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(2) I.L.R. 58 Cal. 180 from p. 193 onwards.

(3) L.R. 4 C.P 296.

(4) 33 T.L.R. 383.

in Cox v. Truscott(1) is nearer the language of our Act. He hesitatingly proceeded on the debtor and creditor basis. We need not go further than this because, as we have said, if these decisions cannot be distinguished, then we must with respect differ. We hold therefore that these contracts which Moolji Sicka & Company had entered into with the Government subsisted on 15th November, 1951, and on 14th February, 1952, and that as Chatturbhuj Jasani, the appellant, was a partner in the firm he also had both a share and an interest in them on the crucial dates. That brings us to article 299 (1) of the Constitution. It states:-

"All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by the President ... and all such contracts... made in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President ... by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise."

The contention was that as these contracts were not expressed to be made by the President they are void. Cages were cited tons under the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935. Certain sections in these Acts were said to be similar to article 299. We do not think that they are, but in any case the rulings ,under section 30 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915, as amended by the Government of India Act of 1919 disclose a difference of opinion. Thus, Krihsnaji Nilkant v. Secrtary of State(2) ruled that contracts with the Secretary of State must be by a deed executed on behalf of the Secretary of State for India and in his name. They cannot be made by correspondence or orally. Secretary of State v. Bhagwandas(3) and Devi Prasad Sri Krihhna Prasad Ltd. v. Secretary of State(1) held they could be made by correspondence. Secretary of State V. O.T. Sarin & Company(1) took an intermediate vie,* and held that though contracts in the prescribed form could not be enforced by either side, (1) 21 T.L.R. 319. (4) A.I.R. 1941 All. 377. (2) A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 449,451. (5) I.L.R. 11 Lah. 375. (3) A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 168.

a claim for compensation under section 70 of the Indian Contract Act would lie. Province of Bengal v. S. L. Puri(1) took a strict view and held that even letters headed "Government of India" did not comply with, the rule in section 175 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Federal Court was called upon to construe section 40 (1) of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935. It held that the directions in it were only directory and not mandatory, and the same view was taken of article 166 (1) of the present Constitution by this court in Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay(2). None of these provisions is quite the same as article 299. For example, -in article 166, as also in section 40(1) of the Government of India Act of 1935, there is a clause which says that "orders" and "instruments" and "other proceedings"

"Made" and "expressed" in the name of the Governor or Governor-General in Council and "authenticated" in the manner prescribed shall not be, called in question on the ground that it is not an "order" or "instrument" etc. 'made" or "executed" by the Governor or Governor-General in Council. It was held that the provisions had to be read as a whole and when that was done it became evident that the intention of the legislature and the Constitution was to dispense with proof of the due "making" and "execution" when the form prescribed was followed but not to invalidate orders and instruments otherwise valid. Article 299(1) does not contain a similar clause, so we are unable to apply the same reasoning here.