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28. After taking us through the definitions as appearing in Section 2 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and particularly the definition of the words "record", "recording" and "work", Mr. Kadam would submit that by Section 3, "publication" is defined. By Section 4, it is stated that except in relation to infringement of copyright, a work shall not be deemed to be published or performed in public, without the licence of the owner of the copyright. Then inviting our attention to Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8, Mr. Kadam would submit that Chapter III of this Act titled as "Copyright" would enable us to differentiate and distinguish vikrant 25/74 4-NMCAL-52-2017.odt between a copyright which subsists throughout India in the classes of work. He would invite our attention to Sub-section (1) of Section 13, and particularly Clause (c) thereof. Mr. Kadam then would invite our attention to Sub-section (3) of Section 13 and Clause (b) thereof to submit that copyright shall not subsist in any record made in respect of a literary, dramatic or musical work, if in making the record, copyright in such work has been infringed.

55. Chapter III of the Act is titled as "Copyright". That word has been understood as appearing in Sub-section (1) of Section 13. That is understood as a copyright subsisting throughout India in the classes of works. Thus, subject to the provisions of Section 13 and the other provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957, copyright subsists in original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, cinematograph films and records (now, sound recording).

56. Mr. Kadam is, therefore, not right in urging that when the sound recording rights are obtained, the arrangement in that regard would take into its fold or subsume the original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work. If these works are distinctly defined and understood by law, then, the copyright must subsist distinctly in them. It cannot be that they are defined and recognized as different categories or classes of works, but the copyright therein is one and the same. Meaning thereby, if vikrant 43/74 4-NMCAL-52-2017.odt copyright subsists in one, that necessarily takes in it the copyright in relation to the other classes as well. If that is how the law is prima facie understood, then, we cannot ignore the arguments of the plaintiff's counsel that for the purpose of this Appeal, which is relevant and prima facie is the nature of the right conferred in M/s. Universal by the plaintiff.

(a) in any cinematograph film if a substantial part of the film is an infringement of the copyright in any other work;

(b) in any record made in respect of a literary, dramatic or musical work, if in making the record, copyright in such work has been infringed.

(4) The copyright in a cinematograph film or a record shall not affect the separate copyright in any work in respect of which or a substantial part of which, the film, or as the case may be, the record is made.

83. In the case before us, the defendants/appellants specifically claim such rights and of ownership. Once the underlying works are distinctly understood and with the copyright therein, prima facie, as narrated above, then, this decision is of no assistance.

84. Equally, the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark decision, namely, Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. (supra) was somewhat distinct.

85. There, the appellant was incorporated for the purpose of carrying on business in India of issuing or granting licences for performance in public of all existing and future Indian musical works in which copyright subsists in India. Its members comprised of music composers, authors of literary and dramatic work and artists. It published a tariff laying down the fees, charges and royalties that it proposed to collect for the grant of licences for performance in public of works in respect of which it claimed to be an assignee of copyrights and to have the authority to grant licences as required by the Copyright Act, 1957. The respondents vikrant 67/74 4-NMCAL-52-2017.odt in the Appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court were associations of producers of cinematograph films claiming to be the owners of such films including the sound track thereof. They filed objections repudiating the appellant's claim on the basis that the producers engaged composers and song writers under contract of service for composing songs to be utilised in their films and that the musical works prepared by the composers under such contracts having been utilised and incorporated in the sound track of the cinematograph films produced by them and that therefore no copyright subsisted in the composers.