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3. On the principal question as to whether the pending petitions (meaning petitions filed and admitted before 1-2-1977) under the original Article 227 would be governed or affected by the amended Article 227 which has come into force on 1st February 1977, Mr. Seervai appearing for the petitioners submitted that such pending petitions will have to be proceeded with, heard and disposed of by this Court under the original Article 227 and the hearing and disposal of these petitions will not be affected in any manner by the amended Article 227 for three or four reasons; in the first place he urged that the amended Article 227 has not been given any retrospective operation either expressly or by necessary intendment so as to apply to or govern the pending petitions and in the absence of such retrospective operation the pending petitions must be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with the original or unamended Article 221; secondly, he pointed out that in the context of Section 58 of the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 making special provisions hi regard to pending petitions under the original Article 226 (where expressly it has been enacted that such pending petitions shall be dealt with in accordance with the amended Article 226) and in the absence of similar provision in regard to pending petitions under the unamended Article 227 it should be reasonably inferred that the Parliament did not intend to make the amended Article 227 applicable to pending; petitions filed under the original or unamended Article, 227 and the intention was clear that such petitions should be governed and- disposed, of under the original Article 227; thirdly, he relied upon Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as also on the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in the leading ease of Colonial Sugar Refinery Ltd. v. Irving reported in 1905 AC 369; and lastly, in the alternative, he urged that quite independently of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, such pending petitions would be saved from the amended Article and would have to be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with the original Article 227 in view of the well-settled general principle that, unless contrary can be shown a provision which takes away the jurisdiction of a court is itself subject to an implied saving of a litigant's right and there is, nothing in the amended Article 227 to indicate to the contrary. On the second question mentioned above, he submitted that if the Court came to the conclusion that the pending petitions under the original Article 227 were governed by and were required to be proceeded with under the amended Article 227, it would be bath seasonable and equitable to grant permission to the petitioners to amend their petitions so as to convert them into petitions under Article 226, for, it is because of amendment that has been effected by Parliament in the original Article 227 that the necessity to amend the petitions in the above manner could be said to have arisen, for which the petitioners cannot be blamed; of course, he fairly conceded that unless the petitioners were able to make out a case under Article 226 the Court would not be in a position, to grant any relief to them, but that would be an aspect touching the merits of the case which the Court will have to determine after the amendment was allowed. On the third question he submitted that in regard to future petitions the High Court will be able to exercise the power of superintendence under the amended Article 227 not only over all courts but also over tribunals, bodies or authorities provided two conditions were satisfied viz. (i) such tribunal, body or authority, whatever be its label, was basically a court and (ii) such tribunal, body or authority was subject to High Court's appellate or revisional jurisdiction; in other words, the amended Article 227 is not confined to exercising judicial superintendence over regular civil or criminal courts constituted under the hierarchy of Courts but would extend to tribunals, bodies or authorities, who perform judicial functions of rendering definitive judgments having finality and authoritativeness to bind the parties litigating their rights before them in exercise of sovereign judicial power transferred to them by the State, provided such tribunals, bodies or authorities are subject to High Court's appellate or revisional jurisdiction.

4. In reply Messrs. Paranjpe and Bhabha, who appeared for the Union of India, Mr. R. W. Adik. the learned Advocate-General of Maharashtra and counsel for the respondents raised two or three contentions. In the first place, it was contended that the amended Article 227 confers on the High Court only 'administrative superintendence' over all courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction and the amendment effected in the original Article 227 has taken away the power of 'judicial superintendence' that had been conferred on the High Court by that article before its amendment; in other words, by the amendment the article has been brought on par with Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and has ceased to be on par with Section 107 of the Government of India Act. 1915 or Section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1361 and since judicial superintendence has been taken away by the amendment with effect from 1-2-1977, the High Court cannot exercise judicial superintendence even in regard to pending petitions because that power no longer exists. Secondly, it was contended that assuming without admitting that the amended Article 227 retains the power of judicial superintendence with the High Court, such power under the amended article is now confined to all courts which are subject to High Court's appellate or revisional jurisdiction and the expression 'all courts' must mean regular civil or criminal courts constituted under a hierarchy of courts, that is to say, courts constituted under the Bombay Civil Courts Act, the Presidency and Provincial Small Cause Courts Acts, the Bombay City Civil Court Act and criminal courts constituted under the Criminal P. C. and would not extend to any tribunal or authority or even a court constituted under any other enactment for enforcing the rights and' liabilities created by such enactment and as such no petition under the .amended Article 227 would He against the decisions or orders of various tribunals like the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal acting under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 or Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 or Maharashtra Co-operative Tribunals acting under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, etc. Thirdly, it was contended that Article 227 being merely procedural would normally operate retrospectively and cover pending petitions without express provision being made in that behalf and as such absence of a provision hi regard to pending petitions under the original Article 227 as is to be found in Section 58 of the 42nd Amendment Act in regard to pending petitions under Article 226 would not lead to an inference that the pending petitions under Article 227 were not governed nor intended to be governed by the amended Article 227. As regards Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the principle of Colonial Sugar Refinery Co.'s case (1905 AC 369) it was contended that neither Section 6 nor the ratio of the Privy Council decision would be applicable to the pending petitions in question, inasmuch as, both Section 6 as also the Privy Council decision deal with 'accrued right' or 'vested right of appeal' and it is such right and proceeding in respect thereof that are saved from the effect of a repealing enactment, while" Article 227, both in its original form as well as in its amended form merely conferred and confers power upon the High Court to exercise superintendence over all courts and tribunals (under the un-amended article) and over all courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction (under the amended article) but did not and does not confer any right on a litigant; in other words, since Article 227 dealt with and deals with procedural rights by way of conferring power of superintendence upon High Courts and not with substantive right of any litigant, Section 6 would be inapplicable and the presumption would be that the amended article would have retrospective operation and govern the hearing and disposal of pending petitions.

"It is a general rule that when the legislature alters right of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, Its enactment unless in express terms they apply to pending actions do not affect them. But there is an exception to this rule viz. where the enactment merely affects the procedure and do not extend to rights of parties. (Per Jessel M. R. in Re Joseph Suche & Co. Ltd., (1875) 1 Ch D 48 at p. 50)."

Moreover, here we are concerned with the question at a stage when the right to move the Court conferred by Article 227 has been exercised or put in action and proceedings have been commenced. In such a case the pending proceedings must be disposed of in accordance with the original Article 227. Secondly, we find considerable force in the contention of Mr. Seervai that in the context of Section 58 of the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 which makes the amended Article 226 applicable to pending petitions filed under the original Article 226 and in the absence of a similar provision in regard to pending petitions under the unamended Article 227 a reasonable inference should be drawn that the Parliament did not Intend to apply the amended article to pending petitions. In this behalf it must be remembered that the amendment of the Article 227 by the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 was a part and parcel of series of amendments that were effected or brought about in the Constitution and the amendment of original Article 227 will have to be considered along with other amendments, particularly the amendments that have been effected in the connected Article 226 and the special provision made in Section 58 as to pending petitions under Article 226. Looking at the question from this angle it will appear clear that in Section 58 of the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 the Parliament has made special provision with regard to pending petitions under Article 226 and has by that provision enacted that such pending petitions shall be dealt with in accordance with the amended Article 226 and it is also clear that a similar provision in regard to pending petitions under the unamended Article 227 has not been made and, therefore, a reasonable inference arises that Parliament did not intend that pending petitions under the original Article 227 should be governed by the amended Article 227. Mr. Paranjpe sought to explain the insertion of Section 58 in the Constitution on the basis that it was necessary to make some provision principally in respect of interim orders that had been passed by the High Courts in pending petitions under the original Article 226 while Mr. Bhabha tried to explain it on the basis that because the original Article 226 contained an admixture of procedural and substantive rights, the special provision of Section 58 was necessary and since the original Article 227 was purely procedural and the amended Article 227 took away the jurisdiction of the High Court over the tribunals a provision akin to Section 58 was unnecessary. It is not possible to accept either of the explanations as valid; in the first place, Section 58 does not principally deal with interim orders passed in pending petitions under the original Article 226 but deals with both as to what should happen to interim orders as also the pending petitions themselves and secondly, as discussed earlier, the original Article 227 did not deal with procedural matters but conferred a substantive right on the litigant and as such it Is not possible to accept the argument that the amended Article 227 has merely taken away the High Court's jurisdiction over tribunals but it has purported to abridge the litigant's right to move the High Court against the decisions or orders of tribunals. It is, therefore, clear that inference suggested by Mr. Seervai arises that Parliament did not intend that pending petitions under the original Article 227 should be governed by the amended Article 227.

20. In view of the aforesaid conclusion reached by us on pending petitions, it is unnecessary to deal with, or decide the question whether the pending petitions should be permitted to be amended by converting them into petitions under Article 226. However, if it became necessary we would certainly grant the necessary permission to amend and that too without imposing any condition as to costs, inasmuch as, the amendment shall have been necessitated by reason of the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 and not for any fault of the petitioners.