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he may, after giving the working trustee an opportunity of being heard, direct such working trustee or any other trustee or person having interest, in the trust to apply to the court for directions, within such time not exceeding thirty days as may be specified by the Assistant Commissioner.

(2) If the working trustee or any other trustee or person having interest in the trust so directed fails to make an application as required, or if there is no trustee of the public trust, or if, for any other reason, the Assistant Commissioner considers it expedient to do so, he shall himself make an application to the court.

I have heard the learned Sr. Counsels for the contesting parties and perused the impugned order as also the judgment of this Court in the case of Sita Ram Das (Supra).

Section 73 of the Act of 1959 prohibits the agitating of matters qua public trusts before civil courts in respect of which provision has been made for in the Act. This Section categorically provides that where the matters in issue in respect of a public trust can be addressed under the Act of 1959, the civil courts  S.B. CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.66/2013 (Mohan Singh Vs. Civil Judge (JD) & Judicial Magistrate, Ringus, District Sikar & Ors.) would have no jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the civil courts in matters of public trust is limited by Section 73 of the Act of 1959 to specific issues and further constrained by the satisfaction of statutorily prescribed formalities. In the context of the allegation in the suit laid by the plaintiffs, reference to Section 38(1)(b) of the Act of 1959 indicates that any person having interest in a public trust can make an application to the Assistant Commissioner with regard to the trust property not being properly managed or administered. On such an application being made, the Assistant Commissioner is to conduct an inquiry after giving the working trustee an opportunity of being heard and only in the event of coming to the conclusion that the trust property as alleged in the application was not properly managed or administered, permission to approach a civil court for appropriate relief can be granted by the Assistant Commissioner. The purpose of Section 38 of the Act of 1959 is thus evidently to eschew frivolous and vexatious proceedings qua the pubilc trust and its property before civil courts and to allow appropriate proceedings to be taken before the civil courts only subsequent to an inquiry by the Assistant Commissioner, Devsthan concluding that requisite protection was necessary to be sought from the civil court. I find little force in the argument of Mr. G.K. Garg, Sr. Counsel that clause (b) of Section 38(1) of the Act of 1959 does not take into its ambit issues of wasting of immovable property or siphoning off movable property of the public trust. In my considered opinion, an expansive construction of clause (b) of Section 38(1) of the Act of 1959 is warranted to take into its ambit issues of property of the trust, immovable or movable being utilised for the purpose other than for the objects of the trust as such issues evidently relate to the management and administration of trust property. A narrow view would  S.B. CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.66/2013 (Mohan Singh Vs. Civil Judge (JD) & Judicial Magistrate, Ringus, District Sikar & Ors.) denude both Sections 38 and 73 of the Act of 1959 of their efficacy and be at odds with the object of the Act of 1959 to limit intervention of civil courts only to matters specifically provided for, the stage and the procedure prescribed before intervention by civil court in matters of public trust. The judgment in the case of Sita Ram Das (Supra) relied upon by Mr. Garg, Sr. Counsel has not taken into consideration the provision of Section 38 of the Act of 1959 and therefore for the purpose of the case before this Court is of little relevance. Consequently, in my considered opinion even on the say of the plaintiffs in their plaint, their aggrievement (cause of action) based on the alleged wasting of immovable property and siphoning off movable property of the trust was addressable by resort to a proper application under Section 38(1) of the Act of 1959. Consequently, the disbarment of the civil court's jurisdiction under Section 73 of the Act of 1959 becomes operative inasmuch as it provides that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which is by or under this act to be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under this Act. It is my firm view that the suit for permanent injunction as laid by the plaintiffs without resort to Section 38 of the Act of 1959 and without the permission granted by the Assistant Commissioner, Devsthan for the purpose, was barred under Section 73 of the Act of 1959. As such the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC filed by the defendant ought to have been allowed by the trial court. In dismissing the said application the learned trial court has palpably failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. I would thus allow this revision petition, quash and set aside the order dated 09.04.2013, passed by the trial court and direct that the plaint be returned to the plaintiffs.