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Showing contexts for: Motion Re in Mohan Lal Tripathi vs District Magistrate, Rae Bareilly And ... on 15 May, 1992Matching Fragments
No part of the section lends support to the submission that its applicability should be confined to President elected by the board, only. Much was attempted to be made out of the proviso. It was urged that since it could not apply to a President elected by the people, the Legislature should be deemed to have intended that it did not desire a president elected by the people to be removed by vote of no- confidence. This section comes into operation after a vote of no-confidence has been passed. Law of expressing no- confidence against a President has been provided for in Section 87-A relevant part of which has been extracted earlier. It applies uniformally to every President whether elected by the Board or electorate. A President elected by the electors has been treated at par with the President elected by the Board. There appears no rationale to treat them differently for any purpose. In absence of any indication Section 87-A applies to either of the President and a motion of no-confidence passed against any one of them in accordance with procedure provided therein could not be said to suffer from any infirmity. It cannot be legitimately urged that the applicability of Section 87-A stands controlled by Section 47-A. The former is a substantive provision authorizing the board to initiate action against a President for loss of confidence. Whereas latter is a procedural section coming into operation after communication to the President of the decision of the Board. The two operate in different field. One is the right of the Board, representative body of the electors of the Municipal Board, to remove a person for loss of confidence, the other is a duty of the President to act with grace and lay down his office in keeping with democratic tradition on mandate of recall. Section 47-A has to be read and construed so as to advance the purpose of Section 87-A and not to frustrate it. On plain reading of the Section or provision there does not appear to be any ambiguity. True from 1926 to 1942 no- confidence motion could be brought against elected President under Section 43(1) only and not the ex-officio one nominated under Section 43(2). But from that it cannot be held, as urged, that Section 47-A should be held to apply to President elected under Section 43(1) only. The ex-officio chairman was excluded from operation of Section 47-A not by implication but express provision. That cannot furnish any historical basis to construe Section 47-A as applying to only those Presidents who were elected by the board. A clear and unambiguous proviso cannot be interpreted by taking an analogy from earlier provision as it stood in the past. A legislature while amending, substituting or deleting any provision acts in presenting drawing from past experience and providing for future. That cannot be defeated by projecting into in the past by interpretation. Nor can the provisions be held to be vague because they do not provide any safeguard against moving a no- confidence motion against the President who is re-elected as was in 1949. In fact the history goes against appellant. In 1949 Section 43 was amended and President of either Municipality was to be elected by the electors directly as sub-section (2) of Section 43 was substituted and it provided as under :