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3. The present Suit was filed on 26th August 2019 which is post the 2019 amendment and since it raises a dispute covered under Section 91(1) of the MCS Act and Section 91(3) of the MCS Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the dispute is barred.

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4. Mr. Naphade has relied upon certain provisions of the MCS Act and in particular, Section 91(1) of the MCS Act, which provides that the Co-operative Court has jurisdiction to decide any dispute touching the constitution, elections, conduct of general meetings, management or "business of Society" between any of the class of persons mentioned in Section 91(1) (a) to (e). Further, Section 91(3) of the MCS Act provides that no Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any Suit or proceedings in respect of any dispute covered by Section 91(1) of the MCS Act. He has submitted that a conjoint reading of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("the CPC") and Section 91(3) of the MCS Act clearly indicates, that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is expressly barred in respect of any dispute covered by Section 91(1) of the MCS Act. He has also referred to Sections 43, 44 and 45 of the MCS Act as well as Rule 47 of the MCS Rules and Section 79A of the MCS Act. Emphasis has been laid on Section 45 of the MCS Act, wherein it is provided that save as is provided in this Act, the transactions of a Society with the persons other than members shall be subject to restrictions, if any, as may be prescribed. Thus, it saves and provides other restrictions under the MCS Act on transactions of the Society with persons other than members as may be prescribed.

12. Mr. Naphade has submitted that Section 154B(1) provides a list of provisions which will apply to housing societies 1-IAL-25993-22.doc which significantly includes Section 45 of the MCS Act. Moreover, Section 91 of the MCS Act was amended in 1969 by which a reference to Sections 43, 44 and 45 was added in Section 91(1)(c). The 2019 Amendment retains the applicability of Section 43(1) except its proviso and Section 45 to housing societies. However, it omits Section 44 of the MCS Act. Thus, the legislative intent seems to be that a dispute between a Society and a non-member which is regulated by the MCS Act is covered within the class of disputes envisaged in Section 91 of the MCS Act. Thus, post 2019 Amendment, if the twin test namely, (i) that the dispute must fall within the class of disputes covered by Section 91 of the MCS Act and

25. Mr. Pai has also joined in the submissions with Mr. Naphade that there is a twin test of jurisdiction under Section 91 of the MCS Act after the 2019 Amendment. The first test being Section 91(1) of the MCS Act and the second test is for the parties to fall under Section 91(1)(a) to 91(1)(e) and in the present case 91(1)(a) and 91(1)(c) of the MCS Act. Section 91(1)(a) of the MCS Act contemplates Developer as an Agent of the Society. He has submitted that the Plaintiff No. 2-Developer being an Agent of the Society, falls within Section 91(1)(a) of the MCS Act. He has thereafter, placed reliance on the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 in Chapter X 1-IAL-25993-22.doc which deals with "Agency" which is relevant for the purpose of Section 91(1)(a). The word "Agent" used in Section 91(1)(a) is referable to any sort of Agency which may be with or without consideration and ranging from a simple Agency to any complicated relationship, so long as it is "to represent in dealings with the third persons". This is provided under Section 182 of the Contract Act. Agency may be for a consideration or without any consideration as provided under Section 185 of the Contract Act. The Agent's authority may be express or implied as provided under Sections 186 and 187 of the Contract Act. He has submitted that the Agent's authority, in the present case is "to do all lawful acts, deeds, matters and things pertaining to redevelopment" of the property of the Society. In that context, he has relied upon Clause 9 of the Development Agreement read with Section 188 of the Contract Act. Further, Agency of the Developer is terminable and in that context, he has referred to Clause 31 of the Development Agreement and Section 201 of the Contract Act. He has also submitted that the Agent can have interest in the property which is the subject matter of the Agency and in that context, he has relied upon Clause X of the Development Agreement read with Clauses 9 and 24 of the Development Agreement and the relevant Section 202 of the 1-IAL-25993-22.doc Contract Act. He has submitted that extent of delegation to the Agency does not making any difference so long as to the title of the Society is not parted with.

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57. Thus, in my view, since redevelopment is not one of the objects of the Plaintiff No. 1-Society, as per the Bye-Laws of the Plaintiff No. 1-Society, it cannot be said to be the business of the Society.

58. Further, I find much merit in the submission of Mr. Madon that the Amending Act of 2019 does not alter the legal position as laid down in a catena of judgments referred to above, which lay down that redevelopment cannot be considered to be business of the Society. This is upon a reading of Section 91 of the MCS Act, wherein "business of the Society" has been mentioned. Thus, absent amendment to the Bye-Laws of the Society, redevelopment cannot be read into the business of Society in Section 91 of the MCS Act. Further, mere inclusion of definition of " Builder promoter" cannot imply that the Builder promoter is one of the persons contemplated in Section 91 of the MCS Act. This considering that Section 91 has remained unamended. Thereby not including Builder promoter thereunder.