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4. My attention is invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1961 SC 1500. The provision in the Land Acquisition Act providing time limit of 30 days for filing an application for reference under Section 18, Land Acquisition Act, came up for consideration in this case. The Land Acquisition Act provided that if the person making the application was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made the award, the application must be made within six weeks from the date of the award and in any other case within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award whichever shall first expire. The "phrase" from the date of the Collector's award" was the subject-matter of interpretation in the above case. The Supreme Court took the view that the award is not a judicial or quasi-judicial decision but only an offer made by the Collector to pay the amount worked out in the award to the owner of the land as compensation. If the owner accepts it, that is an end of the matter. If, however, the owner is not prepared to accept it, Section 18 gives him the statutory right to have the dispute determined by court. The award being only a tender or offer made by the Collector, the making of the award must involve communication of the same to the party concerned, as that is the requirement of Contract Law. Therefore, the date of the award cannot be determined by reference to the time when the award is signed or determined by the Collector in his office. It must be made known to the party either actually or constructively. Therefore, the date of communication is the date of the award. Trenting the award us an administrative decision taken by the Collector, since it ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property, it is only fair and just that it is communicated to the party actually or constructively. Knowledge is necessary before the decision is brought into force and therefore it involves communication to party actually or constructively. Thus, "date of making the award" was construed as date of communication, actual or constructive, of the award to the party. This decision was followed by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604.

6. In Asst. Transport Commr. Lucknow v. Nand Singh AIR 1980 SC 15, the Court had to consider Section 15, UP Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, which prescribed a period of 30 days from the date of the order as time for filing an appeal. The order was communicated to the party a few days after the date seen in the order. His appeal, was within 30 days of the date of receipt of the communication but beyond 30 days of the date seen in the order. The Supreme Court relying on Harish Chandra Raj Singh's case (AIR 1961 SC 1500) held that time would begin to run only from the date of receipt of the communication regarding the order. The court besides upholding the reasoning in the earlier case to the effect that the order must be made known either directly or constructively to the party affected by the order in order to enable him to prefer an appeal if he so likes, found an additional reason to support the conclusion. Mere writing of an order in the file kept in the Office of the Taxation Officer is no order in the eye of law in the sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the order is meant. The order must be communicated either directly or constructively in the sense of making it known, which may make it possible for the authority to say that the party affected must be deemed to have known the order. The Court further observed that in a given case, the date of putting the order in communication under certain circumstances may be taken to be the date of the communication of the order or the date of the order but ordinarily and generally speaking, the order would be effective against the person affected by it only when it comes to his knowledge either directly or constructively, otherwise not.

7. This Court had occasion to construe the provision regarding limitation for filing an appeal under Section 23, Agricultural Workers Act, 1974 in Joseph v. Dy. Collector, 1982 Ker LT 904. Section 23 provided for an appeal to the Agricultural Tribunal against the order passed by the conciliation officer to be filed within a period of 30 days from the date of the order appealed against. M. P. Menon J. in the course of judgment referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra Raj Singh's case (AIR 1961 SC 1500), Boota Mal's case (AIR 1962 SC 1716) and Pushkar Municipal Board case (AIR 1965 SC 458) as well as the decision of the Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Insurance Corporation Ltd. v. Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6 and observed that four theories were competing for supremacy, in the interpretation of provisions relating to limitation. One approach was to go by the literal or grammatical construction, ignoring considerations of equity and hardship. Another was to emphasise the purpose of the remedy, where a person's rights were affected and to hold that knowledge, constructive or actual, was necessary. Yet another was to fix up the point of time when it could be said that the order was effectively made, as distinct from the date of its mere making. The fourth was to postulate that an order was no order at all for the purposes of limitation, unless the party against whom it was passed had some means of knowing about it. The learned Judge took the view that in considering Section 23 of Agricultural Workers Act, literal or grammatical construction could not be invoked. In the words of the learned Judge :

10. Section 64A of the Act which provides a revisional remedy stipulates that the application must be made within 30 days of the order. Rule 172 of the Rules reiterates this provision. Of course, there are certain other rules such as Rr. 170 and 225 where the limit prescribed is 30 days of the receipt of the order appealed against. In those cases, certainly, there would be no difficulty in interpreting the provisions of the Rules. They are clear and unambiguous and subserve the statutory purpose. But, it appears to me that the provision of limitation in Section 64A of the Act and Rule 172 of the Rules must be read along with latter portion of Rule 172 which states that the application shall be accompanied by the original or a certified copy of the order or proceedings against which the application is preferred. The person aggrieved by the impugned order, whether or not he was present at the time of the passing of the order, whether or not copy of the order was served on him, is required to produce either the original or a certified copy of the order along with the application. In these circumstances, to hold that the time stipulated for filing the application would start to run from the date on which the order was made or signed or the decision was arrived at, would amount to stultifying the statutory remedy. He cannot produce the original unless it is served on him. He cannot produce a certified copy unless it is supplied to him. Where it is not supplied to him by the authority, he must be in a position to apply for and obtain a certified copy. This would postulate the presence of actual or constructive knowledge of the order in him. That is the basis of the provision. The expression "30 days from the date of the order" must be understood in this way. Time will begin to run only from the date on which he had actual or constructive knowledge of the order as the case may be, of the impugned order.