Delhi District Court
Shweta Arora vs State Of Nct Delhi on 4 July, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-016422-2024
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.: 430/2024
DR. 'SA1',
D/o. Shri. 'DA',
R/o. 'XYZ'. ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
1. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI).
2. MANISH SHARMA,
S/o. Late Shri. Roshan Lal Sharma,
R/o. BN-42, East Shalimar Bagh,
Delhi. ... RESPONDENTS
Date of e-filing : 31.08.2024
Date of institution : 18.10.2024
Date when judgment was reserved : 03.06.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 04.07.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( hereinafter, referred to as 'Cr.P.C./Code')/Section 419 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'BNSS') against the judgment dated 26.07.2024 (hereinafter referred to as 'impugned judgment'), passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (Mahila Court)-04/Ld. JMFC (Mahila Court)-04, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ld. Trial Court/Ld. JMFC') in case bearing, 'State v. Manish Sharma, Cr. Case No. 10371/2021', arising out of FIR No. 247/2021, PS. Civil Lines, under Sections 354A/506 of the 1 Identities of the prosecutrix as well as that of her other family members have deliberately been withheld in view of the decisions in; Birbal Kumar Nishad v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3464; X v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 279; and Saleem v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 3 HCC (Del) 365: 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2190.
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 1 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.07.04 15:22:19 +0530
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'), acquitting respondent no. 2 of the offence(s) punishable under Sections 354A/506 IPC.
2. Succinctly, the prosecution's case before the Ld. Trial Court is premised on the complaint of the complainant/victim/appellant, 'SA', who is asserted to have tendered a written complaint dated 29.06.2021 to SHO, PS. Civil Lines against the allegation of commission of sexual harassment by respondent no. 2. Relevantly, under her said complaint, the complainant inter alia asserted that respondent no. 2 as well as one Ms. Neerja Sharma, owed her money to a tune of Rs. 2,72,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Seventy Thousand only) and they had been persistently denying settlement of the appellant's account, unless she/the appellant agreed to fulfill respondent no. 2's physical desire. The complaint further records that the aforesaid monetary transactions took place as respondent no. 2 called the appellant to meet him/respondent no. 2 at Civil Lines. The appellant further asserted that, though, initially respondent no. 2 proposed to meet the appellant at her house, however, considering that the appellant resided alone and did not meet anyone at her home, she/the appellant agreed to meet respondent no. 2, outside at Best of Asia Restaurant, Civil Lines ( hereinafter referred to as the 'restaurant/BOA Restaurant'). Corresponding, as per the appellant, upon such congregate, as she/the appellant was sitting in the restaurant, respondent no. 2 touched her inappropriately. It is further the case of the appellant that when she objected and asked respondent no. 2 to behave, he/respondent no. 2 asked the appellant to go to some isolated place or cinema hall, as he was experiencing discomfort in the restaurant and on the premise that he wanted to get close to the appellant.
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 2 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.07.04 15:22:24 +0530
Thereafter, when the appellant is asserted to have walked out of the restaurant, respondent no. 2 is proclaimed to have followed her to parking area, where his/respondent no. 2's car was parked, approached the appellant, touched her/appellant's breast, molested her as well as coerced her for physical favors. The appellant further avowed that when she expressed displeasure to the conduct of respondent no. 2 and refused to submit to the demands of respondent no. 2, then, respondent no. 2 is proclaimed to have pushed the appellant and threatened her of dire consequences of injury to life as well as loss of her entire alleged dues of Rs. 12,92,000/- (Rupees Twelve Lakhs Ninety Two Thousand only). Further, as per the prosecutrix/appellant, the entire incident, as aforenoted, is asserted to have taken place on 26.06.2017. Notably, on the basis of the complainant's/appellant's instant complaint, the FIR of the present case was registered, and investigation ensued. Significantly, during the course of investigation proceedings, statement of the complainant/appellant, under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was got registered before the concerned Ld. MM and respondent no. 2 was made to join the investigation, by issuance of notice under Section 41A Cr.P.C.
2.1. Relevantly, under her statement dated 01.07.2021, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the appellant inter alia proclaimed as under;
"...हमारी College की Teacher है/ इनका नाम Neerja Sharma है/ 16-17 साल से relation था/ मेरी mother की death पर वह Gurudwara आई/ अन्होने बोला don't feel alone/ अनहोने मेल जोल बढ़ाया/फिर एक financial dealing हु ई 12.92 lakh की/ उन्हें जरूरी थी तो हमने अपनी FD तोड़कर paise दिए/ 7 lakhs account- account transfer हैं / 3.20 lakhs cash dealing हु ई/ 88,000 short payment किया हमारे को/ Neerja Sharma ने अपने brother-in-law Manish Sharma को मेरे से introduce करवाया, ये कह कर कि हमारा Finance का CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 3 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:22:28 +0530 सारा काम यही देखता है/ Manish Sharma ने हमारे से 2.72 lakhs की dealing करी/ उसमें air tickets, Hotel booking, consultancy शामिल थी/ एक के स चल रहा है उन लोगो पर DRT में / Amount माँगने पर Manish Sharma ने मुझे Civil Lines में Hotel Best of Asia में बुलाया/वहां पर उसने मुझे hand पर touch किया/ कहीं और चलने को भी बोला/ उन्होंने बोला ऐसी जगह चलते हैं जहां मैं तुम्हारे close आ सकु / Parking में उन्होंने मुझे touch किया, मेरे breast को touch किया/ He molested me, he threatened me/ रातों रात घर से उठें की धमकी भी दी/ मुझे धक्का दिया/ Right elbow में चोट लगी थी/ 4 दिन तक मैं अपनी senses में नहीं थी/ मेरे paise वापस नहीं दिये/ Legal action लिया जाये, इन लोगों के ख़िलाफ़..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.2. Subsequently, upon conclusion of investigation in the present case, chargesheet was filed by the concerned IO before the Ld. Trial Court. Notably, consequent upon Ld. Trial Court's taking cognizance of the offence on 20.09.2021, summons were issued to respondent no. 2. Subsequently, upon compliance of provisions under Section 207 Cr.P.C., disposal of application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C., moved on behalf of the appellant before the Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 30.08.20221, and on the arguments on charge having been addressed by/on behalf of respondent no. 2, State and the complainant/appellant, Ld. Trial Court vide its order dated 05.01.2023 directed framing of charges against respondent no. 2, inter alia, under the following observations;
"...6. A perusal of the complaint as well as the statement of the complainant under Sec. 164 Cr.PC, prima facie, show that there were indeed monetary transactions between the parties and the same led to certain disputes. However, this does not by itself, 1 Reference is made to report dated 29.08.2022, filed by/on behalf of the concerned IO before the Ld. Trial Court, in response to appellant's application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C., inter alia proclaiming, "...The transactions between both the parties are simply money transactions even the complainant herself has given the payment to the alleged parties as a loan amount. Apart from this, the banks statement also confirmed that alleged persons have returned the amount to the complainant. Most importantly, a civil litigation is already pending between both the parties with respect to recovery of amount. As such, the money given by S*** A*** to Neerja Sharma and Payments for tickets of hotels/train/Flight of Manish Sharma do not attract section 420 IPC. The matter is completely of civil nature and litigation is pending before Ld. Court.*** As per the complaint of complainant S*** A*** and statement u/S. 164 Cr.P.C., Section 354 IPC does not attract in the present case..." (Emphasis supplied) CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 4 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.07.04 15:22:32 +0530 lead to the conclusion, that the incident in question did not take place. Merely because certain disputes of a civil nature are pending between the parties, the same does not rule out the possibility of the accused, subjecting the complainant to inappropriate physical and sexual advances and threatening her of adverse consequences upon the complainant's refusal to oblige to the illegitimate demands of the accused. Although, there are certain improvements in the statement of the complainant recorded under Sec. 164 Cr.PC over her initial complaint, these inconsistencies can only be examined at the stage of trial and it is worth nothing that the complainant has maintained the same stance as regards the alleged sexual assault, she was subjected to. Additionally, the accused has cast a doubt on the occurrence of the incident on the ground that despite the alleged misbehaviour of the accused, the complainant neither raised any alarm in the restaurant nor alerted the staff or called the police. Further, the fact that the complainant accompanied the accused to the parking lot, also casts a doubt on the occurrence of the alleged incident. At this stage, the Court cannot enter into a microscopic examination or a hair-splitting exercise into the incident as alleged or the response of the complainant, to the act of the accused. The Court only has to decipher, as to whether from the allegations levelled by the complainant, the offence in question is made out or not. The veracity of the allegations, as levelled by the complainant, are a matter of trial and can only be determined once evidence is led. At this stage, there is sufficient material on record, to presume that the offence, as alleged, has been committed by the accused. Therefore, at this stage, based on the material on record, the offence under Sec. 354A/506 IPC is attracted against the accused Manish Sharma.
7. Accordingly, charges be framed against accused Manish Sharma, for offence under section 354A/506 IPC.
8. Copy of this order be given dasti to the accused as prayed for. Nothing in this order, shall tantamount to any opinion on the merits of this case..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.3. Consequently, the following charges were framed against respondent no. 2 by the Ld. Trial Court on 05.01.2018;
"...I, ***, M.M., Delhi, hereby charge you Manish Sharma S/o. Late Sh. Roshan Lal Sharma, as under:CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 5 of 46 Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:22:36 +0530 That on 26.06.2017 at unknown time at Best of Asia Restaurants, Civil Lines Delhi as well as near the Car parking of said restaurant, within the jurisdiction of PS Civil Lines, you had made physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures, by pressing her breasts and touching the complainant, namely, 'S' inappropriately and thereby committed an offence punishable U/s 354A IPC within my cognizance.
Secondly, on the above said date, time and place, you intimidated the complainant, namely, 'S' with threat to her life and reputation and thereby committed an offence punishable U/s 506 IPC within my cognizance.
And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge..."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.4. Markedly, respondent no. 2 pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charges and claimed trial. Relevantly, during the course of trial, prosecution examined 02 (two) witnesses, i.e., PW-1/complainant/prosecutrix/appellant ('SA'); and PW-2/Inspector Gurdeep Kaur. Correspondingly, on 26.09.2023, respondent no. 2 admitted the genuineness of registration of FIR No. 247/21, PS. Civil Lines (as Ex. A-1); Certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Evidence Act') as Ex. A-2; and genuineness of statement of the appellant, recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (as Ex. A-3), without prejudice to his/respondent no. 2's rights, in terms of the provisions under Section 294 Cr.P.C., leading to the dispensation of corresponding witnesses by the Ld. Trial Court. Subsequently, on conclusion of prosecution evidence, recording of statement of respondent no. 2 under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 09.04.2024, as well as on conclusion of arguments by/on behalf of the parties, as aforementioned, the Ld. Trial Court vide impugned judgment, acquitted respondent no. 2 of the offence(s) punishable under Sections 354A/506 IPC, as noted hereinabove.
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 6 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:22:40 +0530
3. Ld. Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the impugned judgment and order were passed by the Ld. Trial Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the settled principles of law, deserving their setting aside at the outset. As per the Ld. Counsel, the impugned judgment is incorrect both on facts as well as in law, making the same liable to be set aside at the outset. It was further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court erred in not appreciating the facts and circumstances of the present case, nor the submissions of the appellant. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, in case the impugned judgment is permitted to stand, grave justice and irreparable loss would accrue to the complainant/victim/appellant. Correspondingly, as per the Ld. Counsel, the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against respondent no. 2, despite which, the Ld. Trial Court erroneously granted benefit of doubt to respondent no. 2, disregarding the infinite lacunae in the defence put forth by respondent no. 2. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further fervently argued that while passing the impugned judgment, Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the sterling testimony of the appellant. In particular, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the appellant made clear and specific allegations of molestation and threatening to kill against respondent no. 2 in her FIR as well as her statement, recorded in terms of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and apart from the same, the appellant also corroborated/supported her version in her deposition before the Ld. Trial Court. It was further argued that the Ld. Trial Court also failed to appreciate that the appellant in her examination in chief, correctly identified respondent no. 2 and affirmed that on 26.06.2017, respondent no. 2 called to meet her, inducing her that upon her failure to meet the said ultimatum, CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 7 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:22:44 +0530 respondent no. 2 would reach at appellant's house. Subsequently, as per the Ld. Counsel, when the appellant reached at Best of Asia Restaurant at Civil Lines and sitting there, respondent no. 2 touched her hand and when the appellant endeavored to withdraw, noticing wrong intentions on respondent no. 2's part, respondent no. 2 followed the appellant in the parking area and molested her/the appellant by touching her breast and thereafter, on appellant's objecting to the said conduct, respondent no. 2, pushed the appellant, leading to her/appellant's sustaining injury on her right elbow.
3.1. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court wrongly placed reliance on the complaint dated 18.02.2020, which was got lodged by the appellant vide DD No. 34AB to DCP North Civil Lines, while acquitting respondent no. 2. In this regard, Ld. Counsel asserted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the said complaint was also made against one Neeraj Sharma as well as respondent no. 2 and apart from the same, the appellant had levelled the allegations of respondent no. 2 seeking sexual favour from the appellant. As per the Ld. Counsel, the testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses, i.e., PW-1 and PW-2 are trustworthy and corroborative with each other and that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond a shadow of doubt against respondent no. 2, despite which, it was averred that the Ld. Trial Court erroneously passed an order/judgment of acquittal of respondent no. 2. It was further vehemently argued that the Ld. Trial Court wrongly concluded that the case of the prosecution was not free from doubt and suffered with improvements and contradictions. On the contrary as per the Ld. Counsel, the appellant has given the necessary and relevant details in her testimony and also upon being questioned CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 8 of 46 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:22:49 +0530 in her cross examination by/on behalf of respondent no. 2, which shows that there was no occasion for any improvement or contradiction, as otherwise noted. It was further submitted that the testimony of the appellant went unchallenged and even though she was subjected to rigorous cross examination, the appellant stood her ground and her statement could not be wavered. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate the settled law that conviction of an accused can be based on the sole testimony of a prosecutrix and in the instant case, the testimony of appellant was categorical in respect of the fact of commission of offence upon her by respondent no.2.
3.2. Ld. Counsel further strenuously contended that the statement of appellant has been natural and consistent with the version of the prosecutrix qua respondent no. 2 and that she withstood the rigours of cross examination. It was reiterated that solitary evidence of the appellant is sufficient in the instant case to reach a conclusion of guilt of respondent no. 2, which fact has not been duly considered by the Ld. Trial Court. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the Ld. Trial Court even erred in not framing charges under Section 354B IPC despite the fact that the allegations under the FIR as well as the appellant's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. prima facie disclosed the ingredients of the said offence. Correspondingly, it was argued that the Ld. Trial Court did not properly appreciate the law on the point of delay in registration of FIR and even failed to consider that, even otherwise, the delay if any, was properly explained by the appellant before the Ld. Trial Court. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further asserted that the Ld. Trial Court did not consider that the delay in registration of FIR was neither deliberate nor CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 9 of 46 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:22:55 +0530 intentional on the part of the appellant, rather, attributed to the reason of persistent threat met out by respondent no. 2 to the appellant. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, sexual offences against women are violative of their fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India/Constitution and that the courts are obligated to treat search offences sternly, severely and rigorously.
It was further asserted by the Ld. Counsel that the impugned judgment ignores material facts and circumstances and the Ld. Trial Court, did not apply his judicial mind while reaching a finding of acquittal of respondent no. 2 from such serious allegations. Accordingly, it was entreated that the impugned judgment be set aside and respondent no. 2 be convicted and sentenced of the charges levelled against him. In support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in; Hariprasad @ Kishan Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, Crl. Appeal No. 1182/2012, dated 07.11.2023(Hon'ble Supreme Court); and Ravinder Kumar& Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR 2001 SC 3570.
4. Per contra Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the impugned judgment was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as in consonance with the settled judicial precedents. Concomitantly, it was submitted by the Ld. Addl. PP for the State no grounds for any indulgence or relaxation are made out by the appellant. Accordingly, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed at the outset. 4.1. Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2/accused, vehemently contended that present appeal is not maintainable under Section 378 Cr.P.C. before this Court, besides, it was asserted that the instant appeal was filed beyond the statutory period of limitation. Ld. Counsel further submitted that, even CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 10 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:22:59 +0530 otherwise, no irregularity can be attributed to the impugned judgment, which was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due consideration of facts and circumstances brought on record. It was further submitted that the instant appeal has been filed by the appellant with malafide intentions and ulterior motives to harass and humiliate respondent no. 2. In this regard, Ld. Counsel submitted that the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned judgment specifically observed the factum of the FIR being registered with a delay of four years, without tendering any plausible reason for such delay. Correspondingly, it was submitted that the Ld. Trial Court gave due consideration to the fact that the appellant in the present case got registered, DD No. 34B at PS. Civil Lines and a compromised deed dated 10.07.2020 was executed between respondent no. 2's sister-in-law and the appellant. As per the Ld. Counsel, nowhere in the said proceedings the appellant made any alleged of any incident by respondent no. 2, belying the case sought to be subsequently built by the appellant in the instant case/FIR. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court elaborately discussed and evaluated the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses brought forth on record to reach a conclusion that the same was neither reliable nor convincing to reach a conclusion of guilt of respondent no. 2. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that there are glaring inconsistencies/incongruities in the testimony of various witnesses/prosecution witnesses and the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond a pale of doubt against respondent no. 2. Ld. Counsel further reiterated that the Ld. Trial Court, while acquitting respondent no. 2, duly applied its judicial mind and settled judicial precedents, which cannot be faulted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Further, as per the CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 11 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:23:03 +0530 Ld. Counsel, the appellant is not a victim in the instant case, as otherwise asserted. On the contrary, it was submitted that respondent no.21 is a victim in the hand of appellant. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel iterated that the instant appeal is grossly malicious and devoid of merits, deserving its dismissal. In support of the said contentions reliance was placed upon the decision(s) in; Badam Singh v. State of M.P., (2003) 12 SCC 792; Hakeem Khan & Ors. v. State of M.P., AIR 2017 SC 1723; State v. Mewa Lal & Ors., 2022/DHC/004404 (DHC); and State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Jitender Kumar & Anr., Crl. LP No. 364/2017, dated 06.07.2017 (DHC).
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the appellant, Ld. Addl. PP for the State as well as that of Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2 have been heard and the record(s), including the Trial Court Record and the written submission/synopsis filed, as well as the case laws relied upon by the parties, thoroughly perused.
6. At the outset, this Court deems it apposite to enunciate the scope of jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal. In this regard, this Court it is pertinent to outrightly make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., MANU/SC/0236/2016 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, while delving into the ' scope an ambit' of appellate court's jurisdiction in an appeal against acquittal, inter alia noted as under;
"18. Generally, an appeal against acquittal has always been altogether on a different pedestal from that of an appeal against conviction. In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate Court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and law. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 12 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:23:06 +0530 Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. This Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal, in the case of Sambasivan and Ors. v. State of Kerala, MANU/SC/0356/1998: (1998) 5 SCC 412, has held: The principles with regard to the scope of the powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal are well settled. The powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal are no less than in an appeal against conviction. But where on the basis of evidence on record two views are reasonably possible the appellate Court cannot substitute its view in the place of that of the trial Court. It is only when the approach of the trial Court in acquitting an accused is found to be clearly erroneous in its consideration of evidence on record and in deducing conclusions therefrom that the appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal.
19. This Court, in several cases, has taken the consistent view that the appellate Court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded. If the appellate Court, on scrutiny, finds that the decision of the Court below is based on erroneous views and against settled position of law, then the interference of the appellate Court with such an order is imperative.
20. This Court in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, MANU/SC/7108/2007: (2007) 4 SCC 415, after referring to a catena of decisions, has laid down the following general principles with regard to powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal:
42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power an appellate Court on the evidence CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 13 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:23:11 +0530 before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal.
Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Correspondingly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 51, iterated in respect of the foregoing as under;
"8. ...It is also well settled that the Court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [1951 SCC 1207 :
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 14 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEKABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.07.04 15:23:15 +0530 AIR 1952 SC 52] ; Wilayat Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1951 SCC 898 : AIR 1953 SC 122] . In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Quite evidently, from a conjoint reading of the aforenoted judicial dictates it can be perspicuously deduced that the jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal extends to reappreciation of the entire material placed on record of the trial court and to arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not. In fact, as aforenoted, court(s), while exercising appellate power is not required to consider the question of law, rather, also question of facts to affirmatively reach a conclusion of guilt or innocence of an accused. In fact, it is trite law1 that non-re-appreciation of the evidence on record in an appeal may affect the case of either the prosecution or even the accused. Needless to reemphasize that the appellate court is to be further wary of fact that presumption of innocence of an accused, even extents until an accused is held guilty by the final court of appeal. Nonetheless, it is seen from above that in the instances of appeal against acquittal, appellate courts have to be cognizant of the fact that in appeal against acquittal there is 'double presumption' in favour of the accused, i.e., one of fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person has to be presumed, innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Correspondingly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.
9. Therefore, being cognizant of the aforesaid 1 State of Gujarat v. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave, (2021) 2 SCC 735.CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 15 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:23:20 +0530 principles, however, before proceeding with the determination of the rival contentions of the parties, it would be pertinent to reproduce the relevant provisions under law/IPC, for the purpose of present adjudication, as under;
"354A. Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment-(1) A man committing any of the following acts-
(i) physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or
(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or
(iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or
(iv) making sexually coloured remarks, shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment. (2) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
(3) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (iv) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
*** *** ***
503. Criminal intimidation-Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
*** *** ***
506. Punishment for criminal intimidation-
Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.-- and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 16 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:23:23 +0530 imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with line, or with both."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Notably, it is observed from a perusal of the above that Section 354A IPC provides for criminality against any man who engages in unwelcome physical contact and advances explicit sexual behavior, demands sexual favors, shows pornography against a woman's will, or makes sexually colored remarks. Apposite for the purpose(s) of present discourse to further make a reference to the provisions under Section 354 IPC, which provides for criminality in case of assault or criminal force to a woman with an intent to outrage her modesty. Relevantly, in order to attract the said provision/Section 354 IPC, it is required from the prosecution to prove; (i) commission of criminal assault or use of criminal force on a person, who is a woman; (ii) use of criminal force on such victim by the aggressor/accused; and (iii) use of criminal force upon such a woman with a mens rea (intention or knowledge) to 'outrage her modesty'. In this regard, this Court deems is further apposite to refer to the decision in Vidyadharan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 1 SCC 215, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court1, while explicating the basic ingredients of Section 354 IPC, noted as under;
"9. In order to constitute the offence under Section 354 mere knowledge that the modesty of a woman is likely to be outraged is sufficient without any deliberate intention of having such outrage alone for its object. There is no abstract conception of modesty that can apply to all cases. (See State of Punjab v. Major Singh [AIR 1967 SC 63 : 1967 Cri LJ 1] .) A careful approach has to be adopted by the court while dealing with a case alleging outrage of modesty. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 354 IPC are as under:
1Premiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 10 SCC 81.
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 17 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.07.04 15:23:27 +0530
(i) that the person assaulted must be a woman;
(ii) that the accused must have used criminal force on her; and
(iii) that the criminal force must have been used on the woman intending thereby to outrage her modesty.
10. Intention is not the sole criterion of the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC, and it can be committed by a person assaulting or using criminal force to any woman, if he knows that by such act the modesty of the woman is likely to be affected. Knowledge and intention are essentially things of the mind and cannot be demonstrated like physical objects. The existence of intention or knowledge has to be culled out from various circumstances in which and upon whom the alleged offence is alleged to have been committed..."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Analogously, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., MANU/SC/0116/2004, while inter alia cogitating on the meaning of the term, 'modesty', remarked as under;
"11. Coming to the question as to whether Section 354 of the Act has any application, it is to be noted that the provision makes penal the assault or use of criminal force to a woman to outrage her modesty. The essential ingredients of offence under Section 354 IPC are:
(a) That the assault must be on a woman.
(b) That the accused must have used criminal force on her.
(c) That the criminal force must have been used on the woman intending thereby to outrage her modesty.
12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined. The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute associated with female human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex. The act of pulling a woman, removing her saree, coupled with a request for sexual intercourse, is such as would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman; and knowledge, that modesty is likely to be outraged, is sufficient to constitute the offence CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 18 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:23:31 +0530 without any deliberate intention having such outrage alone for its object. As indicated above, the word 'modesty' is not defined in IPC. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Third Edn.) defines the word 'modesty' in relation to woman as follows:
"Decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lowe; Shame-fast, Scrupulously chast."
*** *** ***
14. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines modesty as "freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for propriety in dress, speech or conduct". In the Oxford English Dictionary (1933 Edn.), the meaning of the word 'modesty' is given as "womanly propriety of behavior; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reverse or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions"..."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Reference in respect of the foregoing is further made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51, wherein the Hon'ble Court, whist confronted with the issue, ' whether a female child of seven-and-a-half months could be said to be possessed of 'modesty' which could be outraged', remarked as under;
"15. I think that the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The modesty of an adult female is writ large on her body. Young or old, intelligent or imbecile, awake or sleeping, the woman possesses a modesty capable of being outraged. Whoever uses criminal force to her with intent to outrage her modesty commits an offence punishable under Section 354. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive, as for example, when the accused with a corrupt mind stealthily touches the flesh of a sleeping woman. She may be an idiot, she may be under the spell of anaesthesia, she may be sleeping, she may be unable to appreciate the significance of the act; nevertheless, the offender is punishable under the section."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Remarkably, in the aforesaid dictate, the Hon'ble CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 19 of 46 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:23:35 +0530 Apex Court unambiguously explicated that the sense of modesty in all women is not the same for all and that the same may vary from woman to woman. Nonetheless, considering that the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex, touching of the victim's body, i.e., breasts, mouth any other body parts, etc., by an accused, without the consent of the complainant/victim, would indubitably and plainly fall within the four corners of the provisions under Section 354 IPC. Here, this Court further deems it pertinent to make a reference to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi1 in T. Manikadan v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) & Anr., Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 404/2016, dated 10.01.2017 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, while inter alia explicating the ingredients of offences under Section 354 and 354A IPC and the difference between the said provisions, noted as under;
"9. Thus when the modesty of a woman is outraged or it is likely to be outraged coupled with an assault or criminal force, Section 354 IPC would be attracted. Though assault can be by mere gesture or preparation intending or knowing that it is likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend use of criminal force. This is an act more than mere physical contact with advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures. Ingredients of Section 354 IPC would show that the same mandate an actus reas of assault or criminal force with an intention to outrage or likely to outrage the modesty whereas a mere physical contact with advances as noted above would attract Section 354A IPC. Though in certain fact situations there may be cases where there may be an overlap of both Sections 354 and 354A IPC however, there may be cases which may exclusively fall either in Section 354 or Section 354A IPC. Once an offence falls under Section 354 IPC even if ingredients of Section 354A IPC are satisfied, the accused will be punished for Section 354 IPC the same being more serious in nature as it prescribes the minimum sentence of one year and term for imprisonment which may extend to five years."
(Emphasis supplied) 1 Amit @ Lalu v. State, Crl. Appeal No. 858/2016, dated 25.05.2017 (DHC).
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 20 of 46
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04
15:23:39
+0530
14. In as much as the applicability/culpability under Section 506 IPC is concerned, law is trite that in order to attract the said provision, the prosecution is required to prove that the;
(i) accused threatened some person; (ii) such threat must extend to causing any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested; and (iii) the accused did so with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat. Pertinently, the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa in Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabaghana Behera, 1995 SCC Online Ori 317, while explicating the meaning of the word, ' alarm' used under Section 503/506 IPC, noted as under;
"...The threat must be intended to cause alarm from which it follows that, ordinarily, it would be sufficient for that purpose. The degree of such alarm may vary in different cases, but the essential matter is that it is of a nature and extent to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates and take away from his acts that element of free voluntary action which alone constitutes consent. The case where the threat produces an alarm is comparatively a simple one, for all that has then to be proved is that threat was given and that the alarm was due to the threat: but where the threat has not that effect, it involves a question whether it was sufficient to overcome a man of ordinary nerves. The Court may hold it to be an empty boast, too insignificant to call for penal visitation of Section 506. "Intimidate" according to Webstar's Dictionary means" (1) to make timid, make afraid, overawe; (2) force or deter with threats or violence, cow". Threat referred to in the Section must be a threat communicated or uttered with intention of its being communicated to the person threatened for the purpose of influencing his mind. Question whether threat amounts to a criminal intimidation or not does not depend on norms of individual threatened if it is such a threat as may overcome ordinary free will of a man of common firmness. "Threat" is derived from Anglo-sexam word CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 21 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.07.04 15:23:43 +0530 "threotou to life", (harass). It is the dicleration of an intention to inflict punishment, loss or pain on another. "Injury" is defined in Section 44. It involves doing of an illegal act. If it is made with intention mentioned in the section, it is an offence. Whether threat was given with intention to cause alarm to the person threatened has to be established by evidence to be brought on record..."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Significantly, in the aforenoted dictate, the Hon'ble Court explicitly observed that the mens rea/ intention envisaged under Section 503/506 IPC must be to cause alarm to the victim and whether or not such a victim is alarmed, is not of any consequence. Apropos the present discourse, reference is further made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 , wherein the Hon'ble Court, while dealing with the ingredients of offence under Section(s) 503/506 IPC, inter alia, observed as under;
"11. Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation. "Criminal intimidation" as defined in Section 503 IPC is as under:
"503. Criminal intimidation.--Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section."
A reading of the definition of "criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do."
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 22 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:23:46 +0530 (Emphasis supplied)
16. Consequently, being mindful of the principles hereinunder noted, this Court would now proceed to deal with the rival contentions of Ld. Counsel for the appellant as well as that of Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2. In this regard, this Court reiterates that the Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2 has primarily challenged the maintainability of the instant appeal by victim, in contradistinction to an appeal by the State, as well as on the aspect of limitation. However, in order to deal with the said contention, this Court deems it apposite to reproduce the provision under Section 372 Cr.P.C., as under;
"372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided- No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force. Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Quite evidently, it is observed from above that the law/Cr.P.C., provides for an explicit right to a victim to file/prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court, "acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation" and that such an appeal lies in the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such court. Undoubtedly, there is a limitation in the rights of complainant to prefer an appeal against acquittal, as envisaged under Section 378 Cr.P.C. However, the superior courts have clarified1 that a victim is not required to obtain a leave, as 1 Naval Kishore Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 979 of 2019, dated 05.07.2019 (SC).
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 23 of 46
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04
15:23:51
+0530
envisaged under Section 378 Cr.P.C. and as a corollary, an appellate court cannot dismiss the appeal on the said ground. Reference in this regard is further made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead), Rep. through LRs v. State of Karnataka & Ors., MANU/SC/1165/2018, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while exhaustively evaluating various contrasting dictates of several High Court, explicated the law in respect of the foregoing, as under;
"76. Putting the Declaration to practice, it is quite obvious that the victim of an offence is entitled to a variety of rights. Access to mechanisms of justice and redress through formal procedures as provided for in national legislation, must include the right to file an appeal against an order of acquittal in a case such as the one that we are presently concerned with. Considered in this light, there is no doubt that the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be given life, to benefit the victim of an offence.
77. Under the circumstances, on the basis of the plain language of the law and also as interpreted by several High Courts and in addition the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, it is quite clear to us that a victim as defined in Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be entitled to file an appeal before the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction. It must follow from this that the appeal filed by Kodagali before the High Court was maintainable and ought to have been considered on its own merits.
78. As far as the question of the grant of special leave is concerned, once again, we need not be overwhelmed by submissions made at the Bar. The language of the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is quite clear, particularly when it is contrasted with the language of Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure The text of this provision is quite clear and it is confined to an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a complaint. The word 'complaint' has been defined in Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and refers to any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate. This has nothing to do with the lodging CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 24 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:23:56 +0530 or the registration of an FIR, and therefore it is not at all necessary to consider the effect of a victim being the complainant as far as the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Here, it is pertinent to note that though the instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Section 378 Cr.P.C./Section 419 BNSS, however, during the course of proceedings before this Court, Ld. Counsel for the appellant contended that the present appeal may be treated/considered under Section 372 Cr.P.C. /Section 413 BNSS (proviso to the said provision), as an appeal by victim against an order of acquittal. In this regard, Ld. Counsel fervently argued that due to inadvertence and oversight, correct legal provision could not be mentioned in the pleadings of the present appeal, however, since the appeal is against the order of acquittal of respondent no. 2 by the Ld. Trial Court, the instant appeal by the appellant, who is a victim in the instant case, may be considered under Section 372 Cr.P.C./Section 413 BNSS, instead of that under Section 378 Cr.P.C./Section 419 BNSS. In contrast, Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2 asserted that since the correct legal provision has not been mentioned under the pleadings of the present appeal, the appellant is disentitled to claim any indulgence from this Court. However, in this regard, this Court unambiguously notes that the contention of the Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2 does not find favour with this Court, in view of the repeated avowals1 of the superior court2 inter alia proclaiming that mere mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any 1 Reference is made to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sambhaji & Ors. v. Gangabai & Ors., (2008) 17 SCC 117, wherein the Hon'ble Court inter alia noted, "Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. A Procedural prescription is the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice..."
2Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand, (2019)17SCC326; J. Kumaradasan Nair v. Iric Sohan, (2009) 12 SCC 175; and M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise, MANU/SC/0484/2015.
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 25 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:24:00 +0530
provision of law would not, by itself, sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a Court, if it is otherwise vested in a court of law. In fact, law is trite that under such situation, while exercising its power, the courts are required to merely consider whether they have the source to exercise such jurisdiction/power or not. Needless to reiterate, the instant appeal has been preferred by/at the behest of victim/prosecutrix against the order of acquittal of respondent no. 2/accused in the police case. Quite evidently, such appeal against acquittal of an accused by a victim, plainly falls with the purview of the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. and mere non-mentioning or incorrect mentioning of a legal provision, in the considered opinion of this Court, would not take away the jurisdiction of this Court, which is otherwise vested in it, in view of the said proviso.
19. In so far as the objection of Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2 pertaining to limitation in filing/preferring the present appeal is concerned, this Court observes at the time of hearing on admission/notice in the instant case, Ld. Counsel for the appellant submitted that against the impugned judgment dated 26.07.2024, the instant appeal was filed through e-filing portal on 31.08.2024. In this regard, Ld. Counsel for the appellant, placed on record, e-filing receipt of the present appeal, averring that pursuant to objections raised by the registry of this Court, the instant appeal could only be listed for hearing on 18.10.2024, post the objections were cleared. Correspondingly, while referring to the certified copy of the impugned order, Ld. Counsel for the appellant further asserted that the certified copy of the instant appeal was applied before the Ld. Trial Court on 23.08.2024, whereupon a certified copy of the impugned judgment was prepared and supplied to the appellant only on CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 26 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:24:04 +0530 28.08.2024, and upon exclusion of the said provision, as per the Ld. Counsel for the appellant, the instant appeal was preferred within the statutory period of limitation. Needless to mention, the said submissions were vehemently opposed by the Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2. However, this Court again finds itself difficult to concede with the objection of Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2. On the contrary, upon perusal of the material placed on record, in light of the foregoing submissions, legal provisions1 as well as judicial precedents2, this Court concurs with the submissions of Ld. Counsel for the appellant that there is no delay in filing the present appeal. Even otherwise, presuming for the sake of argument that there is some delay in filing the appeal, same, in the considered opinion of this Court deserves to be condoned in view of the repeated avowals 3 of superior courts.
20. Reverting now to the merits of the present case, this Court deems it pertinent here to refer to the deposition/testimony of the prosecutrix/complainant/PW-1/'SA' before the Ld. Trial Court, who deposed about the incident in question. As per the appellant/prosecutrix, on 26.06.2017, respondent no. 2/ accused Manish Sharma, who was correctly identified by the appellant before the Ld. Trial Court, called her/PW-1 and expressed his willingness to meet with the appellant/PW-1. PW-1 further proclaimed that when she inquired respondent no. 2, the purpose of said proposed meeting, respondent no. 2 is asserted to have 1 Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, which inter alia provides that in computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, "the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded". (Emphasis supplied) 2 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Maharaj Narain & Ors., 1968 SCR (2) 842: AIR 1968 SC 960.
3It is a trite law that for the bonafide mistake committed by the counsel, party should not suffer (Ref.: Rafiq v. Munshilal, (1981) 2 SCC 788: AIR 1981 SC 1400, Shalini Pai & Ors. v. State Bank of Mysore, 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 37790: AIR 2017 Mad 273). Correspondingly, superior courts have affirmed that whiel condoning delay, courts must adopt liberal approach ( Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649; and State of U.P. v. Satish Chand Shivhare & Brothers, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2151).
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 27 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:24:08 +0530
told the appellant to either come and meet him, else he/respondent no. 2 would visit appellant's house. As per the appellant, since she was a single woman and did not meet any male person in her house, she/the appellant agreed to meet respondent no. 2 outside. Consequently, the appellant met with respondent no. 2 in Civil Line at Best of Asia Restaurant/restaurant. Further, as per the appellant/PW-1, when they were sitting in the restaurant, respondent no. 2 touched her/PW-1's hand and when she/PW-1 took her hand back, respondent no. 2 is avowed to have asked PW-1 to go at some isolated place, where he/respondent no. 2 could come close to her/the appellant. It was further proclaimed by PW-1 in her testimony that after judging respondent no. 2's wrong intention, she stood up from her seat and went down in the parking area. However, respondent no. 2 is asserted to have followed the appellant/PW-1 in the parking area and molested her/PW-1 by touching her/PW-1's breast. Thereupon, as per PW-1, when she expressed displeasure on respondent no. 2's unexpected approach, respondent no. 2 pushed her/PW-1 and she/PW-1 got injury on her/PW-1's right elbow. Correspondingly, as per PW-1, before she could call anyone, respondent no. 2 ran away from the spot in his car. It was further deposed by PW-1 that after the said incident, she/PW-1 was not in her senses for 3-4 (three-four) days for the reason that respondent no. 2 had threatened her by declaring, "mai tujhe raato raat ghar se uthva dunga or jaan se marne ki dhamki di or mujhe pata hai tu ghar par akeli rehti hai or na mai tumhare paise vapis karne dunga Nirja Sharma se or na hi mai karunga" (मैं तुझे रातो रात घर से उठा दूंगा और जान से मरने की धमकी दी और मुझे पता है तू घर पर अके ली रहती है और ना मैं तुम्हारे पैसे वापिस करने दूंगा निर्जा शर्मा से और ना ही मैं करुं गा). Relevantly, during her CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 28 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date:
GOYAL 2025.07.04
15:24:12
+0530
deposition PW-1 proved her written complaint, given to the SHO, PS. Civil Line, dated 29.06.2021 as Ex. PW1/A, bearing her/PW-1's signatures at point A. PW-1 further proclaimed that after tendering her complaint, the police officials took her/PW-1 to Tis Hazari Court for the purpose of recording of her/PW-1's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C, which was proved as Ex. PW1/B (running into 06 pages), bearing PW-1's signatures at points A and B. Correspondingly, PW-1 also proved her reply along with supporting documents, to the notice under Section 91 Cr.P.C., as Ex. PW1/C (Colly.) (running into 36 pages), bearing PW-1's signatures at point A.
21. Markedly, in her cross examination by/at the behest of respondent no. 2, PW-1/complainant/appellant proclaimed as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for the accused.
I am graduate and running a traveling agency since the year 2006 I am proprietor of the said traveling agency. I was looking after the booking and accounts etc., by myself. Accused Manish Sharma gave his first booking of his father in my traveling agency on 12.04.2017. It is correct that thereafter accounts of accused Manish Sharma remained maintained in my firm for different bookings of hotels and flights etc., on regular basis. Vol. He booked in our firm certain flights and hotels for his son and the payment of the same is still pending. I sent the WhatsApp messages to accused Manish Sharma for demanding the due amount against him for the booking of his son. Again said, it was not for the booking of his son but it was pendency of amount for booking of hotel Lalit at the asking of accused Manish Sharma. Again said, it was the payment of flight tickets which was not paid to me till date by accused Manish Sharma. I shown the said whatsapp message of demand of money to IO during investigation but now I do not have that message available with me. I took the screen shot of the said message and kept with me. I can produce the said screen shot. I have not brought the same today so it cannot be shown now. The accused Manish Sharma CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 29 of 46 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:24:17 +0530 and his sister-in-law namely Neerja Sharma also hold money of Rs. 12 lacs approximately before the registration of the said FIR. Vol. Still accused Manish and Neerja hold me the amount of Rs. 2 lacs. It is correct that on 18.02.2020, I had lodged a complaint vide DD No. 34 B to the DCP North Civil Line and the same was marked HC Sanjay. It is correct that in the said complaint, I had not mentioned any factum of going to BOA Restaurant, touching my hand and touching my breast etc. It is correct that in the said complaint, I had not mentioned any threat extended by accused Manish Sharma.
It is wrong to suggest that I had not mentioned any fact of sexual advancement, touching hand and breast and threatening because accused Manish Sharma never touched me inappropriately nor extended any threat at any point of time. It is correct that in pursuant to the afore- mentioned complaint dated 18.02.2020, compromise dated 10.07.2020 arrived between me and Neerja and in pursuant to the same, I received the amount from Neerj and close the said complaint. Vol. I do not remember even by the approximation as to how much amount received from Neerja Sharma. Again said the said complaint dated 18.02.2020 was not got closed by me. In the said meeting when the compromise effected on 10.07.2020, accused Manish also participated. Again said, accused Manish had not participated in the said meeting. At this stage, copy of compromise deed dated 18.02.2020 is now Ex.PW-1/X-1 bearing the signature of complainant at point A Even after 10.07.2020, accused Manish used to give bookings for hotels and flight for himself and his family members from me and I did my job after taking money from him and some time on the basis of credit. Vol. Some amount is still pending from Manish for the said bookings. It is correct that on 26.10.2018, I opened a new office and on the celebration of the opening of the said office, I invited accused Manish Sharma for the same. Again said, it was not the proper invitation, rather it was a message sent to him for the same. It is correct that on 23.10.2018, I wished accused Manish for long and healthy life on his birthday.
It is correct that on 04.11.2019, I got served upon a legal/demand notice upon the sister-in-law of accused Manish namely Neerja through my counsel. It is correct that in the said notice also, I did not mention the alleged incident dated 26.06.2017 of any CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 30 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:24:21 +0530 sexual advancement or any threat etc.) on 10.07.2020, the financial aspect of settlement between the parties when Neerja gave me DD of Rs. 5 lacs to me and I got closed the complaint. Vol.
Neerja Sharma did not complied with the other terms and condition of the said settlement and she gave two installment Rs. 2 lacs and Rs. 3 lacs that too after delay that is why the said financial dispute is still going on between the parties. I requested accused Manish many time to let my financial accounts be cleared by his sister-in-law but in vain. The accused Manish refused to pay a single penny to me and rather asked his sister-in-law Neerja not to pay any amount to me. I was not happy when accused Manish Sharma refused to clear the amount payable by his sister-in-law. The Neerja Sharma always broken her promises for returning the amount payable to me and accused Manish Sharma helping her in her endeavor. I did not disclose the incident dated 26.06.2017 to the BOA Staff or the parting person or any other Manager or guard available there. I was carrying my mobile phone at that day. I did not make any PCR call on that day or did not inform any authority in this regard. Vol. I wanted to make PCR call but accused ran away from the spot. I did not disclose the incident dated 26.06.2017 to any of my relative till date. I had not told anybody including any police authority etc., about the incident dated 26.06.2017 till 29.06.2021. Vol. There was no use of telling anybody in this regard. I do not remember when I lastly received any amount from Neerja Sharma and Manish Sharma. I cannot tell even by approximation of year. I did not take any treatment of the injury received by me on 26.06.2017 from any clinic or doctor. Vol. I bandaged my elbow and myself at home and treated the same by my own. I did not tell any friend or neighbour or staff the reason of injury and rapping the bandage on my hand for the treatment. Vol. I did not tell anybody because it was my problem and who are they who asked me the reason of having bandage on my hand. It is correct that I mailed accused Manish Sharma on 28.06.2017 from my mail for providing me tickets for his son's air ticket from Bangalore to Delhi.
It is correct that I have not mentioned Ex.
PW-1/A that on 26.06.2017, I received any injury on my elbow or that accused Manish ran away from the spot and I did not remained in my senses 3-4 days or that accused Manish extended threat to me that he will get me lifted from my home. Vol. I did not mention the afore-mentioned facts in Ex, PW-1/A CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 31 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:24:25 +0530 however, I want to settle the matter with Neerja and Manish that is why I did not give much detail in the said complaint. Again said, the other party was also wanted to settle the matter. When the other party did not agree to compromise the matter, the FIR was lodged in the present case. It is wrong to suggest accused Manish Sharma had never called me or taken me to BOA on 26.06.2017 nor he had touched my hand or my breast nor threatened me any manner. It is wrong to suggest that accused Manish never threatened me. It is wrong to suggest that due to the financial dispute with Neerja Sharma and accused Manish Sharma I lodged the first complaint in Burari and thereafter received the amount from Neerja Sharma. Even after receiving the compromise amount, I demanded more money from accused Manish and Neerja and on their refusal, I lodged the present case in order to settle the financial dispute with them. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Germane for the purposes of the present discourse to further make a reference to the testimony of PW-2/Insp. Gurdeep Kaur, who deposed in her testimony that on 29.06.2021, she/PW-2 was posted in the PS. Civil Lines as Sub-Inspector and on the said day, the complainant/PW-1 reached at the police station with a hand written complaint (Ex. PW1/A). Thereafter, as per PW-2, she endorsed the complaint and prepared a tehrir (Ex. PW2/A), bearing PW-2's signatures at point A. Further, as per PW-2, she subsequently, handed over the complaint along with the tehrir to the Duty Officer, who registered the instant FIR/FIR No. 247/21. Correspondingly, as per PW-2, the Duty Officer handed over the computerized copy of the FIR along with certificate u/s 65B of the Evidence Act to her, which are Ex. A-1 and Ex. A-2, respectively. Further, PW-2 asserted that thereafter, she along with the complainant went to the spot and prepared a site plan (Ex. PW2/B) at the instance of the complainant, bearing PW-2's signatures at point A. Thereafter, as per PW-2, she CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 32 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:24:28 +0530 recorded a supplementary statement of the complainant and discharged her. It was further proclaimed by PW-2 that subsequently on 01.07.2021, she/PW-2 got the statement of the complainant/PW-1 recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex. PW2/B) and during the investigation, she/PW-2 also served a notice under Section 41A Cr.P.C. to respondent no. 2/accused. Thereafter, on 09.07.2021, as per PW-2, she served a notice under Section 91 Cr.P.C. to the complainant/PW-1, which is Ex. PW2/C, bearing PW-2's signatures at point A and she/PW-2 got the reply on 21.07.2021 [Ex. PW1/C (colly) (running into 36 pages)]. After recording the statement of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., PW-2 avowed that she prepared and filed the chargesheet before the Ld. Trial Court. Pertinently, PW-2 further correctly identified respondent no. 2 as accused before the Ld. Trial Court.
23. Notably, in her cross-examination, PW-2 declared as under;
"XXXXXX by Sh. ***, Ld. Counsel for the accused.
It is correct that the incident was exactly of 26.06.2017. However, the complaint of the same was received on 29.06.2021. I was informed about the legal notice, MoU and the settled complaint between the prosecutrix and Neerja Sharma (sister-in-law of the accused). It is correct that the prosecutrix had not provided me the copy of the MoU, legal notice or the settled complaint. It is wrong to suggest that I have in connivance with the prosecutrix concealed the said documents so as to file the final report against the accused in the present case. I had though inquired about the CCTV, however, I did not inquire or serve any notice as to whether any employees were acquainted with the facts of the present case. It is wrong to suggest that I did not make any such inquires because no such incident had taken place. It is wrong to suggest that I did not conduct the investigation of the present case fair and properly. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely."
(Emphasis supplied) CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 33 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:24:32 +0530
24. Proceeding now with the determination of the rival contentions of appellant and respondent no. 2 (as well as the State), this Court deems it apposite to note here that it is a settled law that conviction for an offence of sexual color/assault, rape, etc., can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. In fact, even on a general principle, it has been recurrently avowed 1 by superior courts in a catena of decisions that there is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness if his version is clear and reliable, reason underlying the same being; 'the evidence has to be weighed and not counted'. Notably so, in the instances of such offences, courts have even gone on to the extent to appreciate and declare 2 that to seek corroboration to the testimony of the prosecutrix before relying upon the same would amount to adding insult to the injury3 sustained by such victim and have, consequently, deprecated the said practice. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, wherein the Hon'ble Court, while dealing with evidentiary value of the sole victim/prosecutrix, noted as under;
"21. ...The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an 1 Kusti Mallaiah v. State of A.P., (2013) 12 SCC 680.2
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 and Munna v. State of M.P., (2014) 10 SCC 254 3 State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550.
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 34 of 46 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:24:35 +0530
accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Analogously, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pratap Singh, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3207, in the similar context observed as under;
"17. It is now well-settled that conviction for an offence of rape/sexual assault can be based on the sole testimony of prosecutrix, if the same is found to be natural, trustworthy and worth being relied on. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars..."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Quite evidently, it is seen from the above that a conviction of an accused can be premised on the testimony of a sole witness only when such testimony is 'sterling 1' in nature, which can be relied upon, without any corroboration. Notably, the term(s), 'sterling witness'/'sterling testimony' in criminal jurisprudence has been repeatedly declared by superior courts to mean a witness who is2, "worthy of credence, one who is reliable and truthful." Reference in this regard is further made to the decision in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, catalogued the quality of a 'sterling witness', under the following observations;
"22. ...In our considered opinion, the "sterling witness" should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the 1 Bhimapa Chandapa Hosamani & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2006) 11 SCC 323.2
Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433.
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 35 of 46
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04
15:24:39
+0530
statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co- relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a "sterling witness" whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged..."
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Consequently, being wary of the aforenoted principles, when the material/evidence placed on record is conscientiously evaluated, this Court unwaveringly reaches a conclusion that the testimony of PW-1 in the instant case cannot be considered to be of 'sterling nature' so as to form the sole basis of conviction of respondent no. 2 in the instant case. On the contrary, this Court outrightly records that there are material CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 36 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:24:42 +0530 improvements/variations in PW-1's deposition, especially during her cross examination. In this regard, it is observed that PW-1 in her deposition/cross examination asserted that she had WhatsApp messaged to respondent no. 2, demanding alleged dues against him for the booking of his son, however, later on asserted that the said dues were for the booking of Lalit Hotel, at the instance of respondent no. 2. Nonetheless, PW-1 again improved her version to proclaim that the said alleged dues were against the payment of flight tickets, which were (allegedly) not paid to her/the appellant by respondent no. 2. Correspondingly, PW-1 proclaimed that she had shown the said WhatsApp message of demand of money to the IO during the investigation, however, asserted that she did not have the said messages with her at the time of her deposition. Concomitantly, there are also improvements in the testimony of PW-1 regarding the alleged due amount towards respondent no. 2 and his sister-in-law, namely, Neerja Sharma. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that while at one instance, PW-1 asserted that respondent no. 2 and Neerja Sharma owed her/PW-1 a sum of Rs. 12,00,000/- (Rupees Twelve Lakhs only) before the registration of FIR and a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs only) on the date of her deposition before the Ld. Trial Court. However, upon being further cross examined, PW-1 acknowledged that pursuant to complaint dated 18.02.2020, lodged by her/PW-1 and subsequent compromise dated 10.07.2020, arrived between her/PW-1 and Neerja and in pursuant to the same, she/PW-1 had received the amount from Neerja and closed the said complaint. However, again, PW-1 changed her stand in her cross examination by asserting that neither did she/PW-1 remember, even by approximation, the amount received by her/PW-1 from Neerja CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 37 of 46 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:24:46 +0530 Sharma nor did she close the complaint dated 18.02.2020. Another significant improvement in the deposition/cross- examination of PW-1 is that while she/PW-1 initially asserted that in the meeting when the compromise was effected on 10.07.2020, respondent no. 2/accused Manish had also participated, however, went back on said declaration to again state that respondent no. 2 had not participated in the said meeting.
28. In so far as the alleged incident in question at the restaurant on 26.06.2017 is concerned, PW-1 avowed under her cross-examination that she did not disclose about the said incident, dated 26.06.2017, to any of the staff of the restaurant or any of the parking person or any other manager or guard, available there/at the restaurant. Correspondingly, PW-1 though affirmed that she was carrying her mobile phone on the said day, however, confirmed that she made no call to PCR on the said day nor informed of any authority in this regard. In fact, PW-1 went ahead to confirm that till the date of her deposition before the Ld. Trial Court, she had not even informed any of her relatives of said alleged occurrence. Correspondingly, as per PW-1 she had not even informed any of the police authorities, etc., about the incident dated 26.06.2017 till 29.06.2021. Quite peculiarly, the reasons for PW-1's not making PCR or informing anyone of the incident have been asserted by her in her cross examination as, "...I wanted to make PCR call but accused ran away from the spot..." and "...There was no use of telling anybody in this regard...", respectively. Ergo, under such circumstances, it does not appeal to the senses of this Court as to what occasioned the complainant's/PW-1's approaching the concerned police officials on 29.06.2021 for the registration of the instant FIR against CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 38 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:24:50 +0530 respondent no. 2, especially when nowhere under her deposition PW-1 proclaimed of any subsequent occurrence, post 26.06.2017 or of any motivating force, constraining her to finally break her silence on the alleged incident.
29. Strikingly, though, during the course of argument before this Court, Ld. Counsel for the appellant asserted that the reason for the appellant's delayed reporting of the alleged incident was the 'alleged threat' faced by her from respondent no. 2, however, the said submission stands belied from the material placed on record. In this regard, it is observed that PW-1 even under her examination-in-chief proclaimed that she was not in her senses for 3-4 (three-four) days for the reason that she was threatened by respondent no. 2 of fire consequences by proclaiming, "mai tujhe raato raat ghar se uthva dunga or jaan se marne ki dhamki di or mujhe pata hai tu ghar par akeli rehti hai or na mai tumhare paise vapis karne dunga Nirja Sharma se or na hi mai karunga" (मैं तुझे रातो रात घर से उठा दूंगा और जान से मरने की धमकी दी और मुझे पता है तू घर पर अके ली रहती है और ना मैं तुम्हारे पैसे वापिस करने दूंगा निर्जा शर्मा से और ना ही मैं करुं गा). However, the reason for delay of around 4 years in reporting of the incident is not forthcoming from any material placed on record. The same is further notwithstanding the fact that PW-1, upon being cross examined, affirmed that in her complaint dated 29.06.2021 (Ex. PW1/A) she had not disclosed that she was not in her senses for 3-4 (three- four) days, or that respondent no. 2 had extended threat to her/the appellant by asserting that he/respondent no. 2 would get her/appellant lifted from her house. Needless to mention that PW-1 further affirmed and acknowledged that Ex. PW1/A was not the first instance, post 26.06.2017, when she had approached the police authorities. On the contrary, PW-1 admitted that on CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 39 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.07.04 15:24:55 +0530 18.02.2020, she/PW-1 had lodged a complaint vide DD No. 34 B to the DCP North, PS. Civil Line, which was marked HC Sanjay, however, even under the said complaint, PW-1 admitted that she had not mentioned of any factum of going to the restaurant or of respondent no. 2's touching her/PW-1's hand and breast, etc., prior to the said date. Correspondingly, PW-1 also acknowledged that under the said complaint, she had not even mentioned of any threat, extended by respondent no. 2/accused Manish Sharma. Similarly, PW-1 acknowledged that though on 04.11.2019, she/PW-1 got served a legal/demand notice upon respondent no. 2's sister-in-law, namely, Neerja through her/PW-1's counsel, however, even under the said notice, she had not mentioned of the alleged incident dated 26.06.2017 or of any sexual advancement or any threat, etc., by/at the behest of respondent no. 2. Clearly, in light of the foregoing, this Court finds it quite perplexing that the complainant, though, sought resort to legal recourse against the alleged incident of 26.06.2017 by filing a complaint (Ex. PW1/A) on 29.06.2021, i.e., after around four years' delay, however, the reasons for such delayed reporting before the concerned police officials are not forthcoming from the material placed on record. Same is notwithstanding the fact that, though, this Court is conscious of the settled law 1, persistently avowed by superior courts that in the cases of offences of sexual tenor, ordinarily, the family of victim tend to be hesitant in reporting the matter to the police, lest their life and family's reputation may be put to jeopardy and that under such circumstances, delay in lodging the first information report is quite a normal phenomenon and cannot be read against a prosecutrix. However, present is not the case, where the 1 Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 170; and Dildar Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 10 SCC 531.
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 40 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.07.04 15:24:59 +0530
complainant can seek refuge under the said principle in light of the facts and circumstances brought forth. Appositely, as aforenoted, not only are there several inconsistencies in the version put forth by the prosecutrix/complainant/PW-1 in the instant case, rather, it is not comprehensible as to why the complainant promptly, failed to report the incidents aimed towards her by respondent no. 2, when she had already lodged an earlier complaint on 18.02.2020 vide DD No. 34 B to the DCP North, PS. Civil Line as well as issued a legal notice dated 04.11.2019 to respondent no. 2's sister-in-law for alleged monetary/financial transactions. Consequently, in the instant case, working on the presumption that the incident actually transpired on 26.06.2017, unexplained delay in registration of instant FIR only on 29.06.2021, becomes a vital factor, discrediting the version put forth by the complainant/appellant/PW-1, in the instant case. Needless to observe at this stage, it is trite law1 that delay in loading the FIR creates a doubt in the prosecution case, if the said delay is not properly explained. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the aspect of delay in registration of FIR, remarked as under;
"50. Delay in setting the law into motion by lodging of complaint in court or FIR at police station is normally viewed by the courts with suspicion because there is possibility of concoction of evidence against an accused. Therefore, it becomes necessary for the prosecution to satisfactorily explain the delay. Whether the delay is so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion on the case of the prosecution would depend upon a variety of factors. Even a long delay can be condoned if the informant has no motive for implicating the accused."
(Emphasis supplied) 1 Kishan Singh v. Gurpal Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 775 and Jasbir Singh v. State, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1427.
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 41 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.07.04 15:25:03 +0530
30. Similarly, in respect of the aforesaid, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379, observed as under;
"12. The FIR in a criminal case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence though may not be substantive piece of evidence. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR in respect of the commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as the names of the eye-witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. If there is a delay in lodging the FIR, it loses the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of large number of consultations/deliberations. Undoubtedly, the promptness in lodging the FIR is an assurance regarding truth of the informant's version. A promptly lodged FIR reflects the first hand account of what has actually happened, and who was responsible for the offence in question..."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. Portentously, another confounding aspect in the instant case that though, PW-1/appellant levelled serious allegations against respondent no. 2 of commission of offences under Sections 354A/506 IPC by him on 26.06.2017, however, under her cross examination, PW-1 affirmed that she continued her business and personal relationship with respondent no. 2, way subsequent to the alleged incident, which is quite unlikely conduct of a victim of offence in the nature, asserted herein. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to note that PW-1/appellant under her cross-examination admitted that even after 10.07.2020, respondent no. 2 used to give bookings for hotels and flight for himself and his family members from her/PW-1 and that she/PW-1 did her job, after taking money from respondent no. 2 and even sometimes on the basis of 'credit'. In CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 42 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date:
2025.07.04 15:25:07 +0530 fact, PW-1 went ahead to proclaim that even at the time of opening of her office on 26.10.2018, she/PW-1 had invited respondent no. 2 on the celebration of such opening. However, PW-1 simply proclaimed again that "...it was not the proper invitation, rather it was a message sent to him for the same..." Quite unusually, PW-1 further acknowledged that on 23.10.2018, she/PW-1 had wished respondent no. 2/accused Manish for long and healthy life on his birthday, way subsequent to the alleged incident on 26.06.2017 and prior to reporting of the incident on 29.06.2021, which conduct of the appellant, casts a significant dent in the version put forth by her/the appellant against respondent no. 2.
32. Distressingly, there are also material improvements in the testimony of PW-1 before the Ld. Trial Court in so far as PW-1 inter alia admitted under her cross-examination that she had not mentioned under her complaint (Ex. PW-1/A) that on 26.06.2017, she received any injury on her elbow, or that respondent no. 2/accused Manish ran away from the spot. In fact, the cross examination of PW-1 accentuates that the dispute between the appellant on one hand and respondent no. 2 as well as his sister-in-law, Neerja Sharma pertained to some monetary transaction, wherein, PW-1 explicitly declared/volunteered under her cross-examination that she/PW-1 wanted to settle her matter with Neerja and respondent no.2/Manish and that is why she/PW-1 did not give much details in her complaint and that when the other party did not agree to compromise, the instant/present FIR was got lodged. Concomitantly, PW-1/appellant further deposed in her cross examination that she requested respondent no. 2/accused Manish several times to let her financial accounts be cleared by his/respondent no. 2's sister-
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 43 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:25:11 +0530
in-law, however, in vain. Further, as per PW-1, respondent no. 2 refused to pay a single penny to her/PW-1, rather, asked his/respondent no. 2's sister-in-law, Neerja not to pay any amount to her/PW-1 and that she/PW-1 was not happy when respondent no. 2/accused Manish Sharma refused to clear the amount payable by his sister-in-law. Clearly, the said facts, considering in cumulation further accentuate the lacunae in the case put forth by the prosecution/complainant against respondent no. 2. Congruently, another distressing factor in the instant case is that the investigation does not appear to have been fairly conducted in the instant case. In this regard, it is outrightly noted that despite PW-2 overtly remarked in her deposition that she prepared site plan (Ex. PW2/B) at the instance of the complainant/PW-1, however, it is noted from the record that the said site plan has not been signed by the complainant nor the reasons for such non- affixation of complainant's impression and/or signatures on such site plan, forthcoming on record. The same is further despite the fact that nowhere under her deposition, PW-1 asserted of having accompanied, PW-2 to the site for alleged preparation of site plan at her/PW-1's instance. Congruently, though, PW-2 proclaimed in her testimony that she had, though, inquired about the CCTV at the alleged site of occurrence, however, affirmed that she/PW-2 made no inquiries or even served any notice as to whether any employees were acquainted with the facts of the present case. Quite evidently, no endeavor to join any independent persons/public persons was made in the instant case, considering the aforenoted lacunae/inconsistencies/discrepancies in the version put forth by PW-1. In fact, no independent investigation appears to have been conducted by PW-2 in the instant case.
33. Conclusively, in light of the foregoing, it is CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 44 of 46 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.07.04 15:25:14 +0530 reiterated that from the material placed on record and arguments addressed by/on behalf of the appellant and respondent no. 2, in the considered opinion of this Court, the prosecution/complainant has failed to discharge its burden to prove the present case 'beyond reasonable doubt' against the respondent no. 2. On the contrary, in light of the various contradictions, omissions, lacunae, hereinunder observed, benefit of doubt must accrue in favour of respondent no. 2. Needless to reiterate, the prosecutrix has not only made general, sweeping and vague allegations against respondent no. 2, rather, the conduct of the complainant inter alia pertaining to delayed reporting of the case; non- explanation of reasons for approaching the authorities only on 29.06.2021, without any prompting or incident having taken place on the said date; persistent improvements and contradictions in the testimony of the appellant; conduct of the appellant in persevering both professional and personal relationship with respondent no. 2, way subsequent to the incident; non-reporting to incident by the appellant even at the time of registration of complaint dated 18.02.2020 and issuance of notice dated 04.11.2019; besides considering various lacunae in investigation as hereinunder noted, in the considered opinion of this Court, are sufficient to cast a seizable dent in the prosecution story against respondent no. 2. Needless to mention, it is trite law1 that the prosecution has to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt and the accused should be considered innocent, till it is established otherwise. It is equally a settled law2 that in case where two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused and the other adversely against it, the view 1 Meena v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 5 SCC 21.
2Raghunath v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398, Dhan Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1980) 1 SCC 605 and State of U.P. v. Nandu Vishwakarma, (2009) 14 SCC 501.
CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 45 of 46 Digitally signed ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK GOYAL GOYAL Date: 2025.07.04 15:25:18 +0530
favoring the accused must be accepted. Needless to further mention that though this Court holds highest regard for the decisions relied upon by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant in support of appellant's case, however, the same would not come to the aid of the appellant, in the manner as proposed, as the facts and circumstances of the present case are clearly distinguishable.
34. Conclusively, in view of the above discussion, the present appeal deserves to be rejected/dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the judgment dated 26.07.2024, passed by Ld. JMFC (Mahila Court)-04, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case bearing, 'State v. Manish Sharma, Cr. Case No. 10371/2021', arising out of FIR No. 247/2021, PS. Civil Lines, under Sections 354A/506 IPC, acquitting respondent no. 2 of the offence(s) punishable under Sections 354A/506 IPC, is hereby upheld.
35. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of this order/judgment.
36. Appeal file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally signed by ABHISHEK GOYAL ABHISHEK Date: GOYAL 2025.07.04 15:25:24 +0530 Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 04.07.2025. ASJ-03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi CA No. 430/2024 SA v. State & Anr. Page 46 of 46