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6. The petitioner's counsel elaborates and builds up his argument in this way. According to the complaint, the averments contained in the affidavit are false, though the petitioner disputes that description. If the averments are false, according to the respondent, then the declarant of the affidavit has given false evidence in a judicial proceeding and thereby committed an offence under Section 193, Penal Code. If this is so, assuming, without admitting, that false evidence has been given, the result is that an offence under Section 193, Penal Code, is committed, in which case, by virtue of Section 195 (1) (b), Criminal P. C., no Court can take cognisance of an offence under Section 193, Penal Code, committed in relation to, or in the course of a judicial proceeding without a complaint from the Court before which the offence has been committed. There is no such complaint in the present case. If the alleged false statements partake of the nature of the defamatory statements also, then the person who, as a witness, who in this case is the same as a party to the proceeding, makes such a false statement, has absolute privilege in the making of those statements, and therefore cannot be proceeded with in a criminal Court for an offence under Section 500, Penal Code. If the plea of absolute privilege has to be accepted, then the only other imaginable offence which could have been committed is one under Section 193, Penal Code for which there is no complaint from Court and hence the lower Court ought not to have entertained the complaint. Secondly, even if the declarant has no absolute privilege in relation to the statements made, still, since, according to the complaint, by the self-same statement not only an offence under Section 193, Penal Code, but also an offence under Section 500, Penal Code, is committed according to the decisions of this and other Courts, an offence under Section 499, Penal Code, cannot be enquired into in the absence of a complaint from the Court for an offence under Section 193, Penal Code. Various authorities were cited in favour of the above proposition. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent urges that the case of absolute privilege has not been put forward in the lower Court at all but the objection to the entertainability of the complaint was put forward on the assumption that an offence under Section 500, Penal Code, has been committed. It is further contended that the Indian Law of Defamation as enacted in Sections 499 and 500, Penal Code, is different from the law of England because the English Common Law relating to libel and slander cannot be administered in India in the face of the statutory provision contained in Sections 499 and 500, Penal Code. Though some earlier oases of this Court and other Courts had taken the view that witnesses have an absolute privilege in India in the same manner as they enjoy in England, later cases have veered round to the view that the question is only one of qualified privilege as enunciated in Sections 499 and 500 of the Code. In England ordinarily libel alone is indictable in a criminal Court whereas slander is an actionable tort. But both libel and slander have been included in Section 499, Penal Code, and therefore even though a slanderous statement cannot ordinarily be criminally indicted in England, in India slander can be made the subject of a criminal prosecution on account of the statutory provision contained in Sections 499 and 500, Penal Code. The English Common Law regarding civil remedies for libel and slander are alone administered in India and not where it relates to a crime. Therefore the contention is raised that there is only a qualified privilege so far as witnesses are concerned. The decisions which lay down that, where one and the same set of circumstances or transaction creates offences for one of which a complaint from Court is necessary and for entertaining the other, such a complaint is not, a Court cannot take cognizance of the minor complaint and thereby circumvent the provisions of Section 195, Criminal P. C., cannot apply to this case, where the two offences alleged to have been committed, viz., under Sections 193 and 500, Penal Code, cannot be termed to be offences related to each other in any way but are totally separate and independent offences. The reason put forward is that a conviction or acquittal for an offence under Section 198, Penal Code, does not bar the conviction or acquittal for an offence under 3. 500, Penal Code, on the same set of facts. In other words, the merger of offences, viz., a minor one being merged in a major one, which requires a complaint from a Court, or a graver crime in which is, included a less serious crime, cannot apply where the offences are giving false evidence and defamation as in this case. The two are distinct and separate, the elements of the one having ^nothing to do with the elements of the other.

11. We have nest to see as to how fat the contention, that the alleged defamatory statement, being also one to which is attached the characteristic of an offence under Section 198, Penal Code, cannot be made the subject of a prosecution because of the absence of a complaint from Court under Section 195, Criminal P. C., can be acceded to or not. A large number of cases have been quoted in relation to this topic. The second part of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even if there is no absolute privilege or immunity from criminal prosecution still, since the passages complained against, according to the present complainant-respondent, are false and constitute an offence under Section 193, Penal Code, it is more in consonance with natural justice and equity that where, on the same facts, a general offence, which does not require a complaint by a Court or public servant, is committed along with a more aggravated, and, particularised form of offence, it is not open to the prosecution to circumvent the provisions of Section 195, Criminal P. C., by resorting to proceed with the general minor offence without attempting to move the Court, or the officer concerned, for taking action under Section 195, Criminal P. C. It is hence urged that the Court must consider the facts in the complaint as a whole and if they disclose an offence for which a special complaint is necessary under Section 195, Criminal P. C., the Court cannot take cognizance of the case at all unless such a complaint has been filed. Various decisions are cited in support of this contention, but it is not quite necessary to refer to them in detail. The latest case is by one of us in Chinnayya Goundan, In re, (1948) 1 M.L.J. 448: (A.I.R. (35) 1948 Mad. 474 : 49 Cr. L. J. 737) where it was held that when certain persons are prosecuted under Section 143 read with Section 188, Penal Code, for defiance of an order under Section 144, Criminal P. C., the real offence committed is one under Section 188, Penal Code, and the accused cannot be tried for a minor general offence like the one under Section 143, Penal Code, without a proper complaint under Section 195 (1) (a), Criminal P.C., and the trial and conviction without such a complaint would be without jurisdiction. In this case reference has been made to the decision of Curgenven J. in Perianna Muthirian v. Vengu Ayyar, 56 M.L.J. 208 : (A.I.R. (16) 1929 Mad. 21 : 30 Cr.L.J. 322) to the decision of a :Bench consisting of Jackson and Curgenven JJ. in Ravanappa Reddi v. Emperor, 55 Mad. 348 : (A. I. R. (19) 1932 Mad. 253 : 38 Cr. L. J. 86l) and to other, decisions. The decision of Madhavan Nair and Burn JJ., In re Appadurai Nainar, 59 Mad. 165 : (A.I.R. (23) 1936 Mad. 89 : 37 Cr.L.J. 159) has also been discussed and followed. Happell J. in Antarvedi Sarma, In re, (1946) l M.L.J. 466 : (A.I.R. (33) 1946 Mad. 489 : 47 Cr.L.J. 1034) has also referred to the earlier cases and analysed them exhaustively and the learned Judge followed the decision in Appadurai Nainar v. Sampath Rao Nainar, 59 Mad. 165 : (A.I.R. (23) 1936 Mad. 89:,37 Cr.L.J. 159). We are in entire agreement with the decision in Perianna Muthirian v. Vengu Aiyar, 56 M. L. J. 208 : (A. I. R. (16) 1929 Mad. .21 : 30 Cr.L.J. 322) which was followed in Ravanappa Reddi v. Emperor, 55 Mad. 343 : (A.I.R. (19) 1932 Mad. 253 : 33 Cr.L.J. 361) Which again was followed in Re Appadurai Nainar, 59 Mad. 165: (A.I.R. (23) 1936 Mad. 89: 37 Cr.L.J. 159) where the proposition of law has been laid down that parties should not be allowed to evade the provisions of Section 195 (1) (b), Criminal P. C., by filing a complaint under another provision of the Penal Code if, clearly, an offence under Section 193, Penal Code, or any other section mentioned in Section 195 (1) (b), Criminal P. C., has been committed. This view is supported not only by the three cases adverted to above but also by Anatarvedi Sarma, In re, (1946) l M.L.J. 466 : (A.I.R. (33) 1946 Mad. 489 : 47 Cr.L.J. 1034), Chinnayya Goundan, In re, (1948) l M. L. J. 448 : (A.I.R. (35).1948 Mad. 474 : 49 Cr.L.J. 737), Srinivasa v. Ramasami, I. L. R. (1945) Mad. 459 : (A. I. R. (32) 1945 Mad. 9 : 46 Cr. L. J. 259), Subramanya Aiyar v. Swamikannu Chetty, 1933 M.W.N. 217 : (A.I.R. (20) 1933 Mad. 413 : 34 Cr.L.J. 800), Somayya v. Satyanarayana, 1934 M.W.N. 694 and Gopalaswami v. Emperor, 1935 M.W.N. 1344.

27. This is not the only aspect of the matter. An offence under Section 193, Penal Code, is not compoundable under any circumstances while an offence under Section 600, Penal Code, can be compounded by the person defamed even without the leave of the Court. If, therefore, the contention of Mr. Jayaram Aiyar is acceded to, it would become possible for a person who is being prosecuted for perjury to circumvent the prohibition against the compounding of such an offence, by compounding the offence of defamation with the person aggrieved. He could thus effectively bar a prosecution under Section 183, Penal Code. It is a familiar rule that you cannot do indirectly what you are prohibited from doing directly and an argument which would enable an accused person indirectly to compound a non-compoundable offence cannot be countenanced.

29. These considerations suggest that the better view would be that where an offence falls both under Section 193 and under Section 500, Penal Code, a prosecution under Section 600, Penal Code, would lie without a complaint by a Court for the offence under Section 193. One objection to this view would be that to a certain extent it would enable a private individual to circumvent the prohibition imposed by Section 195 (1) (b), Criminal P.O., against prosecuting a person for an offence under Section 183, Penal Code, without the leave of the Court. It must be recognised that to some extent this is so. But then this does appear to be a contingency which if not manifestly envisaged is provided for in our criminal law. Section 235 (2), Criminal P. C. enacts :