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7. A reading of Section 78 therefore discloses that both the committee as well as an individual member can be removed. In so far as the removal of an individual member is concerned, the consequences are mentioned in clause (b) of Sub Section (1). The said clause (b) has a proviso which posits that a member who has been removed under Section 78(1)(b) shall not be eligible to be reelected, reappointed, renominated, BGP. 14 of 18 WP-5747-15 & WPST-16809-15 .doc 08.07.2015 or re-co-opted as a member of any committee till the expiry of the period of next one full term of the committee from the date on which he has been so removed. Hence, the proviso to clause (b) of Sub Section (1) provides for the disqualification of an individual member who has been removed under Section 78.

8. Now coming to Section 45 of the APM Act, the said provision also contemplates the removal of the marketing committee or the removal of the member. By Sub Section (2A) what is provided is that a member of the committee who has been removed under Sub Section (2A) shall not be eligible to be reelected, reappointed, renominated, or re-co-opted as member of the committee. Hence, Sub Section (2A) also provides for the disqualification of a member who has been removed under Sub Section (1). The Sub Section (2A) does not speak about the disqualification of a member on account of the supersession of the committee as a whole. In my view, except the way the relevant provisions are structured, there is no difference in the said two sets of provisions i.e. Section 78 and Section 45 and therefore, the said provisions can be said to be pari-materia. In so far as the judgment of the Division Bench is concerned, the Division Bench in the said case was also concerned with the rejection of the nomination filed by the Petitioner therein on the ground that he was a member of the managing committee which was superseded. The Division Bench held that BGP. 15 of 18 WP-5747-15 & WPST-16809-15 .doc 08.07.2015 the proviso to clause (b) of Sub Section (1) being a penal provision would have to be construed strictly and since it does not talk about the disqualification on the ground of the committee itself being superseded the rejection of the nomination on the said basis was unsustainable.

operative Societies Act and instead the entire body of the Managing Committee has been removed by invoking the powers under section 78(1)(a) of the said Act. In addition, the petitioner has not been disqualified under section 73-FF of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. The Returning Officer while rejecting the nomination form of the appellant has relied upon the provisions of section 73- FF(iv) which means that the nomination form of the appellant has been rejected on the ground that he has incurred disqualification under the said Act. It appears that the Returning Officer has held that the appellant has incurred disqualifications as the entire Board of Directors has been removed under section 78(1)(a) of the Act. The said ground in support of the order rejecting the nomination form is totally baseless as there is no disqualification from contesting elections to any other co- operative societies in the provisions of section 78(1)(a). However, the proviso to section 78(1)(b) as amended in 1997, provides that any member who has been removed under section 78(1)(b) shall not be eligible to be reelected, reappointed, renominated, or re-co-opted as a member of BGP. 16 of 18 WP-5747-15 & WPST-16809-15 .doc 08.07.2015 any committee till the expiry of the period of next one full term of the committee from the date on which he has been so removed or till such lesser period as may be. In the instant case, no order under section 78(1)(b) has been passed against the present appellant. Even otherwise, this Court in the case of Bhujangrao Narayanrao Deshmukh vs. State of Maharashtra as reported in 1995(1) Mh.L.J. 437 and in the case of Gurunath madhavrao Jamalpure vs. Zilla Parishad Teachers Co-operative Credit Society Ltd., Udgir reported in 1996(1) Mh.L.J. 409, had the occasion to interpret the provisions of section 78(1)(b) as well as its proviso. This Court held that the proviso is penal in nature and it has to be construed strictly and, therefore, unless the words of the statute are clear, we cannot bring more persons under the umbrella of this provision than is intended by the Legislature. It was further held that the proviso speaks about the single member and not of the entire committee. The observations in paragraph No.11 of the judgment in the case of Gurunath Jamalpure (supra) are reproduced below and the said observations were made by following the law laid down in Bhujangrao's case.