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5. The learned counsel refers to a decision in Chotalal v. Ram Golam, which refers to the waiver of the rights by a party. It is observed in the decision that even if there is any mandatory provision which confers any right or privilege or advantage to any of the parties to the litigation, such right, privilege or advantage might be waived by a party in whose favour the provision of law stands and the party having such right or privilege, has a discretion to exercise his right or waive it. On the basis of this decision, it is contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that as the respondent has not filed any objection for the enquiry under Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure, it has to be taken that he had waived the right provided to him under Section 5 of the Act and now he is not entitled to object for the order passed under Section 125 of the Code. The learned counsel refers to a series of decisions as to the effect of the order passed under Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure, thought the Act, 1986 came into force in the year 1986. In Shamsudeen v. Sabhiya 1988 Mad LJ (Crl) 377, the Bench of the Kerala High Court has held that the Act, 1986, does not contain any provision enabling reopening of orders passed under the provisions of the Code which have become final. The Kerala Bench has further observed that the mere change of law cannot lead to alteration or cancellation of the orders passed under the Code which have become final and Section 127 of the Code cannot be invoked to tamper or interfere with the maintenance orders on ground outside the framework of Section 127, or to bring orders which became final prior to the Act, 1986. In Hazran v. Abdul Rehman 1989 Cri LJ 1591 also the Punjab and Haryana High Court has taken the view that there is no provision whatsoever with regard to the enforcement of an order of maintenance which has already become final under the Code and the provisions with regard to the enforcement of such orders contained in the Code, holds good even after coming in to force of the Act, 1986. In M. A. Hameed v. Arif Jan 1990 Cri LJ 96, a single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the same view that the right conferred on a divorced Muslim woman is not taken away by the Act and she is entitled to claim maintenance. In Abdul Khader v. Razia Begum, 1991 Cri LJ 247, the Karnataka High Court also has expressed its view that the provision of the Act cannot defeat the vested rights acquired by the wife to recover maintenance from the husband under the order awarding maintenance before the commencement of the Act, 1986, and the right that had stood crystallised before the new Act, 1986, cannot be defeated by the new Act. One more decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is Bashir Khan v. Jamila Bee, 1994 Cri LJ 361, a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, in which the maintenance was ordered even after the commencement of the Act, 1986. But in that case, the petitioner was not divorced on the date of the petition and therefore the Court has found that as she was not a divorced woman, the Act had no application and she was entitled to claim maintenance. In all the other decisions cited above, the order of maintenance was passed prior to the commencement of the Act, 1986. Therefore the Courts have held that when already order had been passed awarding maintenance to a divorced woman, the right that had vested on her cannot be negatived by the commencement of the Act, 1986. Once the order of maintenance was granted under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, then the enforcement alone comes under Section 128, Code of Criminal Procedure. But under Section 7 of the Act, transitional provision is made only for Section 125, or Section 127, Code of Criminal Procedure, which was pending before the Magistrate on the commencement of the new Act. Therefore, the Courts have taken the view that the order that was in force cannot be altered by the new Act. However, Section 5 of the Act, 1986, makes it mandatory to obtain the consent of the former husband for the proceedings under Section 128, Code of Criminal Procedure also. But in this case we need not probe into the question whether the petition under Section 128, Code of Criminal Procedure is maintainable because the order passed under Section 125 of the Code itself is after the commencement of the Act, 1986.