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6) These orders are under challenge in these appeals and writ petition.

7) Stand of the appellant-Abu Salem The appellant has been extradited from Portugal for being tried in eight cases including the Bombay Bomb Blast Case No. 1 of 1993 subject to certain conditions and the sovereign assurance given by the Government of India to the Government of Portugal. It was his stand that the charges under Sections 3(4), 5 and 6 of the TADA Act, Sections 4(b) and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, Section 25 of the Arms Act and Section 9B of the Explosives Act (in R.C. No. 1(S/93)/CBI/STF (Bomb Blast Case) and charges under Section 120B, 387 and 386 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 5 of the TADA (in C.R. No. 144 of 1995) are in flagrant disobedience of the mandate of Section 21 of the Indian Extradition Act as well as the solemn sovereign assurance of the Government of India, the ministerial order of extradition of the appellant passed by the Government of Portugal, the judgment of the Court of Appeals as well as the Supreme Court of Portugal.

23) The main grievance of the appellant is that inasmuch as he being specifically extradited for trial of certain offences only, the present action of the Designated Court and the prosecution adding other offences without recourse to specific order from the Government of Portugal cannot be sustained. Before us, learned counsel for the appellant administered the list of offences for which Government of Portugal agreed to and adding certain other charges which are in flagrant disobedience of the mandate of Section 21 of the Extradition Act as well as the solemn sovereign assurance of the Government of India. According to the appellant, the charges under Sections 3(4) , 5 and 6 of the TADA Act, Sections 4(b) and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, Section 25 of the Arms Act, Section 9B of the Explosives Act and charges under Section 120-B, 387 and 386 of IPC and under Section 5 of TADA are all impermissible, contrary to the solemn sovereign assurance of the Government of India, the ministerial order of extradition of the appellant passed by the Government of Portugal, the judgment of the Court of Appeals as well as the Supreme Court of Portugal.

24) The parties are in agreement over the application of Section 21 of the Extradition Act, 1962 (which we have already extracted in the earlier part of our judgment) to the case of extradition of the appellant from Portugal to India on 11.11.2005. We have already pointed out that in the absence of formal treaty between India and Portugal, the request for extradition had been made under the International Convention on Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. By virtue of Notification dated 13.12.2002, the Government of India made the provisions of the Extradition Act applicable for the purpose of extradition of the appellant from Portugal to India. It is also pointed out that in the ministerial order dated 28.03.2003, the Government of Portugal rejected the request for extradition of the appellant for the offences under Sections 201, 212, 324, 326, 427 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3(4), 5 and 6 of the TADA Act, Sections 4 & 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, Section 9B of the Explosives Act and Section 25(1A) and (1B) of the Arms Act. Similarly, the Government of Portugal rejected the request for extradition of the appellant for the offences under Sections 120-B, 387 and 386 IPC and under Section 5 of the TADA Act. The said Notification dated 11.04.2003 was published in the official gazette of the Government of Portugal specifying the offences for which consent for extradition was granted. Learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Portugal confirmed the ministerial order and the Notifications. The Supreme Court of Portugal specifically referred to the "Principle of Speciality" and the assurances given by the Government of India regarding the fulfillment of the speciality rule. The pith and substance of the argument of the counsel for the appellant is that once the appellant has been brought to India on the basis of the extradition treaty, he can only be tried for offences mentioned in the extradition decree for which his extradition had been sought and not for other offences. He also pointed out that the Designated Court has no jurisdiction to try the appellant for such offences. He relied on the judgment of this Court in Daya Singh Lahoria vs. Union of India & Ors., (2001) 4 SCC 516. Learned counsel pressed into service the following principles in respect of "Doctrine of Speciality" as discussed in pages 521-522 of the judgment: