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The prinnacle contention is that s. 69A of the Code though was included in the Nineth Schedule, is not a law relating to agrarian reforms and, therefore, it does not get the protection of Article 31A. it is a law relating to acquisition of mines and minerals belonging to the appellants and others which had come into force from December 8, 1982 and is not a law made under Article 39 (b) and (c) and does not get the protection under Article 31C. Even otherwise since it was a post Kesavananda Bharti's case. Section 69A should stand the test of basic structure of the Constitu-tion. Though the right to property lost its protective armour as fundamental right after Constitution's 44th Amendment Act, 1978, it was resurrected under Article 300A as constitutional right. The, law must meet the test of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution also. Since it was given retrospective operation from May 1,1960, the compensation provided under sub-section (4) of Section 69A of the Code is void as compensation was not just equivalent to the property acquired or full indemnification to the owner of the mines and minerals expropriated. It must not be arbitrary and unjust. The quantification or principles in Section 69A(1) & (4) therein are illusory offending Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Section 7 of the Act and other related statutes provide compensation different from the one provided under sub-section (4) of Section 69A and that it is discriminatory and bears no reasonable relation to the object of acquisition and that, therefore, it is unjust, unfair violating Article 14 and unfair procedure offends Article 21 of the Constitution. The acquisition under Section 69A(1) is in violation of Article 300A as it is not for public purpose and no market value is being paid and so it is void. Sri Dave, learned counsel for the State refuted the contentious contentions in chorus of M/s. Zaveri, Ganguli, T.U. Mehta and D.U. Shah, the learned counsel represented the appellants.

The question, therefore, is whether right to property is a basic structure, after Constitution 44th Amendment Act, 1978. Indian society is predominantly agrarian and about 3/4th of its population is living in rural areas on agriculture and other ancillary occupations. In pre-independent period, the land tenures were in vogue on Zamindari, Jagirdari, Taluqadari, inamdari or settlement systems in diverse forms. The tenure and holding by the tiller of the soil was insecure and was exploited by intermediaries. On January 26, 1950, the Independence Day, the Congress Party affirmed in its pledge that the inalienable right of the people is "to have freedom and to enjoy the fruits of their toil and have the necessities of life so that they may have full opportunity of growth". In 1931 in Karachi Congress, Resolution on Fundamental Rights envisaged that "the organiza-tion of economic life must conform to the principles of justice" emphasising to reform "the system of land tenure and revenue and rent"............relief from agricultural indebtedness.......ownership or control of land...........

The debates in the Constituent Assembly on the lines of Section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the resultant right to acquire and, hold to the property in Article 19(l)(f) and deprivation and acquisi-tion of the property under Article 31, as fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution, find their habitation like in every constitution of modern democracies. Equally the debates in the Constituent Assembly and the unanimous animation of the founding fathers was that the tiller of the soil should be conferred with right to hold the property directly under the State and to abolish the estates, elimination of the intermediaries and conferment of right, title and interest in the land in the estate on the cultivator. There was, however, division in opinion on payment of compensation to the deprived Zamindars etc. The Constitution assures to every citizen social and economic justice apart from political justice, equality of status and of opportunity and dignity of person as basic postulates for successful working of political democracy. Establishment of economic and social democracy and agrarian reform as its ingrained facet was the nation's chartered mission for economic restructure of the social order. Land Reform laws were made on its anvil to distribute surplus lands to the landless poor etc. Whether right to property is the basic structure was pointedly projected for the first time assailing the imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings in Maharashtra Agricutural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 as amended up to 1976 in Woman Rao's case. Chandrachud. CJ. speaking for the unanimous Constitution Bench, that decided first Minerva Mills case prior to Constitution 44th Amendment Act, 1978, considered the constitutionality of the First Constitution Amendment Act, 1951 Intro- ducting Article 31-A and Article 31-B traced the history of land tenures, the debates in the Constituent Assembly, need for the agrarian reforms and stated that in our predominantly agricultural society, there is a strong linkage between ownership of land and the person's status in the social system. Those without land suffer not only from an economic disadvantage, but also a concomitant social disadvantage. In the very nature of things, it is not possible to provide land to all landless persons but that cannot furnish an alibi for not undertaking at all a programme for the redistribu- tion of agricultural land. Agrarian reform therefore requires, inter alia, the reduction of the larger holdings and distribution of the excess land accord-ing to social and economic considerations............We embarked upon a constitutional era holding forth the promise that we will secure to all citizens justice, social, economic and political, equality of status and of opportunity, and, last but not the least, dignity of the individual. Between these promises and the 1st Amendment there is a discernible nexus, direct and immediate. Indeed, if there is one place in an agriculture- dominated society like ours where citizens can hope to have equal justice, it is on the strip of land which they till and love, the land which assures to them dignity of their person by providing to them a near decent means of livelihood........

The question then is whether the principles laid in Section 69A(4) of the Code are ultra vires. In Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, [1981] 1 SCC 166, per majority, the Constitution Bench considered Section 11(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of 1976) and fixation of amount of Rs. 2.00 lacs as maximum limited under sub-s. (6) of the property worth Rs. 2.00 Crores, it was held to be not illusory and the provisions is not confiscatory, and that therefore, it does not violate Art. 14 and Art. 31(2) of the Constitution (proceeding Constitution 44th Amendment).In Achutananda Purohit v. State of Orissa, [1976] 3 SCR 919, it was held that fixation of compensation on slab system does not violate Article 14 and 31(2) of the Constitution. In Basant Bat's case this court held that the provision in s.44(3) of the Maharashtra Housing and Develop-ment Act that in the absence of agreement, the amount shall be equal to 100 times the net average monthly income actually derived from such land during the period of five consecutive years immediately preceding the date of the publication of the notification referred to in s. 41, as may be determined by the Land Acquisition Officer, was held to be not violative of Art. 14. Article 21 was held to have no application to the determination of such amount. In Tinsukhiya's case a Constitution Bench held that the limitation of the amount on the basis of the written down book value of the assets was held to be not violative of Art. 14 and such principle was held to be not illusory nor arbitrary. The determination of the amount was held to be an integral and inseparable part of the scheme of nationalisation which cannot be cancelled as a distinct provision independent of the scheme. It was also further held that the material resources of the com-munity mentioned in Art. 39(b) must be widely interpreted and nationalisa-tion and acquisition is one of the methods of distribution of material resources of the community. The economic cost of social and economic reforms is amongst the most vexed problems of social and economic change. The need for constitutional mandates for such legislative efforts at social and economic change recognises otherwise unaffordable economic burden of reforms. It is not possible to diverse the economic constitutions or components from the scheme of nationalisation. The main cause of the scheme of the nationalisation lies on its cost and it cannot be isolated. The quantification, therefore, forms part of the integrated scheme and cannot be considered in isolation.