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2. The challenge as indicated in the writ application and the submissions made before us is based on a very short and interesting argument that after 4-5-1988 the Act ceased to have effect and therefore, any action taken in a proceeding which was instituted under the said Act, prior to that date does not survive for adjudication. It is the case of the petitioner that undisputedly as provided in Section 1(4), the Act ceased to have effect from the said date. The Act being a temporary Act it has expired by efflux of time and since it has not been repealed by any other law, the provisions of Section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act, 1937 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Orissa Act') has no application as the same relates to the effect of repeal. Since there is no repeal in the instant case, the Act has ceased to be operative by efflux of time. It was the intention of the legislature that the Act was a temporary statute intended to be effective for a certain time and after the efflux thereof, the Act was inoperative. In the aforesaid premises it was contended that the continuance of the proceeding after 4-5-1988 is not sanctioned by law and any action taken has no force in the eye of law. The legislative intent is very clear and there is no saving clause in true sense of the term. Even otherwise, the so-called saving clause was in conflict with the body of the statute which intended it to be time bound. The incorporation of the so-called saving clause is inconsistent with the object of the legislation. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the opportunity No. 2 that the argument has no substance as Section 1(4) itself provides answer to such submission, and there was conflict/inconsistency.

(Underlining by us for emphasis) We have underlined the portion as above to indicate the legislative intent. The legislature was aware of the fact that the Act' was a temporary one and it was not being repealed and/or being substituted by any other Act. Therefore, a deeming clause is inserted which clearly provides that in respect of things done or omitted to be done before the date of expiry, the provisions of Section 5 of the Orissa Act would be applicable as if the Act was being repealed by any other Act (referred to as the Orissa Act in the provision). Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the Act was a temporary statute, the Orissa Act had application and particularly Section 5 of the Orissa Act governed the field. Section 5 of the Orissa Act reads as follows:

The effect of the expression "except with respect to things done, or omitted to be done" has been considered by several Courts. The Delhi High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court have taken the view that the words were used to indicate protection to proceeding or action already taken or omitted to be taken. (See 1969 Cri LJ 1582 (Madras); M. R. Pratap v. Director of Enforcement, New Delhi, AIR 1959 Madh Pra93 : State of Madhya Pradesh v. Hiralal Sutwale).

4. The effect of the expiry of a temporary statute has been the subject of adjudication by the Supreme Court in a large number of cases. The guiding principle as laid down by the Supreme Court is to the effect that in the absence of any special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires. The legislature can and often enough does avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision is in some respects similar to the effect of the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. See AIR 1959 SC 609 : Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration and AIR 1962 SC 945; State of Orissa v. Bhupandra Kumar Bose. The provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act are identical in terms of Section 5 of the Orissa Act.

5. As stated above the legislature is empowered to provide for contingencies arising out of expiry of a temporary statute and to make provision for valid continuance of the proceeding initiated after such expiry. In the case of Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1020, a contention was raised that the Emergency Risks (Factories) Insurance Act, 1962, was itself a piece of temporary legislation which lapsed on 10-1-1963 and the proceedings initiated thereunder could not have been continued without any authority of law after expiry of the said Act. A contention similar to one raised before us was also raised that where there is no repeal and a temporary statute ceases to be operative by efflux of time the proceedings initiated thereunder do not have any validity after the date of expiration. The Supreme Court held that whatever be principles of construction of temporary statutes and the effect on the rights and obligations under them on the expiry of the statute itself, where specific provisions are contained preserving the rights and obligations, they are not invalidated on account of the expiry of the statute. The principles behind preservation of such rights and obligations are lucidly contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and for that matter in Section 5 of the Act and the basic feature is that ail the provisions of the Act continued to be effective and in force for the purposes of enforcing the liability, if any, incurred when the statute was in force and if investigation, legal proceeding, remedy is instituted it shall be continued or enforced as if the statute had not expired. Similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Amadalavalasa Co-operative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 958.