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8. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the entire case would need to be examined on the facts and not merely on the technical basis on which the appeal was dismissed by the impugned order. He submits that on 6th December, 1988, Mr. K.V. Kohli executed three sale deeds in favour of M/s. Texla Service Centre. He had done so on the basis of Will propounded by him. M/s. Taxla Service Centre withdrew its suit under Section 6 and 19 of the Specific Mohd. Malik v. Rehman Baba, AIR 1959 J&K 30; Firm Purushottam Das Ganpati v. Gulab Khan, AIR 1963 Patna 407; Raghubir Jha v. State, 1986 RLR 36 (NSC); Shin-Etsu Chemicals v. Vindhya Telelinks, 2009 RLR 36 (NSC); Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department 2008 (6) SCALE 748; R.B. Ramalingum v. R.B. Bhavneshwari, 2009 RCR (1) 136 (SC); Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh, 2010 RLR 498 (SC) AIR 2002 SC 2768 Performance Act since the sales deeds have been executed on 1.9.2009 i.e. Suit No.182/86. On 11.8.1989 Execution Case No.14/1985 was dismissed in default. In the year 1989, the respondent No.1 filed a suit disputing the Will propounded by her brother Mr. K.V. Kohli. She sought 50% of the suit property on the basis of a Will set up by her. In the alternative she sought that insofar as the Will propounded by her brother was conceived, she would only get 1/3rd and 2/3rd share would go to her brother but she would inherit her mother‟s share also, nevertheless her 1/3rd share, admitted in her favour as per the Will propounded by her brother Sh. K.V.Kohli, could not have been sold out to the objector. On 23rd September, 1996, the Execution Petition was filed in the face of section 240 of the Indian Succession Act which bars proceedings upon the decree unless probate has been granted or her rights had not been crystallized, the proceedings could not continue.

13. Having regard to the definition of a suit and an application under Sections 2(l) and 2(b) of the Act respectively, it is amply clear that Section 14 of the Act, per se, would not be applicable to appeals. However, it has been held that the J Kumaradasan Nair & Anr. v. IRIC Sohan & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1333; Shin- Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd.

v. Vindhya Telelinks Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 3284; Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department & Ors., (2008) 7 SCC 169 Debjyoti Gupta v. Indiabulls Securities Ltd. & Anr., (2013) 202 DLT 563; Ketan V. Parekh v. Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement and Anr., AIR 2012 SC 683; Union of India v. M/s. Damyanti Builders & Anr., (2010) VII AD (Delhi) 140; Mohinder Prakash v. DLF Commercial Developers Ltd., (2012) 195 DLT 357; Jitender Kumar Gupta v. Sukhbir Singh Saini, (2012) 192 DLT 438; Ramji Pandey & Ors. v. Swaran Kali, AIR 2011 SC 489; J. H. Nelson v. S. Thkur Singh, (1967) LXIX PLR principles thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing an appeal or a revision in terms of Section 5 of the Act.5

16. At this stage, reference to the factual matrix of the present case would be appropriate. The order dated 23.09.2003 of the High Court reveals that the J.Kumaradasan Nair & Anr. v. IRIC Sohan & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1333 Consolidated Engineering (supra) Consolidated Engineering (supra) execution petition pending before it had been transferred to the District Court in view of Section 2 of the Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 2003. Thereafter, the execution proceedings had been transferred to the learned Civil Judge vide order dated 10.02.2004 since the District Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the same. It is noteworthy that a copy of the plaint had been filed by the objector(s)/petitioners themselves to show the valuation of the suit. The learned counsel for the objectors/petitioners was also present when the order dated 10.02.2004 was passed. This would imply that the petitioners were always aware of the law, i.e., Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 2003 and were beneficiaries of sound legal assistance. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appeal against the order dated 30.06.2006 was filed before the High Court upon incorrect legal advice or due to inadvertence. The High Court also granted an interim stay on 18.04.2006 in favour of the petitioners. An objection to the maintainability of the connected appeal bearing EFA No. 5/2007 was raised on 28.05.2007 wherein the learned counsel for the petitioners had sought time to study the matter. The learned counsel had admitted that if EFA No. 5/2007 was not maintainable, then the connected appeal bearing EFA No. 13/2006 would also not be maintainable. This Court would notice that on 28.05.2007, when the connected appeals bearing EFA Nos. 13/2006 and 5/2007 were taken up, counsel for the petitioners (appellants therein) in both the cases were present. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioners were not aware of the fact that their appeal was not maintainable. Accordingly, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that no objection apropos the maintainability of EFA No. 13/2006 was taken is without substance is untenable.