Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
D Banu Prakash Reddy vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 9 February, 2026
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 857/2025
Between:
1.D BANU PRAKASH REDDY, S/O SIVAREDDY AGED 26 YEARS OCC.
AGRICULTURE R/O 2/106, KANDUKURU, OC COLONY ANANTAPUR
...PETITIONER
AND
1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, BY SHO ITUKALAPALLI P.S
ANANTAPUR
2.BOYA SAKE VIKRAM, S/O LATE MALLOBULESU AGED 27 YEARS,
KANDUKURU VILLAGE ANANTAPUR
3.S YERRAMUDDAIAHGARI HARIKUMAR BOYA SAKE HARI, S/O
YERRAMUDDAIAHGARI BALAKRISHNA AGED 27 YEARS DR.NO.3-
289, KANDUKURU VILLAGE ANANTAPUR
4.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AMARAVATHI
...RESPONDENT(S):
****
DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 09.02.2026
2
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
_________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
3
* THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
+ CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 857/2025
% 09.02.2026
# Between:
1.D BANU PRAKASH REDDY, S/O SIVAREDDY AGED 26 YEARS OCC.
AGRICULTURE R/O 2/106, KANDUKURU, OC COLONY ANANTAPUR
...PETITIONER
AND
1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, BY SHO ITUKALAPALLI P.S
ANANTAPUR
2.BOYA SAKE VIKRAM, S/O LATE MALLOBULESU AGED 27 YEARS,
KANDUKURU VILLAGE ANANTAPUR
3.S YERRAMUDDAIAHGARI HARIKUMAR BOYA SAKE HARI, S/O
YERRAMUDDAIAHGARI BALAKRISHNA AGED 27 YEARS DR.NO.3-
289, KANDUKURU VILLAGE ANANTAPUR
4.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AMARAVATHI
...RESPONDENT(S):
! Counsel for the Petitioners : Gundala Siva Prasada Reddy
^Counsel for the Respondents : 1. P.Akhila Naidu, Assistant Public
Prosecutor
2. B.Abhay Siddhanth Mootha, Legal Aid
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. (2022) 6 SCC 187
2. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3038
4
3. (2012) 9 SCC 750
4. (2013) 7 SCC 263
5. (2012) 10 SCC 489
6. (2008) 13 SCC 133
7. (2016) 12 SCC 744
8. (2022) 8 SCC 602
9. 1937 SCC OnLine All 80
10. AIR 1962 SC 1788
5
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 857/2025
ORDER:
Criminal Revision Case was filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity 'the Cr.P.C.,') challenging the order dated 04.07.2025 passed in Crl.M.P.No.45 of 2024 in J.C.C.No.02 of 2019 on the file of the learned Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Anantapuramu (for brevity 'the learned Trial Court'). CONTENTIONS OF THE COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER:
2. Sri Gundala Siva Prasada Reddy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the impugned order of the Court below is wholly contrary to law, weight of evidence, and probabilities of the case. The finding that Respondent Nos.2 and 3 are minors is bereft of any substantive foundation and is vitiated by grave misappreciation of material on record. The reliance placed by the Court below upon the photocopies of marks lists, which are neither conclusive nor legally admissible for determination of age, is manifestly erroneous. The 'learned Trial Court' below failed to appreciate that the said documents do not constitute reliable proof of age and thereby committed a serious error in treating Respondent Nos.2 and 3 as juveniles in conflict with law.
3. It is further urged that the authentic documentary evidence, namely the Aadhaar cards of Respondent Nos.2 and 3, clearly establishes that both were aged more than 18 years as on the date of the offence. Respondent No.2's year of birth is recorded as 1999, and Respondent No.3's date of birth is 6 09.01.1999, which indisputably makes them 19 years of age at the relevant time. The learned Court below, in complete disregard of such unimpeachable evidence, erroneously declared them juveniles. The Petitioner relies upon the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Manoj v. State of Haryana1, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court categorically held that marks lists cannot be treated as determinative criteria for age assessment, and that reliable statutory documents must prevail.
4. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the antecedents of Respondent No.2, as borne out from C.C.No.1904/2017 on the file of learned Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ananthapuramu, demonstrate that he was treated as an adult offender in prior proceedings. In the said case, the police themselves recorded his age as 20 years, and he never raised the plea of juvenility. The matter was compromised in Lok Adalat, yet within a month thereafter, Respondent Nos.2 and 3, along with other accused, committed the present heinous offence resulting in the death of the informant's father. These crucial facts, which go to the root of the issue, were completely ignored by the learned Court below, thereby rendering its order unsustainable. The failure to consider such antecedents and the suppression of the plea of juvenility in earlier proceedings clearly disentitles Respondent Nos.2 and 3 from claiming the benefit of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for brevity 'the J.J.Act').1
(2022) 6 SCC 187 7
5. It is submitted that the learned Court below ought to have directed a medical board examination or FSL determination to conclusively ascertain the age of Respondent Nos.2 and 3, instead of mechanically relying upon marks lists. The omission to adopt such a legally mandated course of action vitiates the entire order. The impugned order is thus erroneous, unsound, and wholly unsustainable in law. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner, therefore, urges to set aside the order of the 'learned Trial Court' and declare Respondent Nos.2 and 3 as adult offenders, amenable to trial under the ordinary criminal law, in the interest of justice.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
6. Ms. P.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submits that the petition filed by the Petitioner is wholly misconceived, untenable in law, and liable to be dismissed in limine. The Investigating Officer, after due verification of the originals of S.S.C. mark lists and Transfer Certificates issued by the competent educational authorities, has categorically recorded the Respondents as juveniles in conflict with law. Once such determination has been made in accordance with Section 94 of 'the J.J.Act', it is not open to the Petitioner at this belated stage to approbate and reprobate by seeking to declare the Respondents as adult offenders. The relief sought is inherently defective, as it combines two distinct prayers, declaration of majority and transfer of proceedings to the Sessions Court, without the statutory enquiry mandated under 'the J.J.Act'. Moreover, the Sessions case against adult 8 offenders has already been disposed of by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Ananthapuramu, and is pending appeal before this Court. Hence, the prayer to club the present matter with adult offenders is infructuous and unsustainable.
7. It is further contended that reliance placed by the Petitioner upon Aadhaar cards is wholly misplaced. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Saroj v. Iffco- Tokio General Insurance Co2 has unequivocally held that Aadhaar is devised only to provide a unique identity to citizens and cannot be treated as conclusive proof of date of birth. The statutory scheme under Section 94 of 'the J.J.Act' clearly prioritizes school records, matriculation certificates, or birth certificates issued by municipal or panchayat authorities as primary evidence for age determination. Only in the absence of such documents can medical tests like ossification be resorted to. In the present case, the S.S.C. mark lists and Transfer Certificates are available and have been duly verified by the Investigating Officer, thereby satisfying the statutory requirements.
8. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor further submit that seven long years have elapsed since the date of offence, rendering any ossification or medical age determination test futile and unreliable. The law does not permit reopening of settled findings merely on speculative grounds advanced by the Petitioner. The doctrine of estoppel squarely applies against the Petitioner, who cannot now challenge the age determination based on Aadhaar entries, particularly when the statutory authority has already accepted the school 2 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3038 9 records as valid proof. The UIDAI (Unique Identification Authority of India) itself, through its circular dated 22.12.2023, has clarified that Aadhaar per se is not proof of date of birth, thereby reinforcing the Respondents' contention that the Petitioner's reliance on Aadhaar is legally untenable.
9. It is also submitted that the allegations of prior involvement of Respondent No.2 in C.C. No.1904/2017 are irrelevant to the present enquiry. The compromise of that case in Lok Adalat does not prejudice the Respondents' right to plead juvenility in subsequent proceedings. The 'J.J.Act' is a beneficial legislation intended to protect children in conflict with law, and the failure to raise such a plea in earlier proceedings cannot extinguish the statutory right to claim juvenility. The Respondents, being lay persons not well- versed in legal intricacies, cannot be penalized for not setting up such a defense in a compromised matter. The Petitioner's attempt to rely on antecedents is nothing but an effort to prejudice the Court against the Respondents, which is impermissible in law.
10. In view of the foregoing submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the petition as devoid of merit.
11. Sri B.Abhay Siddhanth Mootha, learned Legal Aid Counsel for Respondent Nos.2 & 3 submitted that 'the learned Trial Court' has rightly treated the unofficial Respondents as juveniles in conflict with law by upholding the investigation conducted by the Investigating Officer, based on valid statutory documents, and any attempt to unsettle such determination at 10 this stage would be contrary to the express provisions of 'the J.J.Act'. The petition is not maintainable either in law or on facts, and the relief sought is infructuous. The Respondents, therefore, beseech this Court to uphold the statutory protection afforded to them and dismiss the petition in the interest of justice.
POINT FOR CONSIDERATION:
12. Now the point for consideration is:
"Whether the judgment in Crl.M.P.No.45 of 2024 in J.C.C.No.02 of 2019 dated 04.07.2025, passed by the learned Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Anantapuramu, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?"
RELEVANT STATUTORY MATRIX AND PRECEDENTIAL EXPOSITION:
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Saroj supra at paragraph Nos.9.7 and 9.8 held as under:
"9.7 Judicial notice has also been taken of the circular above. Recently, a learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in Gopalbhai Naranbhai Vaghela v. Union Of India15 in view thereof directed the release of the petitioner's pension in accordance with the date as mentioned in the School Leaving Certificate, keeping aside the difference in the date of birth as mentioned in the Aadhar Card, which was not relevant for the purpose of such consideration. 9.8 In Shabana v. NCT of Delhi a learned Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in a case where the petitioner-mother sought a writ of habeas corpus for her daughter, recorded a statement made for and on behalf of UIDAI that "Aadhar Card may not be used as proof of date of birth."
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P3 at paragraph Nos.32 & 34 held as under:
3
(2012) 9 SCC 750 11 "32. "Age determination inquiry" contemplated under Section 7-A of the Act read with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules enables the court to seek evidence and in that process, the court can obtain the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available. Only in the absence of any matriculation or equivalent certificates, the court needs to obtain the date of birth certificate from the school first attended other than a play school. Only in the absence of matriculation or equivalent certificate or the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, the court needs to obtain the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat (not an affidavit but certificates or documents). The question of obtaining medical opinion from a duly constituted Medical Board arises only if the abovementioned documents are unavailable. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, then the court, for reasons to be recorded, may, if considered necessary, give the benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his or her age on lower side within the margin of one year.
34. Age determination inquiry contemplated under the JJ Act and the 2007 Rules has nothing to do with an enquiry under other legislations, like entry in service, retirement, promotion, etc. There may be situations where the entry made in the matriculation or equivalent certificates, date of birth certificate from the school first attended and even the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat may not be correct. But court, Juvenile Justice Board or a committee functioning under the JJ Act is not expected to conduct such a roving enquiry and to go behind those certificates to examine the correctness of those documents, kept during the normal course of business. Only in cases where those documents or certificates are found to be fabricated or manipulated, the court, the Juvenile Justice Board or the committee need to go for medical report for age determination."
15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana4, at paragraph No.23 held as under:
"23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. The manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in 4 (2013) 7 SCC 263 12 a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3) envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion."
16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B5 at paragraph No.37 held as under:
"37. In Shah Nawaz v. State of U.P. (2011) 13 SCC 751 the matter reached this Court from the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court. An FIR was lodged against the appellant, Shah Nawaz, and three others for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 IPC. The mother of the appellant submitted an application before the Board stating that Shah Nawaz was minor at the time of the alleged occurrence. The Board after holding an enquiry declared Shah Nawaz a juvenile under the 2000 Act. The wife of the deceased filed criminal appeal against the judgment of the Board before the Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar. That appeal was allowed and the order of the Board was set aside. Shah Nawaz preferred criminal revision before the High Court against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge which was dismissed giving rise to appeal by special leave before this Court. This Court considered Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules and also noted, amongst others, the decision in Hari Ram [(2009) 13 SCC 211 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 987] and then on consideration of the documents, particularly entry relating to the date of birth entered in the marksheet held that Shah Nawaz was a juvenile on the date of occurrence of the incident. This Court in paras 23 and 24 of the Report held as under: Shah Nawaz case (2011) 13 SCC 751 "23. The documents furnished above clearly show that the date of birth of the appellant had been noted as 18-6-1989. Rule 12 of the Rules categorically envisages that the medical opinion from the Medical Board should be sought only when the matriculation certificate or school certificate or any birth certificate issued by a corporation or by any panchayat or municipality is not available. We are of the view that though the Board has correctly accepted the entry relating to the date of birth in the marksheet and school 5 (2012) 10 SCC 489 13 certificate, the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court committed a grave error in determining the age of the appellant ignoring the date of birth mentioned in those documents which is illegal, erroneous and contrary to the Rules.
24. We are satisfied that the entry relating to date of birth entered in the marksheet is one of the valid proofs of evidence for determination of age of an accused person. The school leaving certificate is also a valid proof in determining the age of the accused person. Further, the date of birth mentioned in the High School marksheet produced by the appellant has duly been corroborated by the school leaving certificate of the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement of the clerk of Nehru High School, Dadheru, Khurd-o-Kalan and recorded by the Board. The date of birth of the appellant has also been recorded as 18-6-1989 in the school leaving certificate issued by the Principal of Nehru Preparatory School, Dadheru, Khurd-o-Kalan, Muzaffarnagar as well as the said date of birth mentioned in the school register of the said School at Serial No. 1382 which have been proved by the statement of the Principal of that School recorded before the Board."
In para 26 of the Report, this Court observed that Rule 12 has described four categories of evidence which gave preference to school certificate over the medical report."
17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand6, at paragraph Nos.22 & 23 held as under:
"22. It is well settled that it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. The date of birth is to be determined on the basis of material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties. The medical evidence as to the age of a person, though a very useful guiding factor, is not conclusive and has to be considered along with other cogent evidence.
23. It is true that in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar [(2000) 5 SCC 488 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 962] this Court has, on a review of judicial opinion, observed that while dealing with a question of determination of the age of an accused, for the purpose of finding out whether he is a juvenile or not, a hyper-technical approach should not be adopted while appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile and if two views may be possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. We are also not oblivious of the fact that being a welfare legislation, the courts should be zealous to see that a juvenile derives full benefits of the provisions of the Act but at the same time it is also imperative for the courts to ensure that the protection and privileges under the Act are not misused by unscrupulous persons to escape punishments for having committed serious offences."6
(2008) 13 SCC 133 14
18. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Parag Bhati v. State of U.P7 at paragraph No.36 held as under:
"36. It is settled position of law that if the matriculation or equivalent certificates are available and there is no other material to prove the correctness of date of birth, the date of birth mentioned in the matriculation certificate has to be treated as a conclusive proof of the date of birth of the accused. However, if there is any doubt or a contradictory stand is being taken by the accused which raises a doubt on the correctness of the date of birth then as laid down by this Court in Abuzar Hossain [Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83] , an enquiry for determination of the age of the accused is permissible which has been done in the present case."
19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of U.P8 at paragraph Nos.33.9, 33.10 & 33.11 as under:
"33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Evidence Act viz. Section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND DETERMINATIVE FINDINGS:
20. This Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, has meticulously examined the impugned order, the grounds urged by the Petitioner, the counter submissions of the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing Respondent No.1/State, and the submissions of the learned Legal Aid Counsel for the Respondent Nos.2 & 3, and the material on record, including 7 (2016) 12 SCC 744 8 (2022) 8 SCC 602 15 the statutory framework under 'the J.J.Act', alongside authoritative judicial precedents. The scope of revisional powers under Sections 397 and 401 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' is well-settled and circumscribed, it does not permit a re- appreciation of evidence or substitution of the learned Trial Court's findings with those of the revisional Court unless the impugned order suffers from patent illegality, jurisdictional error, material irregularity, or perversity manifest on the face of the record. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any such infirmity, and the learned Trial Court's determination that Respondent Nos.2 and 3 were juveniles in conflict with law on the date of the commission of the alleged offence stands fortified by the statutory matrix of Section 94 of 'the J.J.Act', which mandates a hierarchical approach to age determination prioritizing documentary evidence over secondary methods.
21. Section 94 of 'the J.J.Act.,' unequivocally delineates the procedure for determination of age, placing matriculation or equivalent certificates, such as S.S.C., marks lists and Transfer Certificates issued by recognized educational authorities, at the apex of the evidentiary hierarchy, followed by birth certificates from municipal or panchayat authorities, with medical examinations like ossification tests relegated to the residual category only in the absence of the aforementioned primary documents. The Investigating Officer, in the present case, duly verified the S.S.C., marks lists and Transfer Certificates of Respondent Nos.2 and 3, which unequivocally indicated their minority status on the date of the offence, thereby fulfilling the statutory 16 mandate under Section 94(2) of 'the J.J.Act' and rendering the learned Trial Court's reliance thereon unassailable. The Petitioner's grievance that the documents in question are mere photocopies and hence inadmissible lacks merit, particularly since 'the learned Trial Court' has duly observed and treated them as originals, as 'the J.J.Act' does not prescribe originality as a sine qua non for such school records when verified by competent authorities, and Courts have consistently upheld their probative value in juvenility inquiries, provided no fabrication is alleged or proved, consonant with the beneficial intendment of the legislation to protect children in conflict with law. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh supra has clarified that the date from the matriculation certificate holds primacy, trumping even ossification tests, thereby debunking the Petitioner's misconceived reliance on Manoj supra, which critiqued self-serving school records procured post-facto but did not elevate Aadhaar or other non-statutory documents over verified school credentials.
22. The Petitioner's stout reliance on Aadhaar cards of Respondent Nos.2 and 3, purporting to establish their age as over 18 years (with year of birth 1999), is wholly untenable and contrary to binding judicial pronouncements. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Saroj supra has categorically held that Aadhaar is merely a unique identification document under the Aadhaar Act, 2016, designed for authentication of identity and not as conclusive proof of date of birth, particularly where discrepancies arise with superior evidentiary 17 sources like school records. This position is reinforced by the UIDAI Circular dated 22.12.2023 (Circular No.08/2023), which explicitly directs that Aadhaar per se shall not be accepted as proof of date of birth by Authentication User Agencies (AUAs)/KYC User Agencies (KUAs), underscoring its limited utility for demographic data as declared by the enrollee, susceptible to errors or manipulations. The learned Trial Court, therefore, committed no error, much less a grave one, in disregarding Aadhaar entries in favour of duly verified S.S.C., marks lists and Transfer Certificates, which align with the statutory prioritization under Section 94 of 'the J.J. Act', to hold otherwise would subvert the legislative scheme crafted to ensure swift and reliable age adjudication in juvenile proceedings, shielding vulnerable minors from protracted litigations.
23. The Petitioner's invocation of Respondent No.2's antecedents in C.C.No.1904/2017, where he was ostensibly treated as an adult (aged 20 years) and the matter compromised in Lok Adalat without raising juvenility, does not in any manner disentitle Respondent Nos.2 and 3 from claiming the benefits under 'the J.J.Act' in the present proceedings. The proviso to Section 9(2) of 'the J.J.Act', read with Section 10, mandates that a plea of juvenility may be raised before any Court at any stage, even after final disposal of a case, and it shall be determined in accordance with Section 94 of 'the J.J.Act', irrespective of prior adjudications or suppressions, as affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abuzar Hossain supra and subsequent rulings emphasizing the non-waivable, statutory right of juveniles. The doctrine of 18 estoppel or approbation and reprobation has no application against juveniles, who are laypersons lacking legal acumen, and cannot be prejudiced for not asserting juvenility in a compromised minor case, notably, no estoppel operates against minors in statutory benefits, as held in Ajudhia Prasad v. Chandan Lal9, where misrepresentation of age does not bar subsequent minority pleas under beneficial legislations. The learned Trial Court's non- consideration of these antecedents, even if assumed arguendo, occasions no prejudice, as prior proceedings are extraneous to the independent inquiry under Section 94 of 'the J.J.Act', and the Petitioner's attempt to paint Respondents as habitual offenders is a collateral attack impermissible in a focused age determination inquiry.
24. The submission that 'the learned Trial Court' ought to have directed a medical board examination or FSL ossification test is misconceived and contrary to the express scheme of Section 94(2)(iii) of 'the J.J.Act', which permits such invasive tests solely as a last resort 'in the absence of' both matriculation/school records and birth certificates, neither of which is absent here. Moreover, seven years having elapsed since the date of offence (circa 2019), any ossification test now would be utterly futile and unreliable, as judicial consensus, recognizes that ossification tests lose precision post-25-30 years due to ossification completion, with margins of error up to 2 years even in prime cases, rendering post-facto tests speculative and inadmissible for unsettling settled documentary findings. The Petitioner's prayer for such a 9 1937 SCC OnLine All 80 19 direction at this belated revisional stage smacks of dilatory tactics, undermining the expeditious juvenile justice paradigm under 'the J.J.Act', and 'the learned Trial Court' rightly eschewed it, adhering to the statutory hierarchy without commission of any error vitiating its order.
25. Revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' is not appellate in nature but supervisory, to correct jurisdictional excesses or grave injustices, not to re-weigh evidence or correct perceived errors of fact, as expounded in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP10. The impugned order discloses no jurisdictional defect, no non-application of mind, and no reliance on extraneous material, on the contrary, it methodically applies Section 94 of 'the J.J.Act' to verified school documents, rendering it immune from revisional interference. The combined prayers for declaring Respondents as adults and transferring/clubbing proceedings with the disposed Sessions case (now in appeal) are inherently defective, as juvenility claims mandate a preliminary inquiry under Sections 14/15 of 'the J.J.Act' by the Juvenile Justice Board, not a collateral declaration in revision, and the transfer prayer is infructuous given the Sessions matter's finality before the learned Principal Sessions Judge.
26. The 'J.J.Act' being a social welfare legislation aimed at reformation over retribution for juveniles under 18 years, its provisions must receive a liberal construction, with Courts duty-bound to protect juvenile rights even against belated challenges, as mandated by Article 21 read with Article 39(f) of the AIR 1962 SC 1788 10 20 Constitution of India. The Investigation Officer's initial recording of unofficial Respondents as juveniles' post-verification, upheld by the learned Trial Court, attains finality absent proof of perversity, and the Petitioner's speculative aspersions cannot unsettle this without impinging the rehabilitative ethos of 'the J.J.Act.'
27. A perusal of the record reveals no misappreciation of evidence, much less grave, by the Trial Court, the S.S.C., marks lists' weight over Aadhaar is statutorily ordained, and prior antecedents are irrelevant irrelevancies. No case for medical tests arises, and the order ex-facie discloses judicial propriety.
28. The reliefs sought, declaration of majority and clubbing with adult proceedings, are premature and infructuous, as the Juvenile Justice Board retains primacy for inquiry under Section 14 of 'the J.J.Act' post-age determination, and the Sessions appeal's pendency does not warrant interference.
CONCLUSION:
29. In sum, the present revision case constitutes a misconceived attempt to approbate (accept school records in investigation) and reprobate (challenge now), barred by fair play, with no jurisdictional error patent. The impugned order merits upholding.
30. For the above reasons, the Criminal Revision Case fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.
21
As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.
_________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Dt: 09.02.2026 Note: LR copy to be marked B/o VTS