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Showing contexts for: demolition order in Hardayal Singh Mehta And Another vs M.C.D. And Others on 16 January, 1990Matching Fragments
5. During the pendency of the suit in this Court, respondent No. I made an order dated 4th of August, 1988 directing the petitioners to demolish a part of the property. This demolition order was set aside by the Tribunal on 14th of September, 1988 on an appeal by the petitioners. The Tribunal remanded the matter to respondent No.2 with a direction to make a fresh order after giving an opportunity to the petitioners to produce evidence in support of their contentions in the appeal. For this purpose, the petitioners were directed to appear before respondent No. 2 on 29th of September, 1988. But that day the Office of respondent No. 2 was closed. So, the petitioners were required, by a fresh notice, to appear on 7th of October, 1988 which was also declared a holiday. However, on 27th of September 1988, a statement was made on behalf of the Corporation, at a hearing of the said suit, that an order of demolition of the property had already been passed against the petitioners.
(5) Subject to an order made by the Administrator on appeal under Section 347D, every order made by the Appellate Tribunal on appeal under the this section, and subject to the orders of the Administrator and the Appellate Tribunal on appeal the order of demolition made by the Commissioner shall be final and conclusive.
(6) Where no appeal has been preferred against an order of demolition made by the Commissioner under sub-section (1) or where an order of demolition made by the Commissioner under that sub-section has been confirmed on appeal, whether with or without variation, by the Appellate Tribunal in a case where no appeal has been preferred against the order of the Appellate Tribunal, and by the Administrator in a case where an appeal has been preferred against the order of the Appellate Tribunal the person against whom the order has been made shall comply with the order within the period specified therein, or as the case may be, within the period, if any, fixed by the Appellate Tribunal or Administrator on appeal and on the failure of the person to comply with the order within such period, the Commissioner may himself cause the erection of the work to which the order relates to be demolished and the expenses of such demolition shall be recoverable from such person as an arrear of tax under this Act. "
25. There is yet another way to test the argument of Mr. Sabharwal in the context of the scheme of the provisions made in Ss. 343, 347-C and 347-D of the Act. The Commissioner has the power under sub-sec. (1) of S. 343 to make an order directing that any unauthorised erection or work shall be demolished by the person at whose instance it has been commenced or has been carried on or has been completed. The proviso prohibits the making of an order of demolition unless the concerned person has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why such order shall not be made. The unauthorised construction could be detected by the officers or servants of the Corporation or an information in respect of the same could be given to the Commissioner by anyone else. Irrespective of the source of the information, the exercise of power by the Commissioner must be based upon the material on record and the concerned person must have a reasonable opportunity to controvert the same. This is the first stage, and this is also the foundation on which the subsequent proceedings would rest. At this stage itself, a question must be asked whether a person, like respondent No. 4, has a right to participate in the proceedings. Even if it be assumed, for the sake of discussion, that the Commissioner may have initiated action under sub-sec. (1) on the basis of some information or material furnished by such a person; yet, the proceedings before the Commissioner would not partake the character of a dispute or a contest between the informant and the concerned person. As discussed earlier, in the event of exercise of power by the Commissioner under sub-section (1) of Section 343, the contest would still be between the Commissioner proposing to do the act, namely, to make the order of demolition, and the concerned person opposing it. The determination of the matter by the Commissioner is a quasi-judicial act. The Commissioner, after considering the cause shown by the concerned person, may think it fit to drop the notice or he may proceed to make an order directing that the unauthorised construction shall be demolished. If the Commissioner decides to drop the proceedings, that would be the end of the matter. In such a case, the person on whose information the Commissioner may have initiated the action has not been given a right to appeal against the decision of the Commissioner. The reason for it is, as earlier mentioned, that the proceedings under Section 343(l) are not adversary proceedings and there cannot be. a rival party to the proceedings other than the Commissioner. Therefore, the person who may have given information or supplied material to the Commissioner which may be relevant for the purposes of an action under sub-section (1) of Section 343, would not be the person aggrieved by the decision or the order of the Commissioner refusing to proceed in the matter. On the other hand, when the Commissioner makes an order of demolition, sub-section (1) of Section 343 enjoins upon the Commissioner a duty to deliver to the concerned person the order of demolition with a brief statement of the reasons therefore. This provision has been made to enable the concerned person to prefer an appeal against the order of demolition. Sub-section (2) of Section 343 gives a right to the "person aggrieved" by the order of the Commissioner to prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the person aggrieved will be only he whose building is sought to be demolished and not any other person who may be interested, for whatever reasons, to get the building demolished.
33. With regard to the third ground, it appears that the Tribunal mixed up the representative character of the Corporation as an elected body with the concept of a representative suit. The Corporation has been established as a body corporate under Section 3 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of this Section lays down that the Corporation shall be composed of councillors and elder men. Subsection (4) provides that the councillors shall be chosen by direct election from various wards into which Delhi is divided and elder men shall be chosen by the councillors from amongst persons who are qualified to be councillors but are not councillors themselves. In this sense, the Corporation is a representative body of the residents of Delhi. The Corporation, as a body,. corporate, is charged with the Municipal Government of Delhi. Section 41 declares that subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules, Regulations and Bye-laws made there under the Municipal Government of Delhi shall vest in the Corporation. It is incumbent on the Corporation, under Section 12 of the Act, to make adequate provision by means or measures which it may lawfully use or take, among other matters, for "the securing or removal of dangerous buildings and places". Provisions in Chapter XVI with regard to the Building Regulations have been made to discharge this obligatory function of the Corporation. Section 44 of the Act mentions the Commissioner as one of the authorities under the Corporation for the efficient performance of its functions. The Central Government has the power under Section 54, by a Notification in the Official Gazette to appoint a suitable person as the Commissioner. The entire executive power for the purpose of carrying out the relevant provisions to the Act vests in the Commissioner by virtue of Section 59 of the Act. The Commissioner is the authority empowered to make an order of demolition under, and in accordance with Section 343. Thus, it is clear that the power to make an order of demolition can be exercised only by the specified authority and in accordance with the provision made for that purpose under Section 343. This is a part of the executive power which vests in the Commissioner who discharges this function as an authority under the Corporation. The Tribunal has misdirected its view on the erroneous assumption that the Corporation or the Commissioner exercises the power under Section 343 in a representative capacity for and on behalf of the residents of the area for whose benefit this provision has been made. No doubt, the Corporation and the Commissioner exercise the power vested in them in public interest and for the public good but that does not mean that they do so in "a representative capacity" in the sense betrayed by the impugned order. The analogy of a representative suit is wholly inapplicable to the present case. A representative suit envisages numerous persons having the "same interest" in one suit. It is only in that kind of situation that anyone or more of the persons having the same. interest can seek and be permitted to participate in the proceedings as a party to the suit. In order to put the proposition to a test, could it be said that a resident of the locality could take unto himself the task of demolition of a building or to make an order of demolition or to call upon another to show cause why was building should not be demolished on the failure of the Municipal Authorities to do so on his asking. Obviously, no one can do so in a civilised society and no such proposition can even be countenanced. Otherwise, everyone would take the law in his own hands which would result in chaos rather than an orderly Municipal Government of Delhi.