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Documents citing S. C. Prashar, Income-Tax ... vs Vasantsen Dwarkadas And Others on 12 December, 1962

M. Ct. Muthuraman vs Second Income-Tax Officer, City Circle ... on 29 April, 1976

We have already held that the petitioner in this case is a person who cannot be characterised as an utter stranger to the earlier proceedings prosecuted by his uncle Meyappa; on the other hand, his uncle did have the capacity at that time to represent him and, therefore, such proceedings do have a nexus to the affairs of the assessee and such intimate connection thus established would enable the revenue to exercise jurisdiction under the proviso. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the proviso is violative of article 14 and that this is the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas.
Madras High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

M. K. K. R. Muthukaruppan Chettiar And ... vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras. on 16 September, 1964

As we pointed out earlier, the observation of Das J. in Prashars case that the second proviso to section 34(3) would be invalid even against the assessee was a mere obiter and the Supreme Court, in later cases, has understood that case as merely laying down that the second proviso to section 34(3) would be invalid only against third parties. In regard to actual parties to the assessment, we are unable to see how it can be said to be discriminatory. Even apart form the proviso, it will be open to an appellate authority, who gives a finding of the kind mentioned in the proviso, to remand the proceedings for further investigation by the Income-tax Officer so far as the party is concerned. Such a remand will of course not be possible under section 66. The effect of the second proviso, so far as those who are parties to the appeal are concerned, is to provide a machinery under section 34 to enable investigation afresh in such cases. In short, it will be a mere substitute for a remand. So much will be clear on a true interpretation of the terms of the proviso.
Madras High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Mahendra Bhawanji Thakar vs S.P. Pande And Anr. on 6 March, 1963

That was a decision which was given in an appeal upon a certificate of fitness granted by this Court against the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in a Letters Patent Appeal in Section C. Prashar v. Vasantsen, . The point upon which the Division Bench decided the case in this Court was undoubtedly a different point--not the constitutional point --but the question of the second proviso to Sub-section (3) of section 34 being ultra vires of Article 14 had been raised in the case before the learned Single Judge against whose decision the Division Bench heard a Letters Patent Appeal. The learned Single Judge, Mr. Justice S.T. Desai, upheld that objection and himself held that the second proviso to Section 34(3) did infringe Article 14.
Bombay High Court Cites 32 - Cited by 13 - Full Document

Controller Of Estate Duty vs Zafrul Hasan on 28 February, 1983

In Prashar's case [1963] 49 ITR (SC) 1, the question was about reassessment of income pertaining to assessment year 1942-43. The final order, in this case, had been made by the High Court on October 8, 1953. By that date the period for commencing reassessment proceedings prescribed by Section 34, as amended in the year 1948, had expired. ' Reassessment proceedings were taken on April 30, 1954, but before the expiry of the period prescribed by the 1948 amendment, Section 34 was further amended by the I.T. (Amend.) Act, 1953, with effect from April 1, 1952. This amendment provided that nothing in Section 34 limiting the time within which action might be taken was to apply to an assessment or reassessment made on any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under Section 66. The Supreme Court took the view that on account of the Amending Act of the year 1953, which enabled action at any time if there was a finding or direction in the nature indicated above, the proceedings commenced by the notice given in the year 1954 were valid. It is obvious that on account of successive amendments, the jurisdiction to undertake reassessment under Section 34 was never barred by limitation. The question about initiation of proceedings for reassessment in a case where the jurisdiction to do so was conferred for the first time in regard to cases finalised before the conferment of jurisdiction neither arose nor was considered in this case too.
Allahabad High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 1 - R M Sahai - Full Document

S.K. Roy vs Addl. Member, Board Of Revenue on 25 April, 1966

In this connection, we may also refer to the observations of Hidayatullah J. in Prashar v. Vasantsen, . In that case, the reference mentioned only Section 34(3) of the Income-tax Act, but the limits imposed by mat section were subsequently removed by Section 31 of the Amending Act of 1953 and it was held that it was the duty of the Court to answer the question referred to it with reference to the changes introduced by Section 31 of the Amending Act, even though that section was not even brought to the notice of the High Court by the parties. In this opinion, Raghubar Dayal J. concurred.
Calcutta High Court Cites 42 - Cited by 15 - Full Document

State Of West Bengal And Ors. vs National Rubber Manufacturers Ltd. on 9 September, 1970

5. We are not in a position however, to accept the contention of Mr. Pal. It is no doubt permissible to look into the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the purpose of finding out its history or in other words, why it came to be enacted. That would also appear from the decision of the Supreme Court in S. C. Prashar v. Vasantsen, relied on by Mr. Pal. That decision does not lay down that the Objects and Reasons would control the provisions of the enactment. As a matter of fact in that decision it has been clearly laid down "that the Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing a particular piece of legislation cannot be used for interpreting the legislation if the words used therein are clear enough."
Calcutta High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Induprasad Devshanker Bhatt vs J.P. Jani And Anr. on 15 December, 1964

So also were the words in the amended proviso to Section 34(3) which came up for consideration in 58 Bom LR 184: 1956-29 ITR 857: ( (S) AIR 1956 Bom 530) (supra), general in character. And yet it was held in both these cases that they were not sufficient to indicate that the Legislature intended to give a retrospective operation to the provisions in question. There must be some definite indication in the language of the provision showing that the Legislature intended that the provision should have a retrospective operation. We do not find any such indication in Section 297(2)(d)(ii) either in its express words or by way of necessary intendment. On the contrary there is, in our opinion, the clearest legislative intent that Section 297(2)(d)(ii) should not have a retrospective opera lion. Of course we must make it clear that when we say that Section 297(2)(d)(ii) has no retrospective operation, we do not wish to suggest that it does not operate in respect of past assessment years. On its own terms and by its express language, it operates in respect of pasl assessment years. Where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment in respect of any past assessment year after the year ending 31st March 1940 and no proceedings under Section 34 in respect of such income are pending at the commencement of the new Act, a notice under Section 148 may he issued with respect to such assessment year. But where the right to reopen the assessment in respect of any such assessment year was barred under the old Act, the Revenue cannot take shelter behind Section 297(2)(d)(ii) for the purpose of proceeding in respect of such assessment year it is only in such a case that the question of giving retrospective operation arises in a case where the right to reopen the assessment was not barred under the old Act, there would be no existing right of the assessee which would be liable to be affect-ed nor would then be any question of reviving a right alreadv tost and hence there would be no question of giving retrospective operation to Section 297(2)(d)(ii). It is only where the right to reopen the assessment was barred under the old Act and the assessee had acquired the right to tell the Revenue that the assessment was final and could not be reopened, that the question would arise whether this right was intended to be taken away by the Legislature by enacting Section 297(2)(d)(ii). Now it is significant to note that Section 297(2)(d)(ii) occurs as a saving provision. Sub-section (1) of Section 297 repeals the old Act and Sub-section (2) of that Section enacts various saving provisions consequent on the repeal of the old Act. Now there may be two classes of cases at the commencement of the new Act. One class of cases may be where a notice to reopen the assessment under Section 34 may have already been issued and the proceedings in pursuance of such notice may he pending at the commencement of the new Act. In such a case Section 297(2)(d)(i) provides that such proceedings shall be continued and disposed of under the old Act. This provision had to be made because otherwise the old Act being repealed, the proceedings commenced under the old Act would also fall along with the old Act and, therefore, a saving provision was enacted that notwithstanding the repeal of the old Act, the proceedings shall be continued and disposed of under the old Act. The other class of cases may be where the Income-tax Officer had the right to reopen the assessment, but that right was not exercised by issue and service of notice under Section 34. In such a case, on the repeal of the old Act. the right of the Income-tax Officer to reopen the assessment would also go along with the old Act and the Income-tax Officer would not, thereafter, be entitled to reopen the assessment The right of the Income-tax Officer to reopen the assessment would he destroyed by reason of the repeal of the old Act. The Legislature, with a view to saving this right, enacted Section 297(2)(d)(ii) and provided that in such a case where no proceedings under Section 34 were pending, the Income-tax Officer may exercise the right to reopen the assessment by resorting to the machinery provided in the new Act. The Legislature thus saved the right of the Income-tax Officer to reopen the assessment and made it exercisable by him by issuing notice under Section 148 subject to the provisions contained in Ss. 149 and 150. But where the right of the Income tax Officer to reopen the assessment was already lost by reason of lapse of lime under the old Act, there was nothing to be saved and Section 297(2)(d)(ii) which enacted a saving provision could not have been intended to revive such right of the Income lax Officer. It must be remembered that in effect and substance Section 297(2)(d)(ii) is a saving provision and it would not be right to say that the Legislature in the guise of a saving provision enacted a provision conferring a new right oh the Income-tax Officer to reopen an assessment in cases where his right to reopen the assessment was lost before the new Act came into force and be had no such right at the date of the commencement of the new Act. If the Legislature wanted to confer such right the Legislature would have enacted an appropriate provision using appropriate language and would not have left its intention to be gathered by doubtful implication from the language of a provision relegated to the Section dealing with repeals and savings.
Gujarat High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 11 - Full Document

Bhanji Bagawandas vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras on 18 July, 1967

4. It was also held that since the enactment of the Amendment Act of 1959 a notice issued after April 1, 1956, for reopening an assessment, by virtue of s. 4, could not be permitted to be called in question on the ground that the notice was not issued within the period prescribed by the unamended s. 34(1)(a). On behalf of the respondent reference was also made to the decision of this Court in S. C. Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas,(2) in which it was held that s. 4 of the Amendment Act, 1959 operated on and validated notices issued under s. 34(1)(a) as amended in 1948 even earlier than April 1, 1956, in other words, in respect of assessment years prior to March 31, 1956. and therefore notices issued under s. 34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act before April 1, 1956, could not be challenged on the ground that they were issued beyond the time limit of eight years from the respective assessment years prescribed by the 1948 amendment. On behalf of the appellant Mr. Swaminathan raised the objection that the point was not taken up by the respondent in the High Court, nor was there any reference to it in the statement of the case tiled by the respondent. It was also contended that the point raised was outside the scope of the questions of law referred by the Appellate Tribunal to the High Court. We do not think there is any substance in the (1) 38 I.T.R. 369. (2 ) 49 I.T.R. 1.
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 27 - V Ramaswami - Full Document

Fazlur Rahman vs Income-Tax Officer, A Ward on 15 December, 1971

18. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Hussain Bhai's case, and the observations of Sarkar J. in Prashar's case, which have been approved in Hussain Bhai's case, we have come to the conclusion that the impugned notice is barred by the rule of prescription of time laid down by the 1956 amendment and is not saved by Sub-section (4) of Section 34. The notice being time-barred, the Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction to issue it or to take any proceedings for assessment on the basis of this notice..
Allahabad High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
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