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1. This appeal arises in execution of a decree for ejectment obtained by the respondent against the appellant, in respect of a house situated in the town of Cuttack. The respondent is admittedly the owner of the house. The appellant was occupying the house on a monthly tenancy under her. During the time when the House Rent Control Order of 1942 was in force, she obtained from the House Controller, an order dated 15-8 44 exempting her from the operation of B. 4 thereof. On 13-9-44, she gave the tenant a notice, requiring him to vacate the premises by 1-1044 and also calling upon him to pay up the arrear.3 of rent by then due. She filed a suit for ejectment O. S. No. 71/45 on 26-2-1945 and obtained a decree on 17-12-1945. She proceeded to execute the decree by execution case no. 230/46 filed on 30.4.1946 which was adjourned from time to time by arrangement between the parties and was ultimately dismissed for default on 7-5-1917. On 10-5-1917, the decree-holder respondent filed a fresh execution case, namely, E. C. No. 247/47.Tb.e judgment-debtor raised the objection that without a permission in writing by the Rent Controller cinder Schedule 3, House Rent Control Act of 1947, for the filing of the execution proceedings the game was incompetent. This objection wag overruled by both the lower Courts and hence this appeal by the appellant judgment-debtor.

It is urged that when a suit is filed for eviction after obtaining an order of exemption under Schedule (proviso), the only ground for eviction is that the tenancy has been validly terminated by a notice to quit after the exemption order has been obtained and not any of the grounds referred to in second proviso to el. (b) of Section 5. Similarly when an execution proceeding is filed to enforce a decree for ejectment already obtained after an exemption order, no ground is or need be specified for the execution excepting the fact of the decree having been obtained. It is therefore urged that the section which, in terms, applies only to suits or proceedings of a particular category, namely, those in which particular grounds are specified as grounds for eviction, is wholly inapplicable to cases where an exemption order has already been obtained. It is, therefore, urged that this section is meant to apply only to the limited class of cases where eviction proceedings have been already initiated without the exemption order either because the Act itself was not in force at the time, or because the Act had not been brought into operation in the particular area. This argument necessarily implies that the section is applicable only to fresh execution proceedings where there has been no exemption obtained prior to the institution of the suit, since every suit to be filed after the Act came into force would be preceded by an exemption order, as a matter of course, at least, in so far as month to month tenancies are concerned. 80 to limit the construction of the section would, however, make the word "suit" in the section completely devoid of any operation and would also not obviate the objection that no execution proceeding is based on any particular ground excepting the fact that a valid decree for eviction had already been obtained. If the word "suit" is not to be completely obliterated from the section, by difficulties of construction, it must obviou9ly apply to all future suits for eviction which would be preceded, as a matter of course, by an exemption order in respect of month to month tenancies. It would, therefore, appear to be clear that in respect of, at least, future suits for eviction, as regards month to month tenancies, the permission under Schedule 3 is over and above and independent of an exemption order. Having regard to the absolute and mandatory language of Schedule 3 and the opening words of S. S which says that that section is ''subject to the other provisions of the Act" which of course includes Schedule 3, it cannot reasonably be contended that an order of exemption under Schedule obviates the necessity for obtaining the permission Under Section 13. It appears to me, therefore, that the limited construction urged for by the appellant's counsel restricting the operation of Schedule 3 to oases, where an exemption has not already been obtained is not permissible. Whether a suit for eviction can be maintained merely by obtaining a written permission of the Rent Controller without having previously obtained any exemption is different matter and does not arise for decision. I am, however, inclined to think that an order of exemption in the first instance and a distinct order for permission to institute a suit at the time of such institution are both required under the Act. This appears to be a fair inference from the fact that Schedule 3 is a specific addition by the Ordinance of 1946 and the Act of 1917, to the pre existing corresponding provision under the Order of 1942. The two appear to me to serve two different purposes. As already pointed out above, the exemption order is meant merely to remove the disability relating to the operation of the general law imposed by Schedule (a). Such a removal of the disability enables the landlord to terminate the tenancy and get possession without having to go to Court if he can, and also absolves him from any penalty for contravention of the provisions of the Act Under Section 15 thereof. When, however, the landlord is obliged to seek the help of a Court by instituting proceedings, a fresh permission may well he required to ensure that the circumstances with reference to which exemption has been granted, continue to apply and justify eviction through Court. It is to be remembered that a suit for eviction may be filed long after the tenancy has been terminated and the execution proceedings based on the eviction decree may be kept alive for years, The Act itself was, no doubt, intended to be operative for a temporary period. But having regard to the prevailing conditions relating to pressure for residential house, in urban area3 the Legislature might have been anxious to provide an additional safeguard for the tenant and might have well thought that the safeguard against the abuse of exemptions provided under Schedule 0 (a) real with the proviso to Schedule was not enough. However this may be, so far as the present argument is concerned, I can see no reason for not giving full effect to the language of Section 13, merely because there is scope for saying that the phrase in the section viz , "in which the ground specified in second proviso to cl. (b) of Schedule , has been taken as a ground for such evictions,"

33. As much discussion centred round the construction of Sections 5 and 13 of the Act, I should like to place my views on these sections. It may be remembered that the House Rent Control Order, 1942 was applied only to a few municipal area3 in the province. But the House Rent Control Act of 1947 was applied to a number of other Union Board areas in addition to the areas to which the House Rent Control Order had been applied. Section 13 applies only to such other areas as had been brought under the operation of the Act in March 1947. It, therefore, says that no suit or proceeding shall be entertained by a Court without a permission being granted by the Controller to institute such a suit. Section 5 is restricted to tenancies from month to month and says that a tenant shall not be liable to be ejected whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except for non-payment of rent or breach of the conditions of the tenancy, and provides that the Controller may grant exemption from this provision in certain circumstances. This section opens with the words "Subject to the Provisions of this Act" and is, therefore, undoubtedly subject to the provisions of Schedule 3. It is clear that Schedule is to be read as subordinate to 8, 13. The effect of this would be that if a landlord obtains a decree in compliance with Schedule 3, Schedule (a) will not apply and he can straightway proceed to execute his decree and obtain possession. The two sections are mutually exclusive. Otherwise there would be an apparent inconsistency between the two. It cannot be supposed that after the landlord has filed a suit with the permission of the Controller, under Schedule 3 and obtained a decree, the tenant shall not be liable to be evicted in execution of that decree unless a further permission is obtained from the Controller under Schedule . Conversely, if the landlord obtained an exemption order from the Controller under proviso 2 to Sub-section (b) of Schedule , he will be at liberty to execute his decree obtained subsequent to this exemption, though the requirements of Schedule 3 with regard to the institution of a suit or proceeding may not have been complied with. The words ''whether in execution of a decree or otherwise" occurring in cl. (a) of Schedule should, in my opinion, be restricted to those decrees which had been obtained in areas prior to the extension of the Act to those areas.

48. Therefore though the Act cannot be said to apply to pending proceedings it must be held to apply to new execution cases filed after its commencement, and thereby affect decrees passed prior to its commencement.

49. As regards the construction of Sections 5 and 13 and the necessity of harmonising the two, I am in entire agreement with my learned brother Das J. Section 13 was newly inserted by the House Rant Control Ordinance, 1916 and it was not found in the original House Bent Control Order which remained in force from 1942 to 1946, Simultaneously with the insertion of Schedule 3 in the Ordinance a restriction was put on Schedule by the opening words 'subject to the provisions , of the Act'. There can be no doubt, therefore, that Schedule is subject to Schedule 3, and an exemption obtained under proviso 2 to Section 6 cannot dispense with the necessity of obtaining a permit under Schedule 3. I am, therefore, unable to accept the view that the two sections should be read "as mutually exclusive and as applicable to two different sets of circumstances". When a new section (s. 13) was deliberately inserted in the Ordinance of 1946 and in the Act of 1947 though there was then in existence Schedule requiring the obtaining of an exemption from a Controller and simultaneously with such insertion Section 5 was made 'subject to the other provisions of the Act' it will be against all well-established rules of statutory construction to say that Sections 5 and 13 are two independent sections mutually exclusive. It may be that as a matter of policy the Legislature wanted such double check on the eviction of a tenant-a first check at the time of obtaining an exemption Under Section 5 and a second check at the time of either instituting a suit for ejectment or filing an application for execution of an ejectment decree already obtained, under Schedule 3. However, unreasonable such double check may be it is not the function of the Court to question the wisdom of the Legislature.