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40. Before examining the contention advanced by Shri Dhanuka, it is necessary to point out that the Supreme Court did not accept the claim in Minerva Mills' case, , that the directive principles would have supremacy over the fundamental rights in Part III. The majority held that the fundamental rights occupy a unique place in the lives of civilized societies and have been variously described in judgments of the Supreme Court as "transcendental" "inalienable" and "primordial". It was observed that the fundamental rights constitute the ark of the Constitution and to destroy the guarantees given by Part III in order to achieve the goals of Part IV is plainly to subvert the Constitution by destroying its basic structure. The Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts III and IV and to give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony and balance between the fundamental rights and the directive principles is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. The goals set out in Part IV have to be achieved without the abrogation of the means provided for by Part III. It is in this sense that Parts III and IV together constitute the core of our Constitution and combine to form its conscience. Anything that destroys the balance between the two parts ipso facto destroys an essential element of the basic structure of our Constitution. In view of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court, it is not possible to accept the submission of Shri Dhanuka that articles 39(b) and 39(c) have primacy over article 19 in Part III and, therefore, the Act enacted with the object of securing the requirement of article 39(b) cannot be declared unconstitutional or violative of article 19.

33. We must now turn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Waman Rao v. Union of India, , Which is of particular relevance to the contention in regard to article 31B. A ceiling on agricultural holdings was imposed by the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 27 of 1961, which was bought into operation on January 26, 1962. This Court had held that the provisions of this enactment and certain thereto were not open to challenge on the ground that they were inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by Part III of the constitution since these enactments had been placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution 17th and 40th Amendment Acts. In the proceedings before the Supreme court, the main challenge was to the constitutionality of articles 31A, 31B unamended article 31C Chandrachud J., speaking for the majority, noted the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati , where it had been held that in exercise of the power conferred by article 368, the Constitution could not amended so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. He observed that every case in which the protection of a fundamental right was withdrawn would not necessarily result in damaging or destroying the basic structure of the constitution. The question as to whether the basic structure was damage or destroyed in any given case would depend upon which particular article of Part III was in issue and where what was withdrawn was quintessential to the basic structure of the Constitution. The constitution First and Forth Amending Acts which introduced articles 31A and 31B into the Constitution with retrospective effect for the extinguishment or modification of rights in lands hold or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto strengthened rather than weakened the basic structure of the Constitution. It might happen that while existing inequalities were being removed, new inequalities might arise marginally and incidentally. Such marginal and incidental inequalities could not damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. In so far as article 31B was concerned it did not define the category of laws which were to revive its protection and it afforded protection to the Schedule-laws against all the provisions of part III of the Constitution. No enactment could be placed in the Ninth Schedule except by parliament and, since it was a part of the Constitution on additions or alterations could be made therein without complying with the restrictive provisions governing amendments to the Constitution. Article 31B read with the Ninth Schedule provided a protective umbrella to all enactments included in that Schedule no matter of what character, kind or category they might be Article 31B empowered Parliament to include in the Ninth Schedule such laws as it considered fit and proper to include therein. The 39th Amendment had undertaken "an incredibly massive program to include items 87 to 124 while the 40th Amendment had added items 125 to 188 to the Ninth Schedule" in one stroke. The Supreme Court drew a line, treating the decision in Kesavananda Bharti, , as the land mark Several enactments were put in the Ninth Schedule prior to that decision on the supposition that the power of Parliament to mend the Constitution was wide and untrammelled. The theory that parliament could not exercise its amending power so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution was propounded and accepted for the first time in Desavananda Bharati's case, . This was one reason for upholding the laws incorporated in the Ninth Schedule before April 24, 1973, on which date the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati , was rendered. These laws and regulations would not be open to challenge on the ground that they were inconsistent with or took away or abridge any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of part III of the constitution Enactments and regulations which were or would be included in the Ninth Schedule on or after April 24, 1973, would not receive the protection of article 31B for the plain reason that in the face of the judgment in Kesavananda Bharati , there was no justification for making additions to the Ninth Schedule with a view to conferring a blanket protection on the laws included therein The various constitutional amendments by which additions were made to the Ninth Schedule on or after April 24, 1973, would be valid only if they did not damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution Referring to the unamended portion of article 31C it was observe that it was not " like an uncharted sea". It gave protection to a defined and limited category of laws which were passed for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39. These clauses of article 39 contained directive principle which was vital to the well-being of the country and the welfare of its people. Chandrachud J. said, "It is impossible to conceive that any law passed for such a purpose can at al violate article 14 or article 19. .. In fact, far from damaging the basic structure of the constitution, laws passed truly and bona fide for giving effect to directive principles contained in clauses (b) and (c) of article 39 will fortify that structure " Laws included in the Ninth schedule on or after April 24, 1973, would not receive the protection of article 31B ipso facto those laws would have to be examined individually for determining whether the constitutional amendments by which they were put in the Ninth schedule damaged or destroyed the basic structure of the constitution in any manner. Such an exercise would, however, "become otiose" if they fell within the scope ad purview of article 31A or the unamended article 31C. If those laws were saved by these articles, it would be unnecessary to determine whether they also received the protection of article 31B read with the Ninth Schedule. The fact that article 31B conferred protection on the Schedule-laws against any provisions of Part III and the other two articles conferred protection as against articles 14 and 19 only, would make no real difference since, after the deletion of article 31, the only two provisions of Part III which would generally come into play on the question of validity of laws were articles 14 and 19.

52. Mr. Dhanuka submitted that, at worst, there was a minor abridgment of the freedom of the press and no destruction or damage to the constitution's basic structure. There was no "shocking unconscionable or unscrupulous travesty of the quintessence" of a fundamental right.

53. It is difficult to hold that the freedom of the press is merely abridged by section 22 and that there is no damage or impairment to the basic structure of the Constitution. As has been repeatedly pointed out by the Supreme court, freedom of circulation is as much a part of the freedom of the press as the freedom to propagate news and views. Section 22 imposes a restraint on circulation. As has also been pointed out by the Supreme court the freedom of the press is as much the freedom of the citizen to read the journal of his choice From the point of view as much of the publisher as of the citizen, it is irrelevant to the concept of the freedom of the press that the publisher is a monopoly undertaking. In the wider interests of the active functioning of our democracy, the citizen has a right to inform himself of news and views and the right cannot be denied to him on considerations extraneous thereto. The concept of the freedom of the press necessarily means that a journal's circulation should be free to grow to meet the demand for it. Interference with the circulation of the journal is, interference with the quintessence of the freedom of the press and it damages and impairs the basic structure of the constitution.

57. Mr. Dhanuka stressed the observations in the judgment in Waman Rao's case, , that it was impossible to conceive that any law passed for the purpose of giving effect to clause (c) of basic structure of the Constitution, laws truly and bona fide passed for giving effect to these directive principles would fortify that structure. The observations, with respect, are not a conclusion in regard to anything upon which the court was ruling. They are, in that sense, not obiter dicta. They really are reflections about enactments of the future. The observation are not many to preclude the courts from holding, in an appropriate case, that a law passed to give effect to the directive principles in clauses (b) and (c) of article 39 or any provision thereof impairs the basic structure of the Constitution. We have no doubt that the Act has truly and bona fide been enacted to achieve the objective of article 39(c) and that, as a whole, it fortifies the basic structure of the Constitution; but that does not mean that we must overlook the fact that section 22 therein as applicable to a monopoly undertaking offends the freedom of the press, which is also a part of the basic structure. It is not possible on the basis of these observations to throw out the challenge to the Constitution Amendment Act that introduced the Act into the Ninth Schedule.