rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and revocation of permission granted to the plaintiffs by the order dated 9th June, 2006, and in the alternative and the bank without prejudice to these prayers, for return of guarantee for its cancellation and in the alternative for reduction of the security to such sum as the Court may deem fit. The notice of motion was opposed by the plaintiffs raising various defences.
5. The learned Single Judge by the impugned order, while recording that the defendants were not pressing for the relief other than for release of bank guarantee furnished by them for securing release of the vessel, held that the plaintiffs have not made out any prima facie case in relation to claim for the damages and, therefore, while allowing the notice of motion made it absolute in terms of the prayer clause
(d) which relates to the return of bank guarantee to ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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the defendants for its cancellation.
6. The challenge to the impugned order is mainly on the ground that the plaintiffs, in a properly constituted admiralty action in rem filed against the defendant which is a foreign vessel, have the right to arrest the vessel and are entitled to keep the vessel under arrest and available for satisfaction of their claim, unless the defendants furnish sufficient security to cover the plaintiffs' suit claim and this aspect has been totally overlooked by the learned Single of Judge while granting the relief in the return of the bank guarantee for its cancellation, nature thereby ordering release of security. According to the plaintiffs, arrest of the foreign ship in admiralty suit is a mere procedure to obtain security to satisfy the claim made in the suit and the procedure to be followed in such cases is in accordance with the High Court Rules relating to the admiralty jurisdiction i.e. Rule 941 and are not guided by the provisions of Order 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure which deal with the action in personam. Unless the hopelessness of the plaintiffs' case is beyond doubt, the plaintiffs are entitled for security to be provided by the defendants in respect of the claim of the plaintiffs. Such an action has to ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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proceed for trial and in order that the decree which may be passed in favour of the plaintiffs may not be rendered futile or a paper decree, the plaintiffs are entitled to be secured by necessary security by the defendants in relation to the plaintiffs' claim and therefore, the learned Single Judge erred in ordering release of security.
7. On the other hand, it is the case of the defendants that there is no difference between the admiralty jurisdiction and ordinary original civil jurisdiction unliquidated of the High Court.
damages can get crystalised only when Besides, the a decree by the Court is passed in that regard and even in admiralty action, though the same commences as an action in rem, it continues in personam, once the owner of the vessel appears and submits to the jurisdiction, and therefore, the provisions of Order 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure are squarely attracted to such proceedings. The admiralty law does not permit excessive security even assuming that the provisions of Order 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted and the test to be applied is not reasonably arguable best case but the principle of strong triable case in order to insist for continuation of security by the defendants. ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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8. As regards the quantum of claim amount, it is the case of the plaintiffs that there was a calculation error on the part of the plaintiffs as regards the loss suffered and the same has been subsequently rectified by way of amendment. However, the security granted continues to be in terms of the unamended claim which is less than half of the claim in the suit. The documentary evidence placed along with the affidavit in reply to the notice of motion prima facie substantiate the claim made by the plaintiffs Judge in the suit. However, the learned erred in ignoring the same and this is apparent Single from the impugned order which discloses non analysis of the materials on record, even to find out prima facie case.
9. On the other hand, it is the case of the defendants that the claim for loss of profit is totally exaggerated and inflated for various reasons enumerated by them in their submissions and the defendants being the Carrier could be made liable for the loss of profit resulting from the damage to the cargo provided that the type of loss was within the knowledge of the parties as being likely to result at the time of contract and not otherwise. Neither there ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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are pleadings about any notice of any special loss having served upon the defendants nor that they disclose even an allegation that the same was within the knowledge of the defendants nor any evidence in that regard is placed on record. There is no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant No.1 inasmuch as that the plaintiffs are the holders of bill of ladding issued by Tri-Star who were the contracting party and undertook to carry and deliver the goods at the destination, while the bill of ladding disclosed Kimberly Clarke Philippines and not the plaintiffs plaintiffs are igas the disclosed shippers, as the and that consignees, the and Tri-Star Bill of Ladding was negotiated for payment under the L/C and was retired by the plaintiffs from the bank after payment of the value of the goods. The defendants B/L shows Tri-Star as the shipper clearly demonstrating the privity of contract between the defendants and Tri-Star. The plaintiff is not the holder of APL B/L but the Tri-Star B/L. The plaintiffs as well as their advocate issued notice claiming damages to Tri-Star. It is therefore evident that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant No.1.
10. While canvassing the argument that an ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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admiralty suit is an action in rem, the learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiffs has submitted that in a properly constituted admiralty action in rem against a foreign vessel, the plaintiff is, as a matter of right, entitled to arrest the vessel and to keep the vessel arrested and available for satisfaction of its claim till and untill the defendant furnishes and continues to furnish security to cover the plaintiff's claim in the suit substantiated by reasonably arguable best case. It is further sought to be contended on behalf of the plaintiffs to obtain that the arrest of ship is mere security to satisfy the judgment procedure to be passed and this right is available to the plaintiff even for the claim of damages. Attention is sought to be drawn to Rule 941 of the High Court (Original Side) Rules relating to the admiralty jurisdiction, while contending that normally the rules provided under Order 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure which deal with action in personam will have no application to such cases as those rules are quite different from the rules applicable to admiralty action in rem. If the security is released, the plaintiff in the admiralty suit will be left high and dry and the ultimate decree may result into a paper decree with no remedy to the plaintiff to recover money under the decree. While ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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strongly canvassing for applying the test of reasonably arguable best case in such cases, reliance is sought to be placed in the decisions in the matters of THE "YUTA BONDAROVSKAYA", reported in (1998)2 L L Rep 357 (QBD), of THE "CLARABELLE", reported in (2002)2 L L Rep 479 (NZ), M.V.Elisabeth and another v. M/s.Harwan Investment & Trading Co. and another, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1014, Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. M.V.Kapitan Kud and Others, reported in (1996)7 SCC 127, THE "MOSCHANTHY", reported in (1971)1 LL Rep 37, and THE "GULF VENTURE", reported in (1984)2 LL that Rep in 445 (QBD).
admiralty
It is also sought to be
actions in rem, the
reminded
proceedings
commence with the issue of a warrant of arrest and not a writ of summons, and reliance is sought to be placed in the matter of FREEMAN v. SS.CALANDA AND CAPT. YANOVSKY, reported in XXIV Bom.L.R.1167.
11. It is next contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that since a plaintiff is entitled to keep a ship under arrest, the plaintiff would also be entitled for the sufficient security to cover the amount of his claim with interest and costs on the basis of his reasonably arguable best case, in case the ship is to be released. Reliance is placed in the decision in the matter of Clarabelle's case (supra) as ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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well as in the matters of Moschanthy's case (supra), Gulf Venture's case (supra), and Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. M.V.Kapitan Kud and Others's case (supra).
(supra) The arrest of ship is a mere procedure to obtain security to satisfy judgment and the contention is sought to be made good by relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Elisabeth's case (supra). Again referring to the decision in Clarabelle's case (supra), it is contended that the Court must accordingly make sure that the plaintiff is not left without sufficient security to cover his suit claim.
To get
plaintiff
security to cover the plaintiffs' claim, has to merely show that his case the is reasonably arguable best case which is not bound to fail. So long as the plaintiffs' case is not bound to fail, so that he has arguable case, he would be entitled to have his claim duly secured by the defendants. The defendant, however, can certainly apply for stay or dismissal of such action on the ground that it has no chance of success, and therefore, vexatious. The Court should stay or dismiss action on the said ground when the hopelessness of the plaintiffs' claim is beyond doubt. If it is not beyond doubt, but on the contrary arguable even though a difficult case in fact and law, action should be allowed to proceed to trial. In that ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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regard, reliance is place in Moschanthy's case (supra) as well as Kapitan Kud's case (supra). It is further contended that unless the defendant pleads and establishes by motion, that the plaintiffs' case is not reasonably arguable best case i.e. that it is hopeless or bound to fail, the plaintiff would be entitled to security for his entire claim in the matter and the defendant thereafter would be required to produce evidence in support of his claim.
12. In the case in hand, the defendants did not press for the relief in terms of the prayers (a)
(b) of their notice of motion which were for rejection and of plaint and dismissal of suit. It is, therefore, the contention on behalf of the plaintiffs that the defendants did not seek dismissal of the plaintiff's suit because according to the defendants themselves, there is neither non-arguable case nor the case of the plaintiffs is hopeless nor it is bound to fail. By not pressing for the relief in terms of the prayers
(a) and (b), the defendants have conceded that the case is arguable one and the same is not hopeless. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' right to arrest the ship and their right to keep the ship under arrest unless their claim is duly secured does not stand challenged by the defendants, and the plaintiffs, therefore, are ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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entitled to proceed with their claim and hence the plaintiffs are entitled for sufficient security to cover the amount of their claim with interest and costs on the basis of their reasonably arguable best case. It is their further contention that admiralty jurisdiction differs from the original civil jurisdiction in which orders for arrest and attachment before judgment and security in lieu thereof can be passed only on making out a case under the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, therefore, sought to be contended that if ship is allowed to leave the shores of the difficult Indian igTerritorial waters, to get hold of it and it may not return it would be to the jurisdiction of Indian Courts and the claim thereby even if successful may remain unenforceable. It is their further case that if the defendants want dismissal of the suit, the defendants have to plead and establish that the suit or the plaintiffs' case is not arguable one, i.e., the same is plainly hopeless and bound to fail. If the defendants do not so contend and establish the same, then the plaintiffs are entitled for the security for their claim and for ascertaining whether the plaintiffs have a reasonably arguable case, it would be entirely inappropriate to analyse the evidence. In fact, the law does not envisage any assessment or analysis of evidence prior ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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to trial.
13. According to the plaintiffs, their claim is on both the counts, namely, for the damage caused to the machine as well as for loss of profits for the period when the machine could not be operated. The bills and invoices which have been placed on record by the plaintiffs clearly support the claim of expenditure to the tune of Rs.54 lakhs incurred between May, 2005 to September, 2005 on the repairs of the machine. The consignment received was of a second hand diaper making the machine.
original igImporting or replacement parts manufacturer for repairing the from damage caused during carriage would have cost much more than the amount spent and would have taken longer time to complete the repairs. The basis on which the loss of profit has been computed has been set out in the affidavit of their commercial manager which specifically relies on the registers and records. Based on the said records, the plaintiffs had computed the loss of production not at the rated capacity of the machine but at 30% of such capacity. But, due to a computation error, the plaintiffs initially claimed only an aggregate sum of Rs.5.24 crores and accordingly security has been furnished by the defendants only for that sum, though the correct claim ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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for loss of profits would exceed 11.46 crores. The plaintiffs have subsequently amended the claim to reflect the correct figures, but the security furnished in fact covers less than 50% of the plaintiffs' total claim.
14. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel appearing for the defendants has submitted that there is no difference between the admiralty jurisdiction and ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court and once the ship is arrested and the owner appears continue before ig the Court, the proceedings in the same manner as in any other have ordinary to suit irrespective of the fact that the admiralty action commences as an action in rem. Reliance is sought to be placed in the decisions in the matters of M.V.Elisabeth's case (supra), of M/s.CNA Peejay Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. M.V. Nikolay Maksinov & Ors., reported in AIR 1993 Bombay 286, m.v. MARINER IV, a Foreign Flag Vessel and another v. VIDESH SANCHAR NIGAM LTD., reported in 1998(1) Mh.L.J. 751, M.V.AL. Quamar v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd. and others, reported in AIR 2000 SC 2826, THE "POLO II", reported in (1977)2 LL Rep 115 (QBD), ATHENS SKY COMPANIA NAVIERA S.A. v. THE PORT SERVICES CORPORATION LTD. (THE "TRIBELS"), reported in (1985)1 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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Lloyd's Rep. 128, and of NHM INTERNATIONAL INC. and F.C.YACHTS LTD., reported in 2003 FCT 53 (CanLII). He has further submitted that even assuming that the plaintiffs are entitled to insist for any security, it cannot be excessive in nature. Besides that the material placed on record should reveal strong prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs and only to that extent the security can be asked for.
15. It is further sought to be contended on behalf of the defendant that the learned Single Judge has, on consideration found that the of the plaintiffs' case, claims made in the suit prima were facie not supported by any documentary evidence and had not been prima facie established. The suit is for unliquidated damages, alleged loss of profits claimed to have suffered during the period the machine was allegedly under repairs, and includes claim for alleged repair costs and the alleged insurance cost and surveyor's expenses. According to the defendants, there is no difference between the Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Ordinary Civil Jurisdiction of the High Courts. Admiralty jurisdiction is a part of the totality of jurisdiction vested in the High Court as a Superior Court of record and it is not a distinct and separate jurisdiction. Reliance is placed in the decisions in ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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the matters of CNA Peejay Exports (P) Ltd. v. m.v. Nikolay Mcksimor's case (supra), and m.v.Mariner v. VSNL's case (supra).
(supra) It is their contention that once a foreign ship is arrested, whether or not it is subsequently released against the security, the proceedings continue against the owner as in any other suit. The power of the High Court to render justice in admiralty matters includes the power to pass interlocutory orders for arrest and attachment before judgment. Though an admiralty action may commence as an action in rem, but it continues in personam once the The owner appears and submits to the Indian Courts are competent to pass orders in rem jurisdiction.
or in personam without drawing any distinction between the two. In support of this contention, reliance is placed in the decision of Elisabeth's case (supra). Referring to the decision in the matter of M.V.AL.Quamar's case (supra), it is sought to be contended that the Code of Civil Procedure applies to the admiralty jurisdiction and further that the provisions of Code are not restricted to the matters post arrest thereof or in personam part of an admiralty action.
16. It is also sought to be contended on behalf of the defendant that the decision in FREEMAN'S case ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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(supra) sought to be relied upon by the plaintiffs is not an authority for proposition that the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply to the actions in rem.
The said decision, according to the defendants, merely holds that admiralty cases started with a warrant for arrest of a ship and not with a writ of summons and to that extent the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply, and to read anything beyond that would render the law laid down by the Apex Court in Al Quamar's case (supra) to be not a good law. In this regard, attention is drawn to Rules 928 and 966 of the Bombay High Court (Original Side) Rules.
17. It is further contention on behalf of the defendants that the suit being one for unliquidated damages, it would get crystalised only on adjudication and determination of the claim by the Court and before that there is no subsisting liability that can be presumed. Reliance is placed in the decision in the matter of Iron & hardware (India) Co. v. Firm Shanalal & Bros., reported in AIR 1954 Bom. 423 as well as in an unreported judgment in the matter of Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc in Appeal No.70 of 2003 delivered on 30th April, 2004 of a Division Bench of this Court while contending that the Division Bench, after considering the decision in ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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Kapitan Kud's case (supra),
(supra) has held that the claim
for unliquidated damages, the particulars thereof
would have to be established on evidence and the Court would not pass any interlocutory order for attachment or security in relation to such a claim, despite the fact that the defendant in the case is a foreigner.
18. With reference to the arguments advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs regarding reasonably arguable best case, a test to be followed in such matters, it is sought to be contended on behalf of the defendants that not the Apex Court in Kapitan Kud's case (supra) did accept the test of reasonably arguable best case being different from a strong prima facie case, inspite of the fact that the Apex Court was cognizant of the fact that the admiralty jurisdiction was a part of the original civil jurisdiction and in fact after analysing the evidence on record, the plaintiffs were found to have a strong triable case against the vessel, and on that basis, the Apex Court ordered security to be furnished. It is further contention on behalf of the defendants that the test of reasonably arguable best case does not set a standard lower than the prima facie case test. The plain meaning of the term "reasonably arguable best case" is that the case which excels all others or which is the most ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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outstanding and which is at least reasonably arguable. Even if one were to apply the test of "reasonably arguable best case" as a test distinct from the standard test of strong prima facie case, it is the contention on behalf of the defendants that the parties cannot arrest a ship for exorbitant claim and the Court can never sanction such a course. Besides that even where there is a reasonably arguable best case, the Court has to consider the plaintiffs' case, and only after embarking necessary inquiry in that regard, the Court can arrive at a proper conclusion to justify order of security.
19. As regards the alleged cost of repairs is concerned, it is sought to be contended on behalf of the defendants that the nature and extent of the alleged physical loss and/or damage to the machine is unsubstantiated and highly inflated with a view to have wrongful gain and that is revealed from the Survey Report filed before the learned Single Judge. It is further contention of the defendants that the plaintiffs deliberately did not give the defendants an opportunity to inspect and ascertain what parts of the machine required repairs and what parts of the machine required replacement. Since the plaintiffs had two other diaper making machines, it is quite possible ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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that under the guise of replacement of parts to the said machine, the plaintiffs might have imported parts for the other two diaper making machines. In relation to the replacement of spare parts, it is sought to be contended on behalf of the defendants that several of the spares allegedly procured for machine were admittedly received after 1st October, 2005 i.e. after the machine was commissioned and up and running, and therefore, it is evident that the spares were not used for the said machine. It is their further contention that the analysis of Exhibit K-1 would show that used only Rs.3,18,360/- worth of parts were allegedly from the available stock and that Rs.30,47,872/-
worth were procured from 1st October, 2005. According to the defendants, the claim for the alleged cost of repairs is false. As regards the insurance claim, it is the contention on behalf of the defendants that the defendant by its advocate's letter dated 28th June, 2006 had called upon the plaintiffs' advocate to furnish copies of the correspondence exchanged with the Insurance Company. However, the plaintiffs' advocate by their letter dated 8th July, 2006 gave evasive reply stating that as and when they receive documents they would revert to the defendants and till date, they have not complied with the defendants' request. It is therefore evident that the plaintiffs ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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are suppressing material facts and documents from this Court. As regards the alleged loss of profit, it is the contention on behalf of the defendants that the plaint nowhere gives any particulars of claim of loss of profit. The pleadings in the plaint nowhere disclose any basis for such claim. At the time of obtaining the order of arrest, there was no material or basis for the claim of loss of profit before this Court. No material was produced before the learned Single Judge to prove the loss of profit claim. The said two affidavits filed on behalf of the plaintiffs contained According to bald the and unsubstantial defendants, there is no statements.
tangible evidence to establish loss of profit. It is their further case that such a claim for loss of profit is clearly bogus, exaggerated and inflated as the machine was a second hand machine obviously having low productivity; there were two other machines to produce the diapers to make up for any shortfall in supply, if any; there is no material or evidence in the form of manuals etc. to establish the production output or rated capacity of the second hand machine; and the profit margin of 43% on diaper business is clearly exaggerated, inflated and ignores the demand in the market, competition from other brands, besides to ascertain the loss of profit only net profit can be ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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considered and not the gross profit. The plaintiffs deliberately claimed grossly inflated amounts.
20. Referring to Section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872 and the concept on special damages, it is sought to be contended that a carrier is only liable for loss of profit resulting from damage to cargo provided the type of loss was within the knowledge of the parties as being likely to result at the time of the contract. It is therefore vital to identify the knowledge of the carrier at the time of entering into the contract of carriage.
notice There are no pleadings in the plaint of any special loss was given to or was within that the knowledge of the defendant, and it is settled law that no evidence can be led on a plea not taken in the pleading. The absence of an averment that the loss was within the knowledge of the carrier militates against the plaintiffs' right to claim loss of profit. According to the defendants, under the Indian Law, the loss of profit would be special damages and unless and until the notice is given to that effect, such damages would not be recoverable. When the goods are lost, and in consequence, the plaintiffs lose the profit which he could have earned, the value of the lost goods can be recovered but not any loss of profit in the absence of proper notice. Reliance is placed in ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Union of India v. The Steel Stock Holders Syndicate, Poona, reported in AIR 1976 SC 879 as also in the decision of the High Court in the matter of G.A.Jolli v. The Dominion of India, reported in AIR 1949 Calcutta 380, Jagannath Chetram v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1966 Calcutta 540, Union of India v. Hari Mohan Ghosh, reported in AIR 1990 Guwahati 14, and Janatha Tourist Corporation v. Indo U.S. Wire Casting Limited, reported in AIR 2002 Karnataka 65.
21. of As regards non pressing of the relief in terms prayers (a) and (c) in the notice of motion, it is sought to be contended on behalf of the defendants that it is of no consequence and is not relevant to decide the question of security or whether the test of prima facie case or a reasonably arguable best case would apply.
22. It is then sought to be contended on behalf of the defendant that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the Defendant and the suit itself is not maintainable. The plaintiffs are the holders of Bill of Ladding dated 14th March, 2005 issued by Tri-Star who were the contracting party to deliver the goods at the destination. The Tri-Star ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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Bill of Ladding infact shows that Kimberly Clarke Philippines as the Shippers and the plaintiffs as the Consignees. The Tri-Star was negotiated for payment under the Letter of Credit and was retired by the plaintiffs from the bank after payment of the value of the goods. The defendants' Bill of Ladding dated 13th March, 2005 shows Tri-Star as the Shipper clearly demonstrating the contract or privity between the respondent and Tri-Star. It is further contended that the plaintiffs are not the holders of the APL Bill of Ladding but of the Tri-Star Bill of Ladding. The 2005 plaintiffs, therefore, issued notice dated 28th April, and the advocate's notice dated 1st March, 2006 to Tri-Star claiming damages from Tri-Star. Thus, it is evident that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the Respondent No.1. In the absence of privity of contract, the plaintiffs cannot claim any action based on the contract against the defendants.
23. It is also sought to be contended on behalf of the defendant that the learned Single Judge has assessed the materials on record and has come to the conclusions that there is no document on record to prove loss of profit but only affidavits and mere affidavits are not sufficient; there is no joint ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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survey held nor tenders were invited and the plaintiffs do not have a prima facie case for damages. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox P.Ltd., reported in 1990 Supp. SCC 727, it is submitted that the Appeal Court should be slow in interfering with exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge and shall not substitute its own discretion and hence applying the said rule to the case in hand, it is the case of the defendants that there is no case for interference in the impugned order.
24. In the admiralty suits, are the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure attracted ? Is the Admiralty jurisdiction different from civil jurisdiction ? What should be the approach of the Court in the admiralty suits when the respondent, whose vessel has been released on furnishing the security, approaches the Court for release of such security on the ground that the suit claim does not warrant continuation of the security ? Is it the test of reasonably arguable best case as sought to be contended on behalf of the plaintiffs or is it the test of strong triable case or prima facie case to be applied while dealing with such matters ? Are these two tests different from each other ? Whether the plaintiffs have reasonably ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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arguable best case or have made out a prima facie case for compelling the defendant to keep the security for the plaintiffs' claim alive and enforceable till the disposal of the suit ? Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, continuation of security furnished by the defendant is warranted and justified? These are the points for determination which arise in this appeal.
25. The m.v.Elisabeth's case (supra), the defendant had moved an application before the High Court raising jurisdiction ig preliminary objection of the Court to try the suit in exercise to the of admiralty jurisdiction. The sole contention on the issue of jurisdiction was as regards the lack of admiralty jurisdiction to any Court in Andhra Pradesh or any other State in India to proceed in rem against the ship on the alleged cause of action concerning carriage of goods from an Indian Port to a foreign port. The Apex Court, after taking into consideration the provisions of Admiralty Court Act, 1861, Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, Colonial Courts of Admiralty (India) Act, 1891, Andhra Pradesh State Act, 1953, the State Reorganisation Act, 1956, Government of India Act 1915, Government of India Act, 1935, Charters of 1774 and 1798, Letters Patent of 1823, ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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1862 and 1865, Indian Independence Act, 1947, the provisions of the High Court Act, 1981, those of Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 and 1979, various commentaries on the Law of Admiralty, provisions of Constitution of India, the decisions in the matters of Kamalakar Mahadev Bhagat v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., AIR 1961 Bombay 186, Mrs.Sahida Ismail v.
Petko R.Salvejkov, AIR 1973 Bombay 18, Jayaswal Shipping Company v. S.S.Leelavati, AIR 1954 Calcutta 415,, Rungta Sons Pvt.Ltd. v. S.S.Edison Mariner, (1962) 66 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1083, Smt.Reena Padhi v.
Jagdhir, AIR 1982 Orissa 57, National Co.Ltd. Asia Mariner, (1968) 72 Calcutta Weekly Notes 635, The v.
Yuri Maru v. The Waron, 1927 AC 906, the United States v. Big Malek Adhel, 43 US (2 How) 210 (1844), and Currie v.M.Knight, (1897) AC 97, Bardot v. The American Ship or Vessel 'Augusta' (1873) 10 Bombay High Court Reports 110, held that where statutes are silent and remedy has to be sought by recourse to basic principles, it is the duty of the Court to devise procedural rules by analogy and expediency. Actions in rem were resorted to by courts as a devise to overcome the difficulty of personal service on the defendant by compelling him to enter appearance and accept service of summons with a view to furnishing security for the release of the res; or, in his ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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absence, proceed against the res itself, by attributing to it a personality for the purpose of entering a decree and executing the same by sale of the res. This is a practical procedural device developed by the courts with a view to rendering justice in accordance with substantive law not only in cases of collision and salvage, but also in cases of other maritime liens and claims arising by reason of breach of contract for the hire of vessels or the carriage of goods or other maritime transactions, or tortuous acts, such as conversion or negligence occurring Where in substantive connection with the carriage of law demands justice for the goods.
party aggrieved, and the statute has not provided the remedy, it is the duty of the court to devise procedure by drawing analogy from other systems of law and practice. It was further held that it is likewise within the competence of the appropriate Indian Courts to deal, in accordance with the general principles of maritime law and the applicable provisions of statutory law, with all persons and things found within their jurisdiction. The power of the court is plenary and unlimited unless it is expressly or by necessary implication curtailed. Obviously the Apex Court was referring to the powers of the High Court and that is further clear from the paragraph 67 of the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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judgment in m.v.Elisabeth's case (supra), (supra) which reads that :-
"The High Courts in India are superior courts of record. They have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to determine their own powers."
26. The Apex Court disapproved the view taken by this Court in Jayaswal Shipping Company's case (supra), Kamalakar Mahadev Bhagat's case (supra), Mrs.Sahida Ismail's case (supra), as also of Calcutta High Court in Rungta Sons Pvt.Ltd.'s case (supra), Asia Mariner's case (supra), (supra) as also of Orissa High Court in Smt.Reena Padhi's case (supra) whereby the High Courts had taken a restrictive view of the courts' admiralty jurisdiction by limiting it to what was permitted by the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 and the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890. Referring to the view taken in the said cases by the High Courts, it was held that it was an unjustified abdication of jurisdiction and a self-assumed fetter on competence ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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to render justice.
27. It was clearly held by the Apex Court in m.v.Elisabeth's case (supra) that the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court is dependent on the presence of the foreign ship in Indian waters and founded on the arrest of that ship and this jurisdiction can be assumed by the concerned High Court, whether or not the defendant resides or carries on business, or the cause of action arose wholly or in part, Once a within foreign the local limits of ship is arrested its within jurisdiction.
the local
limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, and the
owner of the ship has entered appearance and furnished security to the satisfaction of the High Court for the release of the ship, the proceedings continue as a personal action. It was further held that the admiralty jurisdiction is an essential aspect of judicial sovereignty which under the Constitution and the laws is exercised by the High Court as a superior court of record administering justice in relation to persons and things within its jurisdiction. Power to enforce claims against foreign ships is an essential attribute of admiralty jurisdiction and it is exercised over such ships while they are within the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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jurisdiction of the High Court by arresting and detaining them.
28. The Apex Court in m.v.Elisabeth's case (supra) further ruled that :-
"The British statute assimilating Indian High Courts to the position of the English High Court in respect of admiralty jurisdiction is an enabling legislation and it is but one of the strands of jurisdiction vested in the High Court by provisions.
virtue
The
of the
jurisdiction
constitutional
of the High
Court is governed by the Constitution and the
laws, and the continuance in force of the
existing laws is not a fetter but an
additional source of power. Access to court
for redressal of grievance being an important
right of every person, it is essential that
the jurisdiction of the courts is construed
harmoniously and consistently with its vital
function in that respect, so that absence of
legislation will not jeopardise that right. Admiralty jurisdiction, despite the peculiarities of its origin and growth- rooted ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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as it is in history and nurtured by the growing demands of international trade - is nevertheless a part of the totality of jurisdiction vested in the High Court as a superior court of record, and it is not a distinct and separate jurisdiction as was once the position in England before the unification of courts. The 1890 and 1891 Acts specifically conferred admiralty jurisdiction on the Indian High Courts by reason of their being courts of unlimited jurisdiction. These Acts jurisdiction, did not create any separate or but merely equated the distinct Indian High courts to the position of the English High Court (united and consolidated as that court has been since 1875) for the exercise of admiralty powers within the jurisdiction of the former. The contrary view expressed in some of the decisions of the High Courts referred to earlier is clearly wrong. Once a foreign ship is arrested in Indian waters by an order of the High Court, in exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction vested in it by statute, or inherent in it as a court of record, in respect of any maritime claim ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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against its owner, wherever the cause of action may have arisen, and whether or not the ship is subsequently released by the owner furnishing security, proceedings must continue against the owner as in any other suit. The arrest of the vessel while in Indian waters by an order of the concerned High Court, as defined under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 (Section 3(15)) attracts the jurisdiction of the competent court to proceed with the trial, as in the case of any other suit, as an action against the ig the owner, and any decree obtained by plaintiff is executable against any property of the owner available within jurisdiction, including the security furnished by him for release of the vessel."
(Emphasis supplied)
29. In M.V.AL.Quamar's case (supra), the respondent No.2 before the Supreme Court had suffered a foreign decree passed by the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Admiralty Court, England in monetary terms by way of damages for breach of contract for salvaging and towing the vessel "M.V.AI Tabish"
alleged, renamed as "M.V.AI Quamar". The respondent ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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No.1-company who was the decree-holder, having come to know about the anchoring of the said ship at Vishakhapatanam filed an execution petition invoking Section 44-A of the Civil Procedure Code for arrest and detention of the ship and for recovering the decretal amount from Respondent No.2 judgment-debtor on the ground that it had obtained a foreign money decree from competent Admiralty Court against Respondent No.2, who was the owner of the said res M.V.Al Tabish. By an ad-interim order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the ship in question was attached and further was lying detained in Visakhapatnam Port awaiting orders of the Court. At that stage, the matter was carried before the Apex Court and the short question which arose for consideration was whether the execution proceedings were maintainable before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh as an executing Court for enforcing the foreign decree passed by the English Admiralty Court by attachment and sale of the said vessel. The submissions on behalf of the appellant were that the invocation of Section 44A of the C.P.C. by the decree-holder of a decree passed by the Admiralty Court was misconceived as the said provision gets excluded by Section 112(2) of the C.P.C. and in the alternative, it was sought to be contended that even assuming that the said provision applies on the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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facts of the said case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court was not a competent Court which could have entertained such execution proceedings under Section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. While dealing with the main contention about non-applicability of Section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure to the proceedings by virtue of Section 112(2) thereof, the Apex Court held that "the bar of Section 112(2) operates within and is confined to the question of "appeals to the Supreme Court" neither can it go backward to any other Parts from I-VI nor can it go forward and touch upon any other of the C.P.C."
subsequent provisions found in Parts VIII to XI It was also held that there was no general exception or exclusion of the entire body of Code to admiralty jurisdiction. On the contrary, Section 140 which is found in Part XI dealing with "miscellaneous provision" clearly indicates that it is not the legislative intent to exclude the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure to admiralty jurisdiction whether original or appellate. In this regard, while dealing with the submission in the alternative, the Apex Court referred to a decision of this High Court in The Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company Ltd. v. Shepherd and Haji Ismail Hossein, (1888) ILR 12 Bom 237. In the said case, it was held by this Court that:-
::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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"The rules regulating admiralty practice provide that a suit shall be commenced by a plaint according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. They were framed when the Code of 1859 was in force, and when the power of the Court to regulate its procedure was more extended than it is at present. The rules subsequent to the one abovereferred to, provide for the taking out of a warrant of arrest when the suit is in rem, and make no special personam;
ig provision
but Rule
when the
54
suit
directs
is in
that
proceedings not provided for by the rules
shall be regulated by the rules and practice
of the High Court in suits brought in it in
the exercise of its ordinary original civil
jurisdiction. Though these rules do not
apparently contemplate a suit in rem and in
personam being combined, they do not expressly or by necessary implication forbid it. The Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 applies to proceedings on the Admiralty side of the High Court; Section 645-A shows that this is so."
( Emphasis supplied ) ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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While approving the said view taken by this Court, the Apex Court ruled that:-
"On the wake of the aforesaid, we are unable to record our concurrence pertaining to the exclusion of the Code in Admiralty jurisdiction. Significantly, the Admiralty Rules of the High Court at Madras, which stand adopted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in no uncertain terms also negate the submission in support of the appeal."
(Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court also referred to some of the Admiralty Rules which were framed by the Madras High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court and made a specific reference to Rules 2, 29, 32, 34 and 50 thereof.
30. Referring to Rules 2, 29, 32, 34 and 50 of the Madras High Court Admiralty Rules, the Apex Court in M.V.AL Quamar's case (supra) clearly observed that the said rules having co-relation with the ordinary civil jurisdiction cannot be said to be subscribing to a view contra to that was canvassed before the Apex Court. It was further held that Section 112(2) does ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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not render the Code inapplicable to Admiralty cases, and in that respect, the decision of Our High Court in Shepherd and Haji Ismail Hossein's case (supra) was specifically approved whilst ruling that:-
"The Bombay High Court in (1888) ILR 12 Bom 237 (supra) has thus came to the conclusion that the Code of civil Procedure of 1882 applies to proceedings on the admiralty side of the High Court and Section 645-A (presently Section 140) shows the same. We record our concurrence with the observation of the Bombay High Court in (1888) 12 Bom 237 (supra) and approve the same in that regard."
(Emphasis supplied) It was further held that :-
"a recent decision of this Court in the case of Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. M.P.Kapitan Kud, (1996)7 SCC 127 also lends concurrence to the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure in admiralty action."
(Emphasis supplied) ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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31. The said Rules 2, 29, 32, 34 and 50 of the Madras High Court Admiralty Rules are similar to Admiralty Rules No.928, 935, 938, 957 and 966 respectively of our High Court. Rule 2 of the Madras High Court Admiralty Rules provides that "a suit shall be instituted by a plaint drawn up, subscribed and verified according to the provisions of the Code save that if the suit is in rem, the defendants, may subject to such variation as the circumstances may require, be described as "the owners and parties interested in" the vessel or other property proceeded against instead of by name."
32. If we peruse the rules framed by our High Court under Part III of the Original Side Rules under the Caption "Admiralty Jurisdiction, the rules for regulating the procedure and practice in cases brought before the High Court under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 (53-54 Victoria CH.27)," and in particular Rule 928 thereof, it provides that a suit shall be commenced by a plaint signed and verified according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which is though not in paramateria with the Rule 2 of the Admiralty Rules of the Madras High Court, it contains all the requirements of the said Rules.
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33. Rule 29 of the Madras High Court Admiralty Rules provides that an attorney instituting a suit against any property in respect of which a Caveat has been entered in the register of Admiralty suits shall forthwith serve a copy of the plaint upon the party on whose behalf the Caveat has been entered or upon his attorney. The provisions of Rule 935 of our High Court Admiralty Rules provide that any person instituting a suit against any property in respect of which a Caveat has been entered in the "Caveat Warrant Book"
thereof shall, before filing the plaint, serve a upon the party on whose behalf the Caveat has copy been entered or upon his Advocate and annex to the plaint a statement of such service, which is similar to the Rule 29 of the Madras High Court Admiralty Rules.
34. Rule 32 of the Madras High Court Admiralty Rules provides that if when the suit comes before the Court it is satisfied that the claim is well founded, it may pronounce for the amount which appears to be due and may enforce the payment thereof by order and attachment against the party on whose behalf the Caveat has been entered and by the arrest of the property if it then be or thereafter come within the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
- 41 -
jurisdiction of the Court. As against the said Rule, Rule 938 of our High Court Admiralty Rules provides that when the suit comes before the Court, if the Court is satisfied that the claim is well founded, it may pronounce judgment for the amount which appears to be due, and may enforce the payment thereof by order and attachment against the party on whose behalf the Caveat has been entered, and by the arrest of the property if it then be or thereafter come within the jurisdiction of the Court, which would disclose to be similar to the Rule 32 of the Madras High Court Admiralty Rules.
35. Rule 34 of the Madras High Court Admiralty Rules provides that every sale under decree of the court, shall, unless the Judge shall otherwise order, be made by the Sheriff in like manner as a sale of movable property in execution of a decree in an ordinary civil suit. Rule 957 of our High Court Admiralty Rules provides that every sale under the decree of the Court shall, unless the Judge shall otherwise order, be made by the Sheriff in like manner as a sale of movable property in execution of a decree in an ordinary civil suit, and the Sheriff shall be entitled to receive the same fees and poundage as he would be entitled to in such a case, which is also ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
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almost similar to the Rule 34 of the Madras High Court Admiralty Rules.
36. Rule 50 of the Madras High Court Admiralty Rules provides that where no other provision is made by these rules, proceedings in suits brought in the Court in the exercise of its Admiralty Jurisdiction shall be regulated by the Rules and Practice of the Court in suits brought in it in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. Rule 966 of our High Court Admiralty Rules in no uncertain terms provide the matter that "the rules and practice of the Court of suits and proceedings on the Original in Side of the Court shall, if not inconsistent with the rules in this part, apply to suits and proceedings on the Admiralty Side of the Court." Both the Rules disclose applicability to the Admiralty Suits of the Rules applicable to the suits and proceedings on the Original Side of this Court.
37. In M/s.M.V.Nikolay Maksinov's case (supra), an appeal was preferred by the original plaintiff to challenge the judgment dated 5th February, 1990 in Admiralty Suit No.8 of 1980 wherein it was held that the Admiralty Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit and thereupon the plaint was ordered ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
- 43 -
to be returned for presentation to the proper Court, that is this Court under its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. In appeal, this Court, considering the undisputed facts in the matter that the consignment or part thereof was loaded on board of defendant vessel and carried up to the Port of Naples, held that the claim for damages against the vessel when it arrives in Port of Bombay was perfectly entertainable by the Admiralty Court, and ruled that the distinction between the admiralty jurisdiction and civil jurisdiction of this Court has disappeared after the decision order of the Supreme Court and of return of plaint was not sustainable.
consequently the
This
Court was referring to the decision of the Apex Court
in m.v.Elisabeth's case (supra).
38. In m.v.Mariner's case (supra), dealing with the matter arising out of admiralty action, the Apex Court held that the rules on Admiralty Jurisdiction in Part III were framed by Bombay High Court to regulate the procedure and practice thereof on the original side of the Bombay High Court. Equally, Original Side Rule 941 is relevant in this regard which provides that party applying under the said rule in a suit in rem for arrest of the property should give an undertaking in writing or through an advocate to pay ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
- 44 -
such sum by way of damages as the court may award as compensation in the event of a party affected sustains prejudice by such order. Further referring to its earlier decision in Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation, reported in (1995)3 SCC 33, it was observed that even in case of civil court exercising its power under Order 39 Rule 1, it has been held that while granting interim injunction, the civil court or appellate court is enjoined to impose as a condition that in the event of the plaintiff failing to prove the case set up and if damages are caused by to the defendant due to the injunction granted the court, the court would first ascertain whether the plaintiff would adequately be compensated by damages if injunction is not granted and equally the court should also impose condition for payment of damages caused to the defendant in the same proceeding without relegating the parties for a separate suit. The Apex Court in that respect also referred to the Rules 952 and 954 of Part III of the High Court Original Side Rules.
39. Undoubtedly, the rules framed regarding admiralty jurisdiction in Part III of the High Court (Original Side) Rules deal with the matters relating to the admiralty action. Rule 927(7) thereof defines ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
- 45 -
the suit to mean any suit, action or other proceeding instituted in the Court in its Admiralty Jurisdiction. As already stated above, the Rule 928 provides that the suit shall be commenced by a plaint signed and verified according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
40. Rule 941 of the High Court (Original Side) Rules is in relation to the application to arrest property in a suit in rem. It provides that if the suit is in rem an application for the arrest of the property in proceeded against shall be made to the Judge Chambers and shall be supported by affidavit. The affidavit shall state the nature of the claim and that it has not been satisfied. It shall also state the nature of the property to be arrested and if the property is a ship, the name and nationality of the ship. There shall be annexed to the affidavit a certificate of the Prothonotary and Senior Master certifying that search has been made in the Caveat Warrant Book and that no caveat has been filed against the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the said property. A party applying under the said rule has to give undertaking in writing, either himself or through his Advocate, to pay such sum by way of damages as the Court may award as compensation in the event of a ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:21 :::
- 46 -
party affected sustaining prejudice by such order.
41. Rule 946(1) of the High Court (Original Side) Rules provides that in a suit in rem the Writ of Summons or the warrant of arrest shall be served on the property against which the suit is brought. Sub-rule (2) provides that whether the property is ship or cargo on board, service shall be effected by affixing the original Writ of Summons or the warrant of arrest for a short time on any mast of the ship or on the outside of any suitable part of the ship's superstructure, affixed ig and leaving a duplicate in its place, when removing the original Writ thereof of Summons or the warrant of arrest.
42. Rule 948 of the High Court (Original Side) Rules provides that in a suit in rem if the property proceeded against has been arrested, the plaintiff may, at any time after service of the Writ of Summons upon the defendant, apply to the Court by Notice of Motion for an order that the arrested property be sold by the Sheriff and the sale proceeds be paid into the registry to the credit of the suit. The Court may make such order on the application as it may think fit.
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- 47 -
43. In terms of Rule 952 of the High Court (Original Side) Rules, a property once arrested under a warrant cannot be released unless notice is given to the person who has filed a Caveat. Rule 954 thereof deals with the subject of arrest of property and it provides that subject to the provision of Rule 952, the property arrested under a warrant may be ordered to be released either at the request of the plaintiff, before an appearance in person or a vakalatnama is filed by the defendant, or on the defendant paying into Court the amount claimed in the suit, or on the defendant in giving such security for the amount claimed the suit as the Court may direct, or on any other ground that the Court may deem just.
44. As already stated above, the Rule 966 of the High Court (Original Side) Rules provides that the rules and practice of the Court in the matter of suits and proceedings on the original side of the Court shall, if not in consistent with the rules in the said Part-III, apply to suits and proceedings on the Admiralty Side of the Court.
45. The above referred rules in the Part-III of the Original Side Rules framed by our High Court in relation to the admiralty jurisdiction, apparently ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
- 48 -
disclose that though a suit in rem is to be commenced in the same manner as any ordinary suit commences by filing a plaint in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, once the plaint is lodge, the procedure to be followed is not the one prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedures. The peculiar characteristic of a suit in rem filed against a foreign ship on the Admiralty Side are clearly revealed from the Rules 941 and 954 of the High Court (Original Side) Rules. The former rule clearly empowers the Court to proceed to issue warrant of arrest on the basis of an affidavit filed stating the nature of the claim and the fact that the same has not been satisfied. It also clarifies that such a procedure is available in a suit for damages provided that the plaintiff has to give an undertaking by itself or through its advocate that in case a party affected sustaining prejudice by the said order of arrest, it would be duly compensated. The latter rule requires the defendant either to pay into the Court the amount claimed in the suit or to furnish security for such amount in order to get arrested property released.
46. It is, however, pertinent to note that the Rule 941 clearly speaks of an application for arrest ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
- 49 -
in a suit in rem. It does not speak of an application independently of a suit. The term 'suit' obviously refers to the one instituted in the Court in its Admiralty Jurisdiction which is clear from Rule 927(7). Such a suit should necessarily commence by filing a plaint satisfying the requirement of rules of pleading prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure.
In addition, the application for arrest has to be
supported by an affidavit disclosing the nature of
claim and the fact that it has remained unsatisfied
till the time of filing of the application for arrest
of the property.
ig That apart, the applicant has
to give undertaking to pay damages in the event of the also party, whose property is to be arrested, in case the defendant on the property sustains prejudice by such arrest. The Apex Court in Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd.'s case (supra), (supra) after considering Rule 941 and while comparing it under the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and reiterating its decisions in m.v.Elisabeth's case (supra), (supra) Asiatic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.'s case (supra), and considering the decisions in Moschanthy and Elefterio's cases (supra), held that "therefore the admiralty action is an action in rem, it is necessary for the plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case in relation to his right in admiralty action." Once it is ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
- 50 -
clear that the High Court in its original jurisdiction is empowered to frame rule in relation to the procedure to be followed in the matters placed before it, including for the admiralty cases, and has actually framed such rules, then those rules need to be followed.
47. It is, thus, clear that though the admiralty suit commences as the suit in rem, once the owner of a ship appears before the Court and furnishes the security, the suit partakes the nature of the one in personam. It is also clear that in relation to admiralty suits, the provisions of original side rules the particularly in Part III would apply but in cases where such rules are silent, other provisions under the Original Side Rules, and in the absence thereof those of Code of Civil Procedure could be applied. The decisions of the Apex Court in m.v.Elisabeth's case, M.V.Al.Quamar's case, Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd.'s case and our High Court Judgment in Shepherd and Haji Ismail Hossein's case (supra) are very clear in this regard.
48. As already seen above, the Apex Court in clear term held that admiralty jurisdiction, despite the peculiarities of its origin and growth rooted as it is ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
- 51 -
in history and nurtured by the growing demands of international trade, is nevertheless a part of the totality of jurisdiction vested in the High Court as a superior Court of record, and it is not a distinct and separate jurisdiction as was once the position in England. It has also been held therein that once a foreign ship is arrested in Indian waters in exercise of admiralty jurisdiction and the ship subsequently released on furnishing security by the owner, the proceedings have to continue against the owner as in any other suit. That apart, this High Court in The has Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company Ltd.'s case (supra) clearly ruled that the procedure to be followed in such admiralty actions after release of a ship on furnishing security shall be as regulated by the rules and practice of the High Court in suits brought before it in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. Obviously, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to the extent they are not inconsistent with the provisions of rules regarding admiralty suits under Part-III of the Original Side Rules of the High Court would be attracted. It is pertinent to note that till 1998 in the admiralty actions in England, it was not necessary even to get undertaking from the plaintiff to compensate the defendant in case of prejudice or loss being caused on ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
- 52 -
account of illegal and unwarranted arrest of a ship. It is only after the new Arrest Convention, 1999 was enacted by U.K., that under Article 26, such a provision was made ( Vide: Modern Admirality Law by Aloka Mandarka Sheppard, First Edition, published by Covendish Publishing Ltd., London, U.K. Page 130). As against the said rule, Rule 941 under Part III of the Original Side Rules of the High Court clearly requires the party applying for arrest of the property in a suit in rem to give an undertaking in writing to pay such sum by way of damages as the Court may award as compensation sustaining ig in the event of a prejudice by such award of arrest.
party affected
Being
so, we do not consider it appropriate to apply the
rulings in Moschanthy, Clarabelle and The Yuta
Bondarovskaya, or Gulf Venture's cases (supra),
blindly and ignoring distinct provisions of law
governing the procedure in suits on the admiralty side in India and the law laid down in that regard by the Apex Court and our High Court. Undoubtedly, in the area which is not covered by the rules framed by this Court in relation to such suits and in the absence of any satisfactory procedure being revealed from the provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure in a given situation arising in such actions and in the absence of any relief by the Apex Court or our High ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
- 53 -
Court on a point in issue, certainly those decisions could be of help and may have persuasive value. However, beyond that, we do not find any great wisdom in chanting those decisions like mantras for deciding the matters arising from the admiralty proceedings, ignoring the rulings of the Apex Court and the statutory provisions squarely applicable to a matter.
49. Once the plaintiff in a suit in rem discloses the claim under affidavit and makes a solemn statement about non payment thereof by the defendant, and gives undertaking arrest of in igterms of Rule 941, the the property can follow, and on arrest warrant of of such property, it can be released in terms of Rule 954 which gives an option to the defendant either to pay the amount claimed in the suit or to furnish the security for such claim. Undoubtedly, once the owner of the vessel appears in the matter and gets the vessel released on furnishing security, the action would cease to be "in rem" and it would proceed as the suit in personam. At the same time, clause (4) of Rule 954 of the Admiralty Rules of our High Court empowers the Court to release the property on any other ground that the Court may deem just and it is in this regard that the point as to whether it is the test of reasonably arguable best case or the one of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
- 54 -
strong triable case to be applied is to be considered.
50. In M.V.Kapitan Kud's case (supra), while dealing with the issue as to whether the appellant before the Apex Court had "reasonably arguable best case" in an admiralty action, and after taking note of the decision of the Apex Court in m.v.Elisabeth's case (supra), as well as in Asiatic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Sub-Lt.Arabinda Chakravarti, reported in AIR 1959 SC 597 and two English decisions viz. in Schwarz & Co. (Grain) Ltd. v. St.Elefterio Ex Arion (Owners), reported in 1957 Probate Division 179, in Moschanthy's case (supra), clearly held that though and the admiralty action is an action in rem, it is necessary for the plaintiff to make out "a prima facie" case in relation to his right in admiralty actions. With reference to the facts of the case before the Apex Court in Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd.'s case (supra), it was held that :-
"We think that neither the approach of the Division Bench of the High Court nor the finding of the learned trial Judge on the admiralty jurisdiction that no prima facie case is made out, is right. It is seen that there is a strong triable case for the reasons ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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stated earlier."
In other words, after stressing need for the plaintiff to make out a reasonably arguable best case in an admiralty action for a fruitful order in his favour, the Apex Court proceeded to hold that to make out a reasonably arguable best case, what is required is that the plaintiffs must establish a prima facie case regarding the right and the claim of the plaintiff in such action. In other words, with the decision of the Apex Court in Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd.'s case (supra), reasonably (supra) the distinction between the two tests, namely "the arguable best case" and "the prima facie case", has almost been disappeared, and both the expressions substantially convey the same meaning, though grammatically the expressions may not be synonymous to each other.
51. It is true that in Moschanthy's case (supra), it was held that the defendant can plead and establish by motion that the plaintiff's case is not reasonably arguable best case and that it is hopeless and bound to fail and on that ground, the defendant can obtain release of the security. However, the said test in Moschanthy's case (supra) cannot be understood to be different from the test of prima facie case in view of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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the abovereferred rulings of the Apex Court i.e. m.v.Elisabeth, M.V.Al.Quamar, and M.V.Kapitan Kud's cases (supra) wherein the test of reasonably arguable best case being equated with a prima facie case. While dealing with the motion of the defendant for release of the security, the principles applicable to a case under Order 39 Rule 1 read with Order 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure will have to be borne in mind. Rule 954(IV) leaves no scope to contend that any other procedure can be adopted in such case. It is also to be noted that the Rule 966 of the Original Side provides the matter of that the rules and practice of the Court suits and the proceedings on in the Original Side of the Court shall, if not inconsistent with the rules in this part, apply to suits and proceedings on the Admiralty Side of the Court. Further it is well settled by the practice of this Court that whenever the rules on the Original Side are silent, the principles behind the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are to be followed, and this view gets support from the decision of the Apex Court in m.v.Elisabeth's case (supra).
52. It is, therefore, clear that while applying the test of reasonably arguable best case, the Court will have to ascertain whether the plaintiff has prima ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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facie case or not, and in that regard the Court will have to analyse the materials on record. Though the provisions of Orders 38 and 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not be directly applicable, the principles thereunder could not be forgotten while dealing with the matter at the stage where the defendant having released the ship on furnishing the security applies for release of security on the ground that the plaintiff has no prima facie case or reasonably arguable best case.
53. empowers Rule the 954(IV) Court of our High Court to release the property Rules on which any ground other than those specified under Item IV provided that the Court may deem it just, clearly discloses the Court's power to release vessel even without insisting for security is clearly provided for. It is a clear provision which speaks of Court power to release the vessel without insisting for security as well as having released the vessel against the security to pass an appropriate order even thereafter which would include even release of the security; albeit, for valid and genuine reasons which are to be borne out from the record and a clear finding to that effect being arrived at by the Court. Being so, the contention that because the plaintiff is ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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entitled to keep the ship under arrest pursuant to the warrant having been successfully obtained, the plaintiff would also be entitled for sufficient security to cover the amount of his claim till the disposal of the suit without establishing prima facie case, cannot be accepted. Even after the ship is released against the security being furnished, nothing would prevent the defendant from pointing out to the Court that the Plaintiff lacks prima facie case in the matter and, therefore, the security obtained should also be released. It would all depend upon the facts of each against case.
the
But there is no general bar
release of security even in cases
as such
where
the plaintiff does not make out prima facie case or
reasonably arguable best case.
54. Perusal of the impugned judgment discloses
that the learned Single Judge on perusal of the
materials placed on record has clearly arrived at a
finding that inspite of the fact that the suit is
essentially based on account of alleged damages caused to the goods, the plaintiff did not take any pain to have a joint survey of the goods before they were subjected to alleged repairs on account of their alleged damage. The learned Single Judge has further observed that though the relief asked for includes ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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insurance claim, insurance expenses and survey expenses, no document in support thereof had been produced on record disclosing satisfactory material in respect of such claim. Whatever documents which have been produced on record undoubtedly disclose repairs having been caused to the machine and having been put to use in October 2005, however, the claim is based on the quotations of the month of November, 2005 and onwards. At the same time, according to the plaintiffs themselves, the machine was in working condition in the month of October, 2005. Further the learned damages, Single Judge has held that in the amount of damages gets crystalised a suit for only after adjudication of the claim and, therefore, in order to get interim relief in such action requiring the defendant to furnish security or to continue the security already furnished for the satisfaction of the decree that may be passed in favour of the plaintiff, it is necessary for the plaintiff to make out a strong prima facie case. As already seen above, whether it is a prima facie case or a reasonably arguable best case, whatever expression that may be used, it is ultimately for the plaintiff who approaches the Court in a suit of such nature, once it ceases to be a suit in rem and proceeds as a suit in personam and the defendant takes out Notice of motion for release of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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the security on the ground that the plaintiff lacks any prima facie case to justify continuation of such security, it is absolutely necessary for the plaintiff to place on record sufficient materials in support of his claim.
55. The contention that the arrest of a ship in admiralty action is a mere procedure to obtain security to satisfy the judgment cannot be disputed, as has been ruled by the Apex Court in m.v.Elisabeth's case (supra). But, at the same time the Apex Court partakes has also held that once the security is furnished, the suit the nature of action in personam and, therefore, the procedure thereupon will have to be followed as the one prescribed for any other normal suit and the Rules framed in that regard do not rule out an occasion to entertain a motion taken out by the defendant for release of the security already granted and to allow such motion in case the plaintiff fails to establish prima facie case or a reasonably arguable best case in the matter. The arrest of a ship is with the sole intention that the suit may not be defeated at the stage of initiation of an action itself, as in case the ship leaves the territorial waters of India, the Court may loose jurisdiction over it and, therefore, in that case, the suit could be rendered ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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infructuous; however consequent to arrest of the ship, and appearance of the owner of the ship before the Court, the suit has to proceed as any other normal suit. Therefore, the contention that the Court cannot analyse materials on record to ascertain whether the plaintiff has reasonably arguable best case or a prima facie case in a Notice of Motion taken out by the Defendant calling for release of the security cannot be accepted.
56. The learned Single Judge, on the analysis of the is materials on record, has clearly held that no material to show that what was the cost of there the parts which were actually used in repairing the machines nor there is any material to show that the machines which were transported were in fact damaged and, if so, to what extent was the damage caused, nor there is any documentary proof about the actual damage to such machines requiring repairs to the extent it is alleged to have been made or even of the amount which is claimed as the expenses having been actually incurred by the plaintiff. Referring to Section 73 of the contract Act, it has also been observed by the learned Single Judge that in case of breach of contract, damages which will naturally arise in the usual course of things from such breach or which the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from such breach, such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach and there is nothing on record to show that the defendant had any reason to know about the amount which was necessary for carrying out repairs to the machines when the contract was entered into and, therefore, taking an overall view of the matter, there is no prima facie case to establish the claim for damages. The findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge are clearly borne out from the record.
57. As rightly submitted on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiff never invited the defendant for any joint inspection or survey to assess the nature and extent of the alleged damage in order to ascertain what parts of machines were required to be repaired or replaced. Undisputedly, apart from the machines which were transported, there were two other diaper making machines with the plaintiff at the site. As sought to be contended on behalf of the defendant, there is nothing on record to rule out the possibility of the plaintiff importing the parts for the two other diaper making machines under the guise of replacement of parts of the machines in question. To rule out ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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this possibility, it was absolutely necessary for the plaintiff to have at an appropriate time a joint survey of the alleged damage caused to the machines and in relation to the requirement of repairs and replacement of the parts.
58. As regards the insurance claim, admittedly, the learned advocate for the defendant had called upon the plaintiff's advocate under letter dated 28th June, 2006 to furnish copies of the correspondence exchanged with the Insurance Company and apart from giving some evasive made replies, no copies of such correspondence are available to the defendant nor there is any justifiable reasons disclosed for hesitation on the part of the plaintiff to furnish copies of such correspondence to the defendant. Suppression of such documents would certainly be a ground to draw adverse inference against the plaintiff in relation to such claim.
59. As regards the claim for loss of profit, apart from the vague averment in that regard, no material has been placed nor the basis disclosed for the alleged claim in that regard. Undoubtedly, at this stage, there may not be material evidence in relation to such loss, however, it was necessary for the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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plaintiff to disclose the basis to arrive at a claim which has been made to such loss of profit. Undisputedly, the machine is a second hand machine.
It was therefore necessary to place on record the extent of its productivity with cogent material in respect thereof. Undisputedly, the plaintiff is already in the business having two other machines in use for the production of diapers. There is nothing on record to disclose the production output or rated capacity of the second hand machine. In such circumstances, the defendant is justified in contending that ig the profit margin of 43% business is clearly exaggerated, or at least no cogent on diaper material in support of such claim has been placed on record even for the purpose of prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff.
60. The defendants are also right in contending that in view of Section 73 of the Contract Act, a carrier would be liable for loss of profit resulting from damage to cargo consequent to a breach of contract provided the loss of profit was possibly within the knowledge of the parties as being likely to result and the same could have been at the time of entering into a contract itself. As rightly submitted by senior counsel for the defendant, the plaint is ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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totally silent on this aspect and admittedly no facts of any special loss was disclosed to the defendant nor there are pleadings to the effect revealing the knowledge thereof to the defendant at the time of entering into a contract. We wonder how in the absence of any pleading in that regard, even the evidence could at all be produced in support of such claim. In Union of India v. The Steel Stock Holders Syndicate, Poona, reported in AIR 1976 SC 879, it has been held by the Apex Court that "It is well settled that the liability of an ordinary carrier even in the English is indirect common law does not extend to a damage or remote. Loss of profit or loss of which a particular market has been held by a number of decisions to be a remote damage and can be awarded only if it is proved that the party which is guilty of committing the breach was aware or had knowledge that such a loss would be caused."
61. The contention that once the ship is arrested in admiralty action, the plaintiff is entitled either to detain the ship or to have security for due compliance of the decree that may be passed till the conclusion of the trial of such suit cannot be accepted ignoring the provisions of law comprised under Rule 954 of Part III of our High Court Original ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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Side Rules. Though in a properly constituted admiralty action the plaintiff, as of right, is entitled for warrant of arrest against a ship, insisting for and continuation of security during the trial would depend upon the prima facie case to be made out by the plaintiff viz-a-viz the defence raised by the defendant.
62. Merely because the defendants have not pressed for the reliefs in the nature of the prayer clauses
(a) and (b) of their Motion, that would not disentitle them from reasonably establishing their case about arguable best case or prima face case absence of to the plaintiff in the matter.
63. Though various other contentions are sought to be raised on behalf of the defendant, we do not find it necessary to deal with all those contentions once we find that the learned Single Judge on the analysis of the materials on record has taken a probable view in the matter which does not require interference by the appellate court, more particularly bearing in mind the law laid down by the Apex Court in Wander Ltd. v.
Antox P.Ltd.'s case (supra).
(supra) We are aware that the
said decision was not in admiralty proceedings.
Nevertheless as already held above, once the suit
::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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proceeds in personam and the normal principles which
are to be followed while dealing with the appeals
against the orders passed by the Court of Original
Jurisdiction and unless the said approach is shown to
be totally inconsistent with the procedure to be
followed by the appellate court in admiralty actions,
we find the said ruling to be applicable with equal
course even in appeals arising out of admiralty
actions.
64. The fall-out of the above discussion is that
the
civil
admiralty jurisdiction is not different from jurisdiction except that at the commencement of the such action it would be by issuance of the warrant of arrest of the property but once the owner of the property appears before the Court and furnishes security for release of the property, the action proceeds in personam and the rules framed by this Court in Part-III of the Original Side Rules are clearly attracted which will not preclude applicability of the principles behind the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure whenever the rules of procedure prescribed under Original Side Rules fall short to meet a situation. The traditional approach of applying the test of reasonably arguable best case in admiralty actions is in no way different from the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::
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concept of prima facie case which is followed in any other normal suit. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no fault can be found with the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge for discontinuation of the security furnished by the plaintiff and for release thereof, as the said findings are clearly borne out from the records.
65. The points for determination framed earlier are answered in above terms.
66. In the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.
(R.M.S.KHANDEPARKAR, J) (SMT.V.K.TAHILRAMANI, J) ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 13:41:22 :::