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11. The respondents filed their respective counter affidavits. According to the counter affidavits though the original notification under Section 4(1) of LA Act was published on 31-3-1980, on account of the pendency of the proceedings under the Urbian Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short 'the ULC Act') award could not be passed as it could not be decided whether the lands of the petitioners would be surplus under the ULC Act or not. If, in the event of determining that the lands belonging to the petitioners would be surplus lands, it is not necessary to finalise the acquisition proceedings under (he LA Act as the surplus lands of the petitioners vest in the Government on payment of compensation under the ULC Act and at any rate under Section 23 of the LA Act, the relevant date for the purpose of determining the compensation is the date on which the notification under Section 4(1) was published. That being the legal position, the petitioners are entitled for compensation on the basis of notification dated 31-3-1980 and the subsequent notifications issued from time to time cannot be taken into account.

15. The main arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners in WP No. 17068 of 1997 is that though possession was taken as long back as on 17-12-1979, till today no award is passed. The Government issued successive notifications under Section 4(1) on 31-3-1980, 22-2-1990, 5-12-1996, but no compensation is paid till day. The ground on which no award was passed determining the compensation is pendency of the proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act (for short 'the ULC Act'). Pendency of the proceedings under the ULC Act is not a bar for determining the compensation payable under the LA Act when once the power under the said Act has been exercised. Unreasonable delay in making the award after issuance of notification under Section 4(1) resulted in arbitrary exercise of power. Therefore, the notifications dated 31-3-1980, 22-3-1990 and 5-12-1996 should be declared as void and a fresh notification should be issued, (refer : P. Appalamurthy v. State of A.P., ; Singarem Colleries Co. Lid v. V.S. Murthy, 1983 (2) APLJ 405; Special Deputy Collector v. M.J. Swamy, . Since the notifications issued under Section 4(1) dated 31-3-1980, 22-2-1990 and 5-12-1996 are void and nonexistent, the respondents should issue a fresli notification as it is within the competence of the respondents to issue successive notifications. (Refer : State of M.P. v. Vishmi'Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 1594; Lt. Governor, H.P. v. Avinash Sharma, ; Raghunath v. State of Maharashtra, ; A.V. Papayya Sastry v. State of A.P., )

16. While the learned Counsel for the respondents contended that when possession was taken under Section 17(4) of the LA Act, the proceedings under Section 4(1) do not lapse. (Refer : Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., ; Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, ; Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman, ; H.M. Kelogirao v. Govt. of A.P., . When once the proceedings do not lapse, under Section If A of the LA Act, the question of issuance of a fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act does not arise. The notification dated 31-3-1980 still subsists and, therefore, the relevant date for the purpose of payment of compensation is 31-3-1980 and subsequent notifications issued on 22-2-1990 and 5-12-1996 are illegal as the Government has no power to issue successive notifications while the original notification subsists. Further, in view of the pendency of the proceedings under the ULC Act, the Government need not proceed with the proceedings under the LA Act as acquiring the land under the LA Act is illegal when they are available under the ULC Act. (Refer : Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra, ).

24. The action of the respondents in not determining and awarding the compensation can neither be declared as unreasonable or oppressive as when once the ULC Act was brought into force, they can await the proceedings under the said Act even though they have initiated the proceedings under the LA Act. It is difficult to countenance the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents. The observations made in Dattalraya's case (supra) are not relevant to the facts of the present case as in that case the land belonging to the petitioners was reserved under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act for a public purpose. Meanwhile the ULC Act was brought into force on 28-2-1976 and proceedings for acquisition of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit placed under the Act were initialed against the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the proceedings under the ULC Act and sought for a declaration that the said ULC Act has no application to the lands reserved for a public purpose under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and also sought a writ of mandamus for restraining the State Government or its agents from acquiring the land or taking possession of the land under the ULC Act. While refusing to issue a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the respondents frojp taking excess land under the ULC Act as legal, the above observations were made. The Court was not considering the case of a notification having been issued under the LA Act and not payment of compensation even after a lapse of 20 years after taking possession of the land. Therefore, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case.