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(i) Whether parties can by agreement make a license irrevocable or revocable only on a given condition or in given circumstances.

15. In M.F. De Souza v. Childrens Education Uplift Society , affirmed by the Supreme Court, by virtue of a compromise decree passed in a previous litigation, the Defendant occupied a room as a licensee. Under the terms of the compromise, the licence in favour of the Defendants was irrevocable. It was contended on behalf of the Plaintiff that a licence must always be regarded as revocable at the will of the licensor except in the two cases set out under Section 60 of The Indian Easements Act, 1882. It was contended that Section 60 did not mention any third class of cases where a licence would be irrevocable, including an agreement that it shall be irrevocable. Mudholkar, J. rejecting the contention, held as under :

(b). In paragraphs 12 and 13, the Division Bench held as under :
[12] ... Be that as it may, the two tests of irrevocability established by the cases and referred to above, or by the Indian Easements Act will, however, give way to the special agreement, if any, of the parties. Thus a license which is prima facie irrevocable either because it is coupled with a grant or interest or because the licensee has erected works of a permanent nature there is nothing to prevent the parties from agreeing expressly or by necessary implication that the license nevertheless shall be revocable. See Liggins v. Inge (1831) 7 Bing 682 at pp. 688, 694 which was applied by the Judicial Committee in Plimmer v. Wellington Corporation (1884) 9 A. C. 699 at p. 714 : 53 J.P.C. 104, Gujarat Ginning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Ahmedabad v. Moti Lal Hirabhai Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Ahemedabad and Ganga Sahai v. Badrul Islam A.I.R. (29) 1942 ALL. 930 : 202 I.C. 676. On the same reasoning, I should think, there will be nothing to prevent the parties from agreeing expressly or impliedly that a license, which is prima facie revocable being not within either of the two categories of irrevocable license should nonetheless be irrevocable.

23. It is incorrect that the Supreme Court did not consider Section 64 of the Indian Easements Act. Sections 62 and 64 were specifically and in terms referred to in paragraph 9 of Ram Sarup Gupta's case. Not that it would have carried the Appellant's case further even if it did not.

24. Further in any event, we prefer the view taken by Justice Mudholkar in M.F. De Souza's case. There is nothing in The Indian Easements Act and, in particular, the chapter pertaining to licences which indicates that Sections 59 and 60 cannot be subject to a contract to the contrary. The rights created are between contracting parties with no element of public policy which would debar a contract to the contrary.

28. We were invited to overrule the judgement in M. F. De Souza's case and not to follow the judgement in Dominion of India. It was also suggested that as the judgement of the Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Gupta's case did not consider the provisions of Section 59 of the Indian Easements Act, we are not bound by it on this point. We are unable to agree on both points.

29. In HSBC's case the material terms of the leave and license agreement were similar to those in the agreement before us. The provision for security deposit was by way of a separate agreement. This latter agreement not being registered the learned Judge held that it created no right in the Respondent. However the judgment also held :