Bombay High Court
State Of Maharashtra And Anr. vs Shriram Babulal Chaurasiya on 5 March, 1992
Equivalent citations: 1992(3)BOMCR201
JUDGMENT B.U. Wahane, J.
1. Both these appeals arise out of the judgment and order dated 31st March, 1982, delivered by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Akola, in Civil Suit No. 23 of 1979. The original plaintiff Shriram Chaurasia preferred First Appeal No. 139 of 1982 as the learned lower Court dismissed his claim for interest payable on the suit amount. The original defendant, State, preferred First Appeal No. 137 of 1982 to set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Akola.
2. The facts giving rise to the present appeals, are as follows:
The original plaintiff, Shriram Chaurasia, avers that he is an agriculturist having 16 acres of agricultural land, takes produce of cotton, jawar, cotton, rice and other crops in his land. Besides this, he is a grain merchant and deals in jawar, wheat, rice and other commodities. According to him, he is a licensee to carry on the business of grain.
On 23rd March, 1973, at the instance of the District Food Supply Officer, the Food Inspector seized foodgrain from the possession of the plaintiff on the allegations that the plaintiff had contravened the provisions of Essential Commodities Act. The plaintiff was prosecuted for the offence under sections 3(2) and 4(2) of the Maharashtra Food Grain Control Order read with section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and a Criminal Case No. 2325 of 1973 was filed against him. He was tried and eventually was acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, on 30-12-1976. The learned Magistrate also ordered to return the seized goods to the plaintiff. It is alleged by the plaintiff that during the pendancy of the case, he orally and in writing repeatedly requested the defendant to return the seized property to him on supratnama, but no response was given.
According to the plaintiff, the rates of the commodities at the relevant time, were: Jawar Rs. 100/- per quintal, Wheat Rs. 150/- per quintal and Rice Rs. 130/- per quintal. The price of the seized commodities at these rates comes to Rs. 29,735/-. The plaintiff further averred that despite his several demands, the defendant avoided to return the goods or the price thereof. Consequently, a notice dated 27-6-1977, through Advocate Shri Moyal was issued. On receiving the notice, the defendant paid Rs. 15,095/-, which he received under protest. Another notice was issued on 22-3-1978 through Advocate Shri V. Mohta, but the defendant failed to comply with the notice and, therefore, he instituted a civil suit for the balance amount of Rs. 14,630.47 paise, against the defendant.
The plaintiff had claimed interest at the rate of 18% p.a. on Rs. 29,735/- from 29-9-1976 to 29-9-1977 amounting to Rs. 5300/- and on Rs. 14,640/- from 29-9-1977 to the date of suit amounting to Rs. 5530/-, total Rs. 10,830/-. According to the plaintiff, he is entitled to this much interest by way of damages, since the goods and price thereof was retained by the defendants he suffered loss. Thus the plaintiff laid the claim for Rs. 25,470/-
3. The defendant resisted the plaintiff's claim by filing written statement Exh. 9, but admitted the factum of the seizure of the commodities. According to the defendant, the foodgrains were sold for Rs. 15,095.53 paise as per the prevalent price and the same was paid to the plaintiff. The price of the goods viz. Rs. 29,635/- as worked out by the plaintiff, is denied and, therefore, the liability to pay the difference of Rs. 14,639.47 paise and the interest of Rs. 10,830/- is also denied. It is further submitted by the defendant that the rates of the respective commodities were fixed by the Government and as per those rates, the plaintiff was adequately paid for the seized commodities.
4. The plaintiff examined 4 witnesses to substantiate his claim. Witness No. 1 is Prabhakar Vyas, an Editor and Publisher of "Matribhumi" daily, Akola; witness No. 2 is Shri Chaudas Dhake, who was Supervisor in Agricultural Produce Market Committee at Jalgoan (E.K.); witness No. 3 is Omprakash Jagannath Tiwari, who runs an Adat Shop; P.W.4 is the plaintiff himself. The defendant examined Pralhad Govind Ahir, Food Supply Inspector, Akola.
5. The learned trial Court, after scrutinising the evidence of the rival parties and documents placed on record, held that the plaintiff has proved that if he would have sold the commodities at the relevant time, he would have obtained the price of Rs. 29,735/- Admittedly, the plaintiff had received the amount of Rs. 15,095.53 paise, and he is entitled to the difference of Rs. 14,629.47 paise. However, the trial Court declined to grant the interest by way of damages being unjustifiable either on the amount of Rs. 29,735/- or Rs. 14, 625.47 paise.
6. The plaintiff and the defendant being a aggrieved by the findings of the learned lower Court, preferred the present appeals. Shri Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the appellant State, strenuously submitted that the learned trial Court has not at all considered the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act and, therefore, he has based his arguments only on the legal aspects, though those have not been raised either in the written statement Exh. 19 or in the memo of appeal. Shri Udhoji, the learned Counsel for the appellant/plaintiff raised objection to these submissions and, therefore, the case was adjourned to enable Shri Udhoji to make his submissions on legal aspects.
7. Mr. Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the State, submitted that as per the Government's direction, the dealers and the agriculturists were required to submit the declaration of stock of foodgrains in 1973. The plaintiff was an agriculturist as well as dealer in foodgrains. He failed to submit the declaration of stock in the year 1973. There was directions from the Government that the surplus stock of those who failed to submit their declaration, should be seized. Therefore, on 23-3-1973, Shri Dorkar, then Food Supply Inspector, seized Jawar, Wheat and Rice stock of the plaintiff. Shri Vyawahare, then Food Supply Inspector, seized 22 quintal of Jawar on the same day. All these seized foodgrains were taken to the Government godown and were stored. Therefore, the Government officials acted in good faith and seized the goods under the bonafide belief. The plaintiff assessed the damages to the tune of Rs. 29,735/- and as he was paid Rs. 15,095.53, he claimed the balance of Rs. 14,639.47 paise as damages. As the officials acted in good faith and the plaintiff has not alleged any mala fide either against the Food Supply Inspector, who seized the goods, or any other Government Officers, the suit is not tenable at all in view of the provisions of section 15 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Section 15 of the Essential Commodities Act reads as under:
" (1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for the anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of any order made under section 3.
(2) No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Government for any damage caused or likely to be caused by anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of any order made under section 3."
7-A. It is no doubt that the plaintiff raised no plea that the action of seizure of the commodities from his possession or the disposal of the property by the Government officials, was a mala fide act. Consequently, no issue was framed on this aspect. Similarly, no defence was raised in the written statement, but it being a legal issue, it needs consideration.
7-B. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 deals with the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try all the civil suits of civil nature unless specifically barred. Section 9 reads as under:
"The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except the suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred."
A reliance has been placed on a case of Firm Seth Radha Kisdhan v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, . In that case the person aggrieved instituted a civil suit in the Civil Court for refund of the terminal tax instead of availing the remedy of appeal under section 84 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 and, therefore, it was held by Their Lordships that the suit is barred under section 86. Their Lordships observed as follows:
"Under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. A statute, therefore expressly or by necessary implication, can bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of a particular matter. The mere conferment of special jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of the said matter does not in itself exclude the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. The statute may specifically provide for ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Courts; even if there was no such specific exclusion, if it creates a liability not existing before and gives a special and particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the remedy provided by it must be followed. The same principle would apply if the statute had provided for the particular forum in which the remedy could be had.
But there is also an equally well settled principle governing the scope of the Civil Court's jurisdiction in a case where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy. Even in such cases, the Civil Court's jurisdiction is not completely ousted. A suit in a Civil Court will always lie to question the order of a tribunal created by statute, even if its order is, expressly or by necessary implication, made final, if the said tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the Act but in violation of its provision".
7-C. Any liability of the Government for acts of its servants, has been discussed in a case of M/s. Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, , wherein it is observed:
"There is a material distinction between acts committed by the servants employed by the State where such acts are referable to the exercise of sovereign powers delegated to public servants, and acts committed by public servants which are not referable to the delegation of any sovereign powers. If a tortious act is committed by a public servant and it gives rise to a claim for damages, the question to ask is: was the tortious act committed by the public servant in discharge of statutory functions which are referable to, and ultimately based on, the delegation of the sovereign powers of the State to such public servant? If the answer is in the affirmative, the action for damages for loss caused by such tortious act will not lie. On the other hand, if the tortious act has been committed by a public servant in discharge of duties assigned to him not by virtue of the delegation of any sovereign power, an action for damages would lie. The act of the public servant committed by him during the course of his employment is, in this category of cases, an act of a servant who might have been employed by a private individual for the same purpose. This distinction which is clear and precise in law, is sometimes not borne in mind in discussing questions of the State's liability arising from tortious acts committed by public servants".
7-D. A reliance has also been placed on a case of M/s. Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay, . In the case before their Lordships, the suit was filed to recover the tax so recovered under the Bombay Sales Tax Act. The point was raised that under section 20, the civil suit is barred expressly or impliedly by the statute. While deciding this aspect, their Lordships observed:-
"The normal rule prescribed by section Bombay Sales Tax Act of the Code of Civil Procedure is that the Courts shall (subject to the provisions contained in the Code) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. A claim by the dealers for the refund of sales tax which is alleged to have been paid by them through mistake is a claim of a civil nature. It should normally be triable by the ordinary courts of competent jurisdiction as provided by section 9. But the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try suits of a civil nature can be excluded either expressly or impliedly. This is laid down in this section itself. The question about the exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts either expressly or by necessary implication must be considered, in every case, in the light of the words used in the statutory provision on which the plea is rested, the scheme of the relevant provisions, their object and their purpose.
Whenever a plea is raised before a Civil Court that its jurisdiction is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication to entertain claims of a civil nature, the Court naturally feels inclined to consider whether the remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by a special statute is sufficient or adequate. Where the exclusion of the Civil Courts jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the considerations as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or the sufficiency of remedies provided for by it may be relevant, it cannot, however be decisive. But when exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication, such considerations would be very important, and, in conceivable circumstances, might even become decisive. If a statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right and liability to be dealth with by tribunals specially constitute in that behalf, and it further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, it is pertinent to enquiry whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not".
"Held (i) that the question about the taxability of a particular transaction was within the jurisdiction of the appropriate sales tax authorities exercising their powers under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946;
(ii) that even erroneous orders of assessment made would be entitled to claim its protection of section 20, Bombay Sales Tax Act against the institution of a civil suit.
(iii) ----------------
(iv) that the wide words of section 20 constituted an absolute bar against the institution of the present suit;
(v) that even on the wide construction the said section 20 was constitutionally valid".
8. Shri Udhoji, the learned Counsel for the appellant Shriram submitted that the provisions of Section 15 of the Essential Commodities Act, are not applicable to the instant suit because the plaintiff has not claimed damages, but he claimed prevalent market price of the commodities seized from him on 23-3-1973. The learned Counsel further submitted that there is no doubt that the provisions of section 15 are protecting the Government Officers if their acts or omissions are in good faith or bona fide. But, in the instant case, seizure being illegal as the prosecution failed to prove that the declaration given by the plaintiff was incorrect, therefore, the defendant cannot claim protection under the provisions of section 15 of the Essential Commodities Act.
8-A. Shri Udhoji, the learned Counsel for the appellant Shriram, further submitted that there are various enactments wherein the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. But, inspite of that the civil suits are tenable. In certain enactments there is complete or total bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court, while in some enactments there is an indemnity for the acts done in good faith or bona fide by the public servant.
8-B. Section 146 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, bars the civil suit and thereby giving indemnity to the Government Officers for the acts done in good faith. Section 146 reads as under:
"No suit or proceeding shall lie against the Government or against any Prohibition, Police, or other officers or against any person empowered to exercise powers or to perform functions under this Act, for anything in good faith done or purporting to be done under this Act".
8-C. Under Section 162 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, an indemnity for the acts done in good faith, is given. Section 162 reads as under:
"No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against the Registrar or any person subordinate to him or acting on his authority, in respect of anything in good faith done, or purported to be done by him by or under this Act".
8-D. Section 303 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 deals with the bar of the suit against the council, its officer, servants, etc., for acts done in good faith. However, this section has been interpreted in a case of Balapur Municipal Council v. Sk. Umrao, 1977 Maharashtra Law Journal, Note 35 (Nagpur). In the case before His Lordship the plaintiff sued for recovery of price of articles sold illegally for the recovery of dues. The Special Recovery Officer sold certain articles belonging to the plaintiff under section 168 of Maharashtra Municipalities Act, for the recovery of the amount of Rs. 493/-, said to be due from the plaintiff, when according to the plaintiff the arrears due were only Rs. 71/-. The sale fetched Rs. 227/-. The plaintiff challenged the same unsuccessfully before the Sub-Divisional Officer. Therefore, he filed the second appeal and the Additional Collector held that there was no justification for selling other articles. After the sale of safe it was sufficient for discharging the amount due but as the purchasers were not parties to the appeal the Additional Collector held that he had no power to order recovery of the articles illegally sold. It is alleged that the arrears being only Rs. 71/- but, the value of goods sold is more than the amount due and, therefore, Municipality was not entitled to take the benefit of the provisions of section 303 of the Municipalities Act. The facts of this case being altogether different, it is of no assistance to the plaintiff.
8-E. Section 124 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 deals with the bar of jurisdiction. Section 124 (i) specifies that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question (including a question whether a person is or was at any time in the past, a tenant and whether the ownership of any land is transferred to, and vests in, a tenant under section 46 or section 49-A or section 49-B) which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tahsildar or Tribunal, a Manager, the Collector or the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in appeal or revision or the State Government in exercise of their powers of control. Sub-section (2) of section 124 specifies that no order of the Tahsildar, the Tribunal, the Manager, the Collector or the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal or the State Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court.
8-F. Section 125 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, also bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the suits involving issues required to be decided under this Act. If any issue is involved in a civil suit, the Civil Court has to refer such issue to the competent authority for determination.
8-G. Section 41 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court. The import of the section is that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Commissioner, Collector, Tribunal, the officer authorised under section 27, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal or the State Government.
8-H. Section 114 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936, prescribes bar of suit or other legal proceedings against the Trust or any trustee or any person or servant of the Trust or any person acting under the direction of Trust or of the Chairman or any officer or servant of the Trust for anything in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act.
9. Shri Udhoji, the learned Counsel for the appellant Shriram, submitted on the basis of the enactments referred that there are two types of protections envisaged in the enactments. One is a complete bar of jurisdiction of the civil or Criminal Courts like provisions in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, while the second protection is about the indemnity for acts done in good faith by the Government or its servant, as per the provisions in the other enactments referred to above. It means in cases of the acts adverse to the provisions the Act or beyond the jurisdiction, neither the Government nor the officer/officers can claim any protection even if the act is done in good faith. For example, the Police Officer without obtaining warrant for search, visits a house of the person and enters the house or premises, such action is definitely without jurisdiction or against the provisions of the Act. Thus, the entry of the Police Officer will amount to trespass and the State and the Officer will be liable for the illegal act done without jurisdiction. Such actions will not be protected as taken in good faith. There is no dispite about the submissions of the learned Counsel, but in this case, it is not alleged that the seizure of the commodities on 23-3-1979, is either contrary to the provisions or any way they flouted the provisions of law. Similarly, it is not alleged that the action of seizure and sale is mala fide and that those were not done in good faith. Considering the facts in the instant case, and there being no averments or evidence to the effect that acts done by the District Food Supply Inspector, the Collector and other officials were not in good faith, definitely the provisions of section 15 of the Essential Commodities Act will come into play and thereby the suit instituted by the plaintiff is not maintainable.
10. It is further submitted by the plaintiff that the commodities which were seized from his possession, were not sold at a controlled price by public auction or through the fair price shop and, therefore, the act is contrary to the provisions of law. But, fact remains that it was sold through Akola Taluka Purchase and Sale Society, Akola and same amount was credited in the bank under challen Exh. 46. The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, vide his judgment and order dated 30th December, 1976, Exh. 35, acquitted the plaintiff and ordered to return the property or its price to the plaintiff. But, the commodities were neither returned to the plaintiff nor its price was paid. According to the plaintiff, its price comes to Rs. 29.735/-. As per section 6-A(3) of the Essential Commodities Act, the money so realised shall be paid to the owners thereof or the person from whom the commodity is seized.
10-A. My attention has been attracted to the provisions of Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Section 6-A(2) deals with the powers of the Collector to sell the commodities if they are subject to speedy and natural decay, at a controlled price, if any fixed for such essential commodity under the Act or under any law for the time being in force; or where no such price is fixed, order to sell the same by public auction; or through fair price shops at the price so fixed. The sale proceeds, after deduction of the expenses of any such sale or auction or other incidental expenses relating thereto, in the event of no confiscation under the provisions of this Act, to be paid to the person concerned. It is an admitted fact that during the pendancy of the criminal case, the commodities seized were sold through Akola Taluka Purchase and Sale Society and the sale proceeds were deposited in the Bank. Though it is stated by the plaintiff that he repeatedly approached the authorities and the Magistrate for the return of the commodities, but no action was taken, Plaintiff led no evidence or placed documents on record to substantiate his version. Section 6-A(2) empowers the Collector to sell the goods or commodities if they are subject to speedy and natural decay. Pralhad, the witness examined on behalf of the State, in para 2 specifically deposed that as per the direction of the Government all the stock seized from the plaintiff was sold to Akola Taluka Purchase and Sale Society. At that time prices of Jawar, wheat and Rice were fixed by the Government. In the written statement Exh. 19, the State has specifically pleaded in para 3 to the effect that the plaintiff is already paid Rs. 15,095.53 paise as price of the seized goods against the foodgrains according to the Government rate of that year. Shri Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the appellant State, rightly submitted that the Essential Commodities Act is a special enactment and, therefore, in itself is a special code, and, therefore, the provisions of this special Act are first to be considered. As per section 6-A(2) of the Essential Commodities Act, The Collector has been specifically empowered to deal with the seized property, no permission of Magistrate is required for the disposal of such goods. Permission is required after the conclusion of the criminal case. As the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act being in itself a complete Code, general provisions are not applicable. A reliance has been placed on a case of The State v. Abdul Rasheed, A.I.R. 1967 Mysore 231, wherein it is observed :
"Where a statute specifies a particular mode of enforcing a new obligation created by it, such obligation can as a general rule be enforced in no other manner than that provided by the statute. The amended provisions of section 6-A of the Act impliedly limit the powers of the Criminal Court in the matter of disposal of foodgrains etc. which are seized in contravention of the Act and Orders whether or not prosecution is instituted against the accused. Even after the prosecution is instituted, the Criminal Courts get power of disposal of foodgrains only after the enquiry or trial is over as provided under various clauses of the Orders made under section 3 or 5 of the Act."
10-B. In a case of Sri Krishna Oil and General Merchants and Commissions Agents, Ravulapalam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1984 Cri.L.J. 173, Their Lordships dealt with section 6-C(2), 7, 3 and 6-A. A person against whom the prosecution was launched is entitled to return of the goods confiscated by Collector under section 6-A or their monetary equivalent by virtue of section 6-C(2).
10-C. In a case of State of Maharashtra v. Morarji Hirji Maru and others, (1978 Mah.L.J. 260) (Bombay D.B.), the provisions of sections 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 6-D, and 7(1)(b) and sections 516-A and 517 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, are discussed. Their Lordships observed that provisions of sections 6-A to 6-D are of an interlocutory character and provisional in nature. Order of Collector is subject to order of Magistrate at conclusion of trial. When the prosecution ends in acquittal then also order of the Collector stands superseded and the property has to be returned to the accused in specie or as converted.
11. Lastly Shri Udhoji, the learned Counsel for the appellant Shriram, has submitted that section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for the interest. Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 empowers the Court to grant interest. However, the learned trial Court overlooked these provisions on the ground that the suit was for damages. It is also submitted that the plaintiff has claimed interest because the plaintiff was deprived of using this amount since long i.e. 1973. Therefore, the interest has not been claimed by way of damages, but for non-use of his money, he claimed interest at the rate of 18% p.a.
12. Shri Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the appellant State, submitted that these is no specific provision under the Essential Commodities Act regarding the interest. Section 6-C(2) deals with interest. However, it makes it clear that where in a prosecution instituted for the contravention of the order in respect of which an order of confiscation has been made under section 6-A, the person concerned is acquitted and in either case it is not possible for any person to return the essential commodity seized, such person shall, except as provided by sub-section (3) of section 6-A, be paid the price thereof as if the essential commodity has been sold to the Government with reasonable interest calculated from the day of the seizure of the essential commodity.
12-A. However, in the instant case, no order of confiscation was passed by the Collector or by competent authority and, therefore, question of granting interest, does not arise. A reliance has also been placed on a case of Mirza Javed Murtaza v. U.P. Financial Corporation, Kanpur and another, A.I.R. 1983 Allahabad 234 (D.B.), in which it is held that in the absence of any usage or contract, express or implied, or of any provision of law to justify the award of interest, the Court cannot award interest by way of damages caused on account of wrongful detention of money. It is also observed in para 14 as under:
" The law with regard to claim for interest is also by now well settled. The claim for interest may be sustained only in cases where the same is claimed either in terms of the agreement itself or when it is permitted by some law of custom or usage having the force of law. Interest may be awarded for the period prior to the date of the institution of the suit if there is an agreement for the payment of interest at fixed rate, or, it interest is payable by the usage of trade having the force of law, or under the provisions of any substantive law entitling the plaintiff to recover interest, as for instances, under section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and under section 61 of the Sales of Goods Act or Interest Act. Interest can be awarded if there was a debt or a' sum certain' payable at a certain time or otherwise by virtue of some written contract and there must have been a demand in writing stating that interest will be demanded from the date of the demand see Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India, and Union of India v. Rallia Ram, . In the absence of any usage or contract, express or implied, or of any provision of law to justify the award of interest, the Court cannot award interest by way of damages caused on account of wrongful detention of money."
12-B. A reliance is placed on a case of M/s Shankarlal Purnimal v. Commissioner of Civil Supplies, Hyderabad and another, , wherein His Lordship considered the provisions of sections 6-A(2) and 6-C. In the case before His Lordship, proceedings not resulted in passing of any confiscation order. Trader is merely entitled to refund of sale proceeds, but not interest. In view of this position, it is observed " The situation arising out of mere disposal of goods followed by their sale is not within the scope of section 6-C. Where an essential commodity is sold under sub-section (2) of section 6-A pending disposal of the confiscation proceedings which ended in passing no confiscation order by the Collector, section 6-A merely directs return of the goods or its value subject to the deduction of expenses of any sale. Thus section 6-A does not contemplate payment of any interest. It is only section 6-C of the Act that deals with the situation arising out of the appeal filed by the trader when an order of confiscation was passed, the section authorises payment of interest. Section 6-C will have no application to the present case since no order of confiscation has been passed by the Collector. In view of the above the petitioner whose case attracts section 6-A without reaching the appellate stage of section 6-C, is not entitled to payment of any interest. He is merely entitled to refund of sale proceeds."
13. In view of the discussion in the preceeding paras, the judgment and order of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Akola, dated 31st March, 1982 is set aside. In the result the First Appeal No. 137/82 is allowed while the First Appeal No. 139/82 is dismissed. The parties to bear their own costs.