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24. In a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India [(2012) 6 SCC 502], the Court held as under:

“The independence of the Indian judiciary is one of the most significant features of the Constitution. Any policy or decision of the [pic]Government which would undermine or destroy the independence of the judiciary would not only be opposed to public policy but would also impinge upon the basic structure of the Constitution. It has to be clearly understood that the State policies should neither defeat nor cause impediment in discharge of judicial functions. To preserve the doctrine of separation of powers, it is necessary that the provisions falling in the domain of judicial field are discharged by the judiciary and that too, effectively.”

25. Thus, various Benches of different strength (Seven Judge Bench, Five Judge Bench and Two Judge Bench) of this Court have consistently held that independence of judiciary is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be permitted to be adversely impacted by policy- making or even by legislative power. The constitutional ethos of independent judiciary cannot be permitted to be diluted by acts of implied intervention or undue interference by the executive in the impartial administration of justice, directly or indirectly. This Court in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India [(1993) 4 SCC 441], in unambiguous terms stated: “Independence of judiciary has always been recognised as a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.” It is a known fact that a large part of the litigation in courts is generated from people being aggrieved against the governance, action and inaction of the Government including the executive and/or its instrumentalities. Thus, the courts must be kept free from any influence that the executive may be able to exercise by its actions, purely executive or even by its power of subordinate legislation. Where this court refers to independence, fairness and reasonableness in decision-making as the hallmarks of judiciary, there it also states impartiality as one of its essentials. Though, what is most important is the independence of judiciary, its freedom from interference and pressure from other organs of the State. The Courts and Judges, thus, must be provid Plot No 37/1, Site IV,ed complete freedom to act, not to do what they like but to do what they are expected to do, legally and constitutionally and what the public at large expects of administration of justice. If the State is able to exercise pressure on the Judges of the High Court by providing arbitrary or unreasonable conditions of service or altering them in an arbitrary manner, it would certainly be an act of impinging upon the independence of judiciary. Of course, what is put forward as part of the basic structure must be justified by reference to the provisions of the Constitution. When one looks into the scheme of our Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, there are many Articles, some of which I have already referred to, which clearly show that independence of the judiciary was of utmost concern with the framers of the Constitution. Such intent of the framers is not only ingrained into the ethos of our Constitution but is also explicitly provided for, even in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. Reference in this regard can usefully be made to Article 50 of the Constitution, which requires the State to separate the judiciary from the executive in public services of the State. This Article, with the passage of time, has turned into a constitutional mandate rather than a mere constitutional directive.

“…We may also usefully refer to the latest decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Registrar (Admn.), High Court of Orissa v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy wherein K. Venkataswami, J., speaking for the Constitution Bench, made the following pertinent observations in the very first two paras regarding Articles 233 to 235 of the Constitution of India:
“An independent Judiciary is one of the basic features of the Constitution of the Republic. Indian Constitution has zealously guarded independence of Judiciary. Independence of Judiciary is doubtless a basic structure of the Constitution but the said concept of independence has to be confined within the four corners of the Constitution and cannot go beyond the Constitution.” XXX XXX XXX [T]he mere fact that Article 309 gives power to the Executive and the Legislature to prescribe the service conditions of the Judiciary, does not mean that the Judiciary should have no say in the matter. It would be against the spirit of the Constitution to deny any role to the Judiciary in that behalf, for theoretically it would not be impossible for the Executive or the Legislature to turn and twist the tail of the Judiciary by using the said power. Such a consequence would be against one of the seminal mandates of the Constitution, namely, to maintain the independence of the Judiciary.”

31. Keeping in view the doctrine of separation of powers and independence of judiciary, which are the structural ethos of our Constitution, it is expected that the legislative power and more particularly, the subordinate legislative power, ought not to be exercised so as to obtrude these basic fundamental principles. The exercise of subordinate legislative power, which by necessary implication, entrenches upon the independence of judiciary, would have to be decided on the touchstone of it being violative or otherwise, of the basic structure of the Constitution.