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Showing contexts for: constructive knowledge in Sh. Azad Singh(Deceased) Through Lr'S vs Union Of India on 14 January, 2021Matching Fragments
17. Further relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 1963 SC 1604 titled State of Punjab Vs. Mst Qaisar Jehan Begum and Ors.. it has further been sought to be argued that even the Hon'ble Supreme Court has gone to the extent of clarifying that knowledge of award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made but must relate to the essential contents of the award which may be known to the petitioners/interested persons either actually or constructively. Hon'ble Apex Court has even laid down that knowledge of essential contents of the award should be read within the meaning of section 18(2) of the Act having regard to scheme of the Act. Ld. Counsel has finally sought to rely upon a recent judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhagwan Das and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (2010) 3 SCC 545 thereby arguing that if a person is not present at the time when collector has made an award and a notice u/s 12 (2) of the Act has also not been served upon him then only way to decipher knowledge for interested person is either the interested person has drawn the compensation or has participated in the mazhar/possession proceedings or has filed a case challanging award wherein documentary evidence or any statement on oath about the contents of knowledge in any other proceedings before any authority is made. He has argued that at best the date of knowledge or the date of constructive knowledge in this case shall be the date on which the possession of the land of the petitioners was taken which is 25.07.2006 and the petition being filed on 04.10.2006 is as such well within the period of 6 months as stipulated under proviso to Section 18(2) of the Act. He has finally argued that the compensation in respect of acquired land has been accepted by the petitioners under protest and the application for reference u/s 18 of the Act being filed within limitation, the petitioners are entitled for enhancement in compensation.
26. The aforesaid preposition of law was further clarified or elucidated by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab Vs. Mst Qaisar Jehan Begum and Ors case (Supra) wherein it has been held that "the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively and the period of six months will run from the date of knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under section 12(2) of the Act, the Party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award, Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award".
29. The aforesaid preposition of law has been applied and reiterated by our own Hon'ble High Court in Shanti Devi (Supra) where it has been held that Land Acquisition Act being a complete code itself does not permit the application of general principles of law regarding Limitation and Limitation u/s 18(2) of the Act should commence from the date, the petitioner has constructive and/or actual knowledge or the information of the award including itself essential ingredients and shall expire on lapse of 6 months thereof.
31. Once the aforesaid two facts are proved the only eventuality left before the court is to scrutinize and ascertain the date of actual or constructive knowledge of petitioners in respect of collector's award. Now the respondents have claimed that the petitioners had full knowledge of the date of award itself when they might have present either personally or through their representative but have concealed the same. Later on, it has been sought to be argued that in any case the fact that the petition is carrying the date of 26.05.2006 alongwith the signature of petitioners, shows that the petitioners had full knowledge of the contents of the award on either 26.05.2006 or any date prior thereto. On the other hand, the petitioners had claimed that they had come to actual or constructively knowledge of the award only when the actual physical possession of their land was taken by respondents on 25.07.2006 which can be seen from the Kabza Karyawahi (possession proceedings) by the Revenue Officer which are already part of record and certified copies of which has also been filed by the petitioners and thus the limitation should commence from 25.07.2006. It has further been sought to be brought before the court that PW1 in his deposition has duly exhibited the reference petition on oath besides filing the specific affidavit regarding the knowledge being attained only on the date of possession proceedings and the limitation should commence from 25.07.2006 itself. Now this requires a critical examination. First of all, it may be seen that the petitioners clearly mention that petitioners had no knowledge of the contents of the award. It has also been proved on record by way of deposition of PW1, the certified copies of the Award Proceedings of Land Acquisition Collector that the petitioners were not present or served with the notice u/s 12 (2) of the Act. However, it is also an interesting fact to be noted that the petition is signed and dated on 26.05.2006. The petition also contains the schedule of land which is also signed and dated on 26.05.2006. If the petitioners have to rely upon the petition, they could not choose to rely upon the certain part of it and ignore the date of 26.05.2006. Now admittedly, the petitioners had sufficient knowledge of the award on 26.05.2006, though they have reserved their right to amend the same and further kept it open to add/delete the contents of the reference petition, but ironically they have chosen not to do so, which clearly shows that the petitioners at least had knowledge of the essential contents of the award at least on 26.05.2006. The respondents on their part has only made arguments that interested petitioners had knowledge prior to, but nothing on record in accordance with law has brought to the knowledge of the court to prove the same. The petitioners having discharged its essential onus of proving the requisite facts as per the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhagwan Dass (supra), the onus shifts upon the respondents to prove otherwise or rebut the same. This being the position, this court taken on the yardstick of preponderance of probabilities is of the view that the contention of the petitioners regarding knowledge being attained on the day of Kabza Karyawahi only as also the contention of the respondents that the petitioners had knowledge on 02.01.2006 on the date of passing of the award itself are both liable to be rejected and on the basis of record, this court is of the considered view that the date of knowledge of award by petitioners comes out to be 26.05.2006 and is, accordingly considered as the date of constructive knowledge from which date the limitation shall also commence. The reference petition is admittedly filed on 04.10.2006 and is incidentally well within the purview of period of 6 months from the aforesaid date of commencement of limitation i.e. 26.05.2006. The reference is, accordingly held to be a valid reference filed within a prescribed period of 6 months.