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Showing contexts for: forest defined in Bharath Booshan Aggarwal vs The State Of Kerala on 6 October, 2021Matching Fragments
Relevant provisions of the Act
15. Section 2 (f) defines “forest” and states:
“2. ….(f) “forest” includes:
(i)the following whether found in or brought from, a forest or not that is, to say-
timber, charcoal, wood-oil, gum, resin, natural varnish, bark, lac, fibres and roots of sandalwood and rosewood; and
(ii) the following when found in or brought from a forest, that is to say-
a) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits and all other parts or produce not here-in-before mentioned, of trees.
“6. … It must be noted in this context that there are several types of essential oils in India, the important ones being sandalwood oil, agar- wood oil, deodar oil and pine oil, apart from oleo-resin and wood oil derived from exudation from living trees in the forest area. These essential oils are obtained from any forest wood. Sandalwood as observed by the High Court is forest produce. Even its roots thereof are also included as forest produce. They are also timber within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act. The purpose of the Act is to conserve forest wealth which is very dear for preservation to maintain ecology. Forest produce defined under Section 2(f) is an inclusive definition. It is settled law that the word ‘include’ is generally used as a word of extension. When used in an interpretation clause, it seeks to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition at p. 64 stated the construction to be adopted to the meanings of the words and phrases that “The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver”. At p. 214 it is stated that an interpretation clause which extends the meaning of a word does not take away its ordinary meaning. An interpretation clause of the inclusive definition is not meant to prevent the word receiving its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that word would be properly applicable, but to enable the word as used in the Act, when there is nothing in the context or the subject-matter to the contrary, to be applied to somethings to which it would not ordinarily be applicable…. An interpretation clause should be used for the purpose of interpreting words which are ambiguous or equivocal, and not so as to disturb the meaning of such as are plain. At p. 216 it is stated that another important rule with regard to the effect of an interpretation clause is that an interpretation clause is not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another, or as strictly defining what the meaning of the term must be under all circumstances, but rather as declaring what may be comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that it should be so construed.
18. In the other judgment, relied on by both parties, i.e. Standard Essential Oil Industries (supra), the issue was whether sandalwood oil could be confiscated by virtue of provisions of Section 61A of the Kerala Forest Act.9 This court held that sandalwood oil, though a forest produce, could not be the subject matter of Section 61A in view of its restrictive wording:
“21. A perusal of the definition of forest produce, as given by Section 2(f) of the Act, shows that other than timber, charcoal, firewood it includes wood oil, gum, resin, natural varnish bark, roots of sandalwood, etc. However, the use of the specific words “timber, charcoal, firewood and ivory” under Section 61-A instead of “any forest produce or ivory” makes it clear that the intention of the legislature in providing armoury under Section 61-A is only with regard to certain category specified therein and not for every forest produce as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act. Undoubtedly, sandalwood oil is a forest produce but Section 61-A of the Act is limited only to the categories specified therein and does not give power of confiscation of sandalwood oil.
“61A. Confiscation by Forest Officers in certain cases.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, where a forest offence is believed to have been committed in respect of timber, charcoal, firewood or ivory which is the property of the Government, the officer seizing the property under sub-section (1) of section 52 shall, without any unreasonable delay, produce it, together with all tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing such offence, before an officer authorized by the Government in this behalf by notification in the Gazette, not being below the rank of an Assistant Conservator of Forests (hereinafter referred to as the authorized officer).” “7. The legislature having defined "forest-produce", it is not permissible to us to read in the definition something which is not there. We are conscious of the fact that forest wealth is required to be preserved; but, it is not open to us to legislate, as what a court can do in a matter like at hand is to iron out cresses; it cannot weave a new texture. If there be any lacuna in the definition it is really for the legislature to take care of the same.