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10. It should be noted that this Act, which came on 27.2.1991, receiving assent of the President of India, was earlier challenged before the Allahabad High Court, where it was found to be valid. The High Court held that the invalidity of the land acquisition in issuance of the Section 4 and Section 6 notification simultaneously, was cured by this Act, which was made applicable with retrospective effect. It was not with an intention to wipe out the judgment of this Court in the case of Radhey Shyam (cited supra). Validity of the Validating Act also came before this Court in Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satvir Singh & Ors. reported in 1996(11) SCC 462. There, it was held that the exercise of the power under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 were not vitiated and the Validating Act was not invalid. This Court specifically observed in that case:-

The High Court held that the Legislature, by amending Act, has merely removed the defect pointed out by this Court in case of Radhey Shyam (cited supra) and removed the basis of the decision rendered by the Court. The High Court also rejected the argument regarding the Section 17(4) and the proviso added to it by Validating Act. Ultimately, the High Court, wholly relying on the judgments in Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Jan Kalyan Samiti Sheopuri reported in 1996 (1) SCC 562, Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Jan Kalyan Samiti, Sheopuri reported in 1996(2) SCC 365 and Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satvir Singh & Ors. (cited supra), held that the High Court had no authority to hold these three cases as per incurium and since in these three cases the Validating Act was upheld, there was no question of finding fault with the Validating Act. Similarly, the High Court also rejected the argument regarding the invalidity of Sections 17(1)(3A) and (4) of the Act. The High Court also independently considered the principle of eminent domain. The High Court also considered the Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-II and found that the final award was made on 25.2.1987 while in Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-III Scheme, proceedings for passing the award were completed and were sent to the appropriate authority for scrutiny, consideration and approval. The High Court went on to approve of the application of the urgency clause in both the schemes. It also took into account the argument of the LDA that the possession of the lands were already taken and a new city has already come up on the banks of river Gomti and a huge township has come up consisting of flats, houses and markets etc. which was constructed by LDA. Not only this, those premises have been transferred to thousands of people, inhabited in the colonies and, therefore, it would not be worthwhile to interfere in the process of acquisition. The High Court also approved the argument that once a possession was already taken, the Government would not withdraw from acquisition nor would the proceedings lapse. The High Court also found, as a matter of fact, that the possession of the whole land was already taken over, contrary to the claim made by the Writ Petitioners that they were still in possession. Ultimately, on all these grounds, the Writ Petitions came to be dismissed. All the present appeals are against the aforementioned common judgment of the High Court, disposing of the Writ Petitions.

17. Finding that the challenge to the notification was held to be valid by this Court in Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Jan Kalyan Samiti (cited supra) and in Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satvir Singh (cited supra), the Learned Senior Counsel assailed these cases on the ground that in these cases, the constitutional validity was not considered at all. It was pointed out then that the High Court judgment was bad, as it did not consider the question of validity of the Act merely on the ground that in the aforementioned two decisions in Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Jan Kalyan Samiti (cited supra) and in Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satvir Singh (cited supra), the said Act was held valid though extensive arguments were made before the High Court suggesting as to why the two cases did not apply to the matter. It was also suggested that we should refer the matter to the larger Bench, as in the aforementioned two cases, the questions raised in the appeal were not decided. The contentions raised by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants can be classified in two major parts, the first part being constitutional validity of the Amending Act and the constitutional validity of Section 17(4) proviso of the Act introduced thereby, as also the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Amending Act. This would be the first part. The other contentions of Shri Trivedi pertain to the merits of the land acquisition on the question of date of taking possession, non payment of 80% compensation and the policy of the State Government regarding Cooperative Societies.

40. It was then argued that Section 17 (4) of the Act as amended by the Amending Act is ultra vires of the Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution as it nearly overrules the decision of this Court in State of UP v. Radhey Shyam Nigam (cited supra). We have already dealt with this issue and pointed out that this question was specifically dealt with in the two judgments of Lucknow Development Authority and Meerut Development Authority (cited supra). A very strong reliance was placed on Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India reported in 1978 (2) SCC 50 by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. In Meerut Development Authority's case (cited supra), the aforementioned decision in Madan Mohan Pathak's case (cited supra) has already been considered in paragraph 11 of that judgment. Reliance was also placed on the judgment in Bakhtawar Trust v. M.D. Narayan & Ors. reported in 2003 (5) SCC 298. Learned Counsel for the appellant relied on paragraphs 14 to 16. In our opinion, paragraph 14 was completely against the appellants wherein the State Legislature's power to make retrospective legislation and thereby validating the prior executive and legislative acts retrospectively is recognized. Of course, the same has to be done only after curing the defects that led to the invalidation. We respectfully agree with the propositions laid down in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 thereof. In Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Broach Borough Municipality reported in 1969 (2) SCC 283, which is referred to in paragraph 16 of the decision, it is stated that:-