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Earlier the view taken by some of the High Courts was that mere intimation of the award would be sufficient and the prescribed period of limitation of six months would commence from that date, when the award was announced and mere intimation was sent to the claimant. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, this view cannot be regarded as correct law. The most fair and reasonable construction of this proviso would be the date of knowledge of contents of the award which would be sufficient to enable the applicant to pursue his remedy like a common prudent man and in accordance with law. Unlike other proviso to section, sources of information or knowledge would not be a material consideration. It is the ultimate provided by the legislature for preferring an application under Section 18 of the Act. In other cases, it would be within six weeks from the date of receipt of notice by the claimant under Section 12(2) and in the event of the party being present at the time of announcement of the award within six weeks from the Collector's award. In no event, the Collector would have jurisdiction to entertain and make a reference to the Court of competent jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Act in excess of six months from the date of Collector's award. In other words, within six months from the date, the party had constructed and/or actual knowledge or Information of the award in regard to Its essential features. The last part of the second proviso has not defined the word "Collectors Award" and this would have to be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case but in view of the principle aforestated. Once the award has been made and the party has knowledge about its ingredients, the time limit on a realistic interpretation would commence from that date and has expired on lapse of six months. Prohibition of limitation in a statute Is normally to be construed strictly and the equitable or ethical consideration would not normally be with the courts in giving it totally a liberal interpretation so as to wipe out the very effect of the limitation clause.
This principle was reiterated with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Quiser Jehan Begum (supra) with further expansion to the word knowledge and/or information of the award' and clearly interpreting the expression six months from the date of Collector's award, the Court held as under:
(5) As to the second part of Clause (b) of the proviso, the true scope and effect thereof was considered by this Court In Harish Chandra's case, 19621 SCR 676 : AIR 1961 SC 1500 (supra). It was there observed that a liberal and mechanical construction of the words "six months from the date of 'the Collector's award: occurring in the second part of Clause (b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and" the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the expression...used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. "Admittedly the award was never communicated to the respondents. Therefore the question before us boils down to this. When did the respondents know the award either actually or constructively? Learned Counsel for the appellant has placed very strong reliance on the petition which the respondents made for interim payment of compensation on December 24, 1954. He has pointed out that the learned Subordinate Judge relied on this petition as showing the respondents' date of knowledge and there are no reasons why we should take a different view. It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandras case 19621 SCR 676 : AIR 1961 SC 1500 (supra) is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award Is communicated to a party under Section 12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in Court either personally or through his representative when the awards made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award.

In the case of Bharat Chand Dilwali v. 42 UOI 1988 Rajdhani Law Reporter 224 as well as a Division Bench of Gujrat High Court in the case of Rsulkhanji Sardar Mabomad Khanji v. H.P. Rathod 3rd Spl Land Acquisition Officer Ahmd and Anr. 1975 (16) Gujrat Law Reporter 911 took the view that mere knowledge of the award or taking part in the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act would not be helpful for holding that limitation had commenced from such a date. For this purpose, the date would be when either the award was communicated to the party actually or he had knowledge of essential contents of the award actually or constructively. Now we would apply to the above well settled principles of law to the facts of the present case. In this regard, at the very outset, we may also notice that complete and correct facts have not been disclosed by the petitioners in these petitions. The award was announced on 1 9m June. 1992 and possession of the property in question was taken on 25 January, 2000. The claimants were obviously fully aware about the acquisition proceedings and they filed the application for receiving of compensation on 23 June, 2001. In this application reference was made to the essential features Including the number of the award. In regard to amount of compensation payable to the petitioners they had specified definite figures in the indemnity bonds and other documents annexed with the applications or filed subsequent thereto. The indemnity bond and surety bonds and other documents were filed by Bale Barn on 3rd December 2001 while the application was filed on 23 March, 2001. These documents clearly show that the petitioners had complete and full knowledge and information about the passing of the award and essential contents thereof for the purposes of upholding their remedy under Section 18 of the Act in accordance with law. The limitation for filing an application by the petitioner under Section 18 thus would commence at best from 23 March, 2001 and even if any liberal attitude, which is not called for, is given to the petitioners, then the limitation would commence from December, 2001 and would expire on 23rd September, 2001 and June, 2001 while admittedly the application under Section 18 of the Act was filed on 30th May, 2002 and 3 June, 2002. The Supreme Court in the case of Msmt. Qalsar Jehan Begum supra) had granted relief to the petitioner because their Lordships of the Supreme Court as a finding of fact held that the claimants had no knowledge of the contents of the award and did not know the amount of compensation which have been awarded. This Judgment, therefore, is of no help to the petitioners as they themselves had submitted all necessary documents for payment of compensation Including all essential contents required for that purpose.