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(c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and
(d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applied the said provisions to the subsequent Act."

23. The learned Government Pleader on behalf of the State Government urged that if we are inclined to read that entry 37 of the Gujarat Act is a piece of referential legislation supplementing the Excise Act and the Additional Duties of Excise Act, it would be tantamount to abdication of legislative functions by the State Legislature, which would be in that case presumed to have incorporated without applying its mind. In other words, he urged that the contention advanced on behalf of the assessees to read the amended definition of "cotton fabrics" in the Excise Act and the Additional Excise Duties Act as if incorporated in entry 37 of the Gujarat Act because there is legislation by incorporation, it would result in abdication of the legislative functions of the State Government since it would amount to adoption not only of the law as it existed but also as it might exist in future from time to time. In support of his contention, the learned Government Pleader relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in B. Sharma Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry [1967] 20 STC 215 (SC). On behalf of the assessees this contention is sought to be repelled by urging that this is not a case of excessive delegation of powers since entry 37 of the Gujarat Act cannot be attached on the ground that the said statute did not provide in terms for adoption and/or application of the amended provisions of the Excise Act by the Parliament in future which was a case in B. Sharma Rao's decision [1967] 20 STC 215 (SC).

24. We are afraid that the learned Government Pleader was not right in trying to persuade us that our view to read the future amendments in the definition of "cotton fabrics" in the Excise Act or the Additional Duties of Excise Act as incorporated in entry 37 of the Gujarat Act on well-recognised principles of interpretation of referential legislation on the ground that it would amount to abdication of duty by the State Legislature, is not well-founded. The decision of the Supreme Court in B. Sharma Rao's case [1967] 20 STC 215 (SC) clearly supports our view. The facts in the said case were that the Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory of Pondicherry passed the Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act, 1965, which received the assent of the President on 25th May, 1965. Section 2(1) of the Act provided that the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, as in force in the State of Madras immediately before the commencement of the said Act shall extend to and come into force in the Union Territory of Pondicherry subject to certain modifications and adaptations specified in that section. Section 2(2) of the Act provided that the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1959, and any other rules made or issued under the Madras Act and similarly in force, were to apply to Pondicherry. The Pondicherry Government issued a notification dated 1st March, 1966, bringing into force the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, as extended by the Pondicherry Act on Pondicherry as from 1st April, 1966. In the meanwhile, the Madras Act was amended with effect from 1st April, 1966, by the Madras Legislature. The Pondicherry Legislature passed the Pondicherry Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1966, whereby it was, inter alia, provided that the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1959, and any other rules made or issued under the said Act and similarly in force in so far as their application is required fort he purpose of effectively applying the provisions of the said Act shall also extend to and be in force in the Union Territory of Pondicherry until such time as the rules are framed under the Pondicherry Act. In that context the Pondicherry Act was challenged on the ground of excessive delegation of the legislative power. The majority Court held that there was a total surrender in the matter of sales tax legislation by the Pondicherry Assembly, and therefore, the Pondicherry Act was void or still-born. The majority view was expressed by Shelat, J. (as he then was) and at page 225 the court ruled as under :

"The question then is whether in extending the Madras Act in the manner and to the extent it did under section 2(1) of the principle Act the Pondicherry Legislature abdicated its legislative power in favour of the Madras Legislature. It is manifest that the Assembly refused to perform its legislative function entrusted under the Act constituting it. It may be that a mere refusal may not amount to abdication if the legislature instead of going through the full formality of legislation applies its mind to an existing statute enacted by another legislature for another jurisdiction, adopts such an Act and enacts to extend it to the territory under its jurisdiction. In doing so, it may perhaps be said that it has laid down a policy to extend such an Act and directs the executive to apply and implement such an Act. But when it not only adopts such an Act but also provides that the Act applicable to its territory shall be the Act amended in future by the other legislature, there is nothing for it to predicate what the amended Act would be. Such a case would be clearly one of non-application of mind and one of refusal to discharge the function entrusted to it by the instrument constituting it. It is difficult to see how such a case is not one of abdication or effacement in favour of another legislature at least in regard to that particular matter."
"But Mr. Setalvad contended that the validity of such legislation has been accepted in Delhi Laws Act case [1951] SCR 747 and particularly in the matter of heading No. 4 as summarised by Bose, J., in Rajnarain Singh's case [1955] 1 SCR 290. In respect of that heading the majority conclusion no doubt was that authorisation in favour of the executive to adopt laws passed by another legislature or legislatures including future laws would not be invalid. So far as that conclusion goes Mr. Setalvad is right. But as already stated, in arriving at that conclusion each learned Judge adopted a different reasoning. Whereas Patanjali Sastri and Das, JJ., accepted the contention that the plenary legislative power includes power of delegation and held that since such a power means that the legislature can make laws in the manner it liked if it delegates that power short of an abdication there can be no objection. On the other hand, Fazl Ali, J., upheld the laws on the ground that they contained a complete and precise policy and the legislation being thus conditional the question of excessive delegation did not arise. Mukherjea, J., held that abdication need not be total but can be partial and even in respect of a particular matter and if so the impugned legislation would be bad. Bose, J., expressed in frank language his displeasure at such legislation but accepted its validity on the ground of practice recognised ever since Burah's case (1878) 5 IA 178 and thought that that practice was accepted by the Constitution-makers and incorporated in the concept of legislative function. There was thus no unanimity as regards the principles upon which those laws were upheld ....."