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32. Next, we are expected to deal with the question as to the impact of the provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under this welfare legislation. From the Statement of Objects and Reasons as well as the Preamble of the NGT Act, it is clear that the framers of the law intended to give a very wide and unrestricted jurisdiction to the Tribunal in the matters of environment. Be it original, appellate or special jurisdiction, the dimensions and areas of exercise of jurisdiction of the Tribunal are very wide. The various provisions of the NGT Act do not, by use of specific language or by necessary implication mention any restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal so far it relates to a substantial question of environment and any or all of the Acts specified in Schedule I. Sections 15 and 16 of the Act do not enumerate any restriction as to the scope of jurisdiction that the Tribunal may exercise. There is no indication in the entire NGT Act that the legislature intended to divest the Tribunal of the power of judicial review. It is the settled cannon of statutory interpretation that such exclusion has to be specific or absolutely implied from the language of the provisions governing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Another relevant consideration which the Tribunal should keep in mind is in regard to independence of judicial functioning of the Tribunal. In the case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1981) Supp. SCC 87, the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated that the principle of independence of judiciary is not an abstract conception but is a living faith which must derive its inspiration from the Constitutional charter and its nourishment and sustenance from the constitutional values. The principle of independence of judiciary is the basic feature of the Constitution. Any policy or decision of the Government which would undermine or destroy the independence of the judiciary would not only be opposed to public policy but would also impinge upon the basic structure of the Constitution (Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 502).

33. The dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441, that independence of judiciary has always been recognised as a part of basic structure of Constitution, squarely applies to all the Courts and Tribunals performing the function of dispensation of justice. Once the Courts and the Tribunals are free from the influence that could be exercised by executive or otherwise, their functioning would be in consonance with the constitutional scheme and fundamental principles of democracy. Any influence or pressure by any other organ of the State upon the functioning of the Judges would impinge upon the independence of the judiciary.

50. Vide an interim order dated 31st October, 1985 passed in Sampath Kumar, the Court directed to carry out certain measures with a view to ensure better functioning of the Tribunal along constitutionally sound principles. These changes had already been incorporated in the Act before Sampath Kumar's case came up for final hearing. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that though judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution, the vesting of power of judicial review in an alternative institutional mechanism, after taking it away from the High Courts, would not do violence to the basic structure so long as it was ensured that the alternative mechanism was an effective and real substitute for the High Court. In one of the connecting matters that was being heard by the larger bench in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the High Court had taken a view that the Supreme Court and High Courts are the sole repositories of the power of judicial review. It could only be introduced by the Constitutional Courts and no other alternative mechanism. The contention was that the Constitution bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sampath Kumar (supra) defines proposition laid down in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.

53. Another facet of this constitutional aspect is that there cannot be a total exclusion of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts in terms of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India respectively. The plain consequence of such exclusion would be divesting the High Court of its constitutional powers, which is impermissible, being the basic structure of the Constitution of India. Any such law, even if enacted by the Parliament, would still be unsustainable, being violative of the basic structure. Complete exclusion has to be understood in its correct perspective. If the decisions of the Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review can be subjected to the constitutional jurisdiction of the higher courts, in that event also there is no complete exclusion and the functions of the Tribunal would only be supplemental. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Ashish Kumar Roy and Ors., (2005) 10 SCC 110, the Supreme Court was concerned with the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act 1997. The Tribunal had been given the jurisdiction to entertain disputes with regard to the five Specified Acts therein. The issue therein related to certain provisions of that Act being ultra vires to the Constitution, as well as declaring the provision directing transfer of cases to the Tribunal as being violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. The Supreme Court while declining to declare the provisions as unconstitutional, took the view that the Tribunal was performing the functions which may be of a supplementary role and without complete exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court held as under: