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and an order of discharge or termination of service as a result thereof "punitive in character", the fundamental difference between a probationer or a temporary employee and a permanent employee would be completely obliterated, which would be wholly wrong.

20. In the present case neither any formal departmental inquiry nor any preliminary fact- finding inquiry had been held and a simple order of discharge had been passed. The High Court has built an edifice on the basis of a statement made in the written statement that the respondent was a habitual absentee during his short period of service and has concluded therefrom that it was his absence from duty that weighed in the mind of Senior Superintendent of Police as absence from duty is a misconduct. The High Court has further gone on to hold that there is direct nexus between the order of discharge of the respondent from service and his absence from duty and, therefore, the order discharging him from service will be viewed as punitive in nature calling for a regular inquiry under Rule 16.24 of the Rules. We are of the opinion that the High Court has gone completely wrong in drawing the inference that the order of discharge dated 16.3.1990 was, in fact, based upon misconduct and was, therefore, punitive in nature, which should have been preceded by a regular departmental inquiry. There cannot be any doubt that the respondent was on probation having been appointed about eight 7 of 13 RSA-2559-1994 (O&M) -8- months back. As observed in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab the period of probation gives time and opportunity to the employer to watch the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserves a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period, which is styled as period of probation. The mere holding of preliminary inquiry where explanation is called from an employee would not make an otherwise innocuous order of discharge or termination of service punitive in nature. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the respondent's absence from duty was the foundation of the order, which necessitated an inquiry as envisaged under Rule 16.24(ix) of the Rules.

21. In the present case, neither it is in dispute nor it is the case of the respondent before this Court that a bare reading of the order of discharge shows that it is punitive or stigmatic. No malafide against the competent authority who had passed the order has been alleged. The fact that the respondent-plaintiff was appointed on 11.11.1989 and was on probation is also not disputed. Even the power of the Senior Superintendent of Police under Rule 12.21 of the Punjab Police Rules to discharge an employee within a period of three years of his enrollment has also not been disputed. The fact that the respondent-plaintiff had 10 of 13 RSA-2559-1994 (O&M) -11- absented himself from duty without leave from 02.12.1990 to 19.01.1991 i.e., 47 days 19 hours and then from 19.01.1991 to 12.02.1991 i.e., 23 days 22 hours and 30 minutes and thus, there being absence for a period of 72 days (approximately) has also not been disputed. Thus, in the said circumstances and in view of the law laid down in the abovesaid judgments, it cannot be said that the order of discharge is either in violation of Rule 12.21 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 or is stigmatic or punitive. Reliance placed on behalf of the respondent, upon the averments made in the written statement to the effect that the plaintiff-respondent was stated to be a habitual absentee during his short period of tenure also cannot be made the basis to hold that the order of discharge was punitive or stigmatic. Reference in this regard may be made to the observations made in paragraph 20 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and others vs. Sukhwinder Singh (supra) (relevant portion of which is reproduced hereinabove), to the effect that the High Court had completely gone wrong in building up a case of the order of discharge being punitive on the basis of averments made in the written statement to the effect that the employee was a habitual absentee during the short period.