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16. Learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance upon judgement rendered by this Court in Ram Pyare Verma versus Third Additional District Judge, Faizabad, 2015 (128) RD 273, to say that impleadmeant of the purchaser who had bought the property during the pendency of the suit is not necessary. The purchaser during the pendency of the lis steps into the shoes of the original defendant/judgement debtor.

17. Reference has also been made to the judgement rendered by the Supreme Court in Sanjay Verma versus Manik Roy and others 2007 (25) LCD 313, saying that if the defendant in the suit is prohibited by an order of the court from transferring the property during the pendency of the suit, except with the prior permission of the court, the alienation would obviously be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The principle underlying Section 52 is that a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. Reference has also been made by the learned counsel for the respondents to a judgement of the Supreme Court in Bibi Zubaida Khatoon versus Nabi Hassan Saheb, 2004 (1) SCC 191, where the Supreme Court has held that a transferee during pendency of the litigation should ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interest, but there is no absolute Rule that the transferee pendente lite without the leave of the court should in all cases be allowed to join and contest the pending suit. Similarly, in Usha Sinha versus Dina Ram and others, 2007 (7) SCC 144, the Supreme Court held that a person purchasing property from the judgement debtor during the pendency of the suit has no independent right to the property to resist, obstruct or object to the execution of a Decree. Such a person having no independent right is not entitled to get his claim adjudicated.

40. In the case of Raj Kumar (supra), the doctrine of lis pendens as expressed in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act was considered by the Supreme Court. The transfer took place during the pendency of the suit, but the Decree passed ex-parte in the suit was sought to be set aside, not by the defendant on record, but by a person, who did not come or was not brought on record promptly, and hence, apparently appeared to be a third party. The Supreme Court observed that such a person in accordance with the principles incorporated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would be a representative-in-interest of the defendant-judgement debtor. Under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, a decree passed against the defendant transferor would also be executed against the lis pendens transferee of the defendant, even though he was not a party to the suit. Such a person can prefer an appeal being a person aggrieved. The person who is liable to be proceeded against in execution of the decree can file an appeal against the decree. Such a person can also file an application for recall under Rule 13 of Order IX of the CPC, as such, a person stepped into the shoes of the defendant and the decree was sought to be executed against him. It was held by the Supreme Court that a lis pendens transferee, though not brought on record under Order XXII Rule 10 of CPC, is entitled to move an application under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC to set aside a decree passed against his transferor, the defendant in the suit.

41. In the case of A Nawab John (supra), the Supreme Court was considering a case where a specific performance of a registered agreement and delivery of possession was sought by the plaintiff in a suit before the trial court. During the pendency of the suit, the sole respondent V.N. Subramaniam filed an application, praying that he may be impleaded as a party-defendant to the said suit on the ground that he had purchased the suit property. His application for impleadment was allowed and the plaint came to be amended mentioning the details of subsequent events. The Supreme Court examined the background of insertion of the doctrine of lis pendens in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. It referred to a judgement rendered by it earlier, reported in (1972) 2 SCC 200, which in turn relied upon "Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland", by Bell where it was observed that "during pendence of an action of which the object is to vest the property or obtain the possession of the real estate, a purchaser shall be held to take that estate as it stands in the person of the seller, and to be bound by the claims which shall ultimately be pronounced".

48. The judgement rendered in Sanjay Verma (supra) relied upon that by the respondents only holds that the transferee pendente lite without leave of the Court, cannot as of right, maintain a separate suit particularly so when the suit was pending for a long time. However, it observed in Paragraph-10 that though the alienation would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52, such alienation cannot be said to have been annulled automatically, only that the alienation will have no effect on the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit.