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Documents citing Krishnasami Panikondar (Died) And Anr. ... vs S.R.M.A.R. Ramasami Chettiar And Ors. on 1 August, 1912

S.K.M.R.M. Somasundaram Chettiar And ... vs Rm. Ar. Ar. Rm. Arunachalam Chettiar And ... on 3 March, 1932

7. It is true that both in the case of pauper suits and pauper appeals the Legislature thought it necessary to impose some limitation on the right of suit or appeal in forma pauperis for the protection of the litigant opposed to the pauper from frivolous suits or appeals. Such protection in the case of suits appears in Order 33, Rule 5. This rule not being applicable to appeals, analogous protection in the case of appeals is mentioned in the proviso. Once the proviso is there, I do not think we can fall back upon Order 33, Rules 5 and 7. The proviso being complete by itself, we cannot import into it the idea that apart from the rule the respondent is, as a matter of general principle, entitled to notice before leave is given. It is true that an order passed without notice to the respondent ought not to be binding upon him; but nobody says that leave once having been given the order granting leave is conclusive, that the judgment appealed against is erroneous or contrary to law; and at the actual hearing of the appeal the respondent would have an opportunity of showing that the decree appealed against is in accordance with law and is not erroneous or unjust. So that, I do not agree with the Lahore High Court in thinking that if leave is granted it amounts to an order binding on the respondent without his having been heard. Mr. Patanjali Sastri relied on the analogy of a decision in Krishnaswami Panikondar v. Ramaswami Chettiar (1917) L.R. 45 I.A. 25 : I.L.R. 41 M. 412 : 34 M.L.J. 63 (P.C.) where the Privy Council observed that before excusing the delay in the filing of appeals, notice should always go to the respondent in the first instance. That relates to an entirely different matter and I do not see any analogy between the two proceedings. At the end of the period prescribed for filing an appeal the respondent gets a vested right in the judgment and that right ought not to be lightly disturbed and therefore notice ought to go to him before the delay is excused. But apart from that consideration the real ground for the observation of the Privy Council was that there should be no uncertainty about the question of the delay in filing the appeal until the final hearing of the appeal and until heavy costs are incurred.
Madras High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

K.M.Azmathullah Badsha vs Santhi Swarup Patnaik on 31 July, 2013

3. AIR 1917 Privy Counsel 179 (Krishnasami Panikondar Vs. Ramasami Chettiar and Others ) "It is the duty of a litigant to know the last day on which he can present his appeal, and if through delay on his part it becomes necessary for him to ask the Court to exercise in his favour the power contained in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, the burden rests on him of adducing distinct proof of the sufficient cause on which he relies. "
Madras High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 0 - K R Baabu - Full Document

Rajammal vs G.S. Parthasarathi Ayyengar on 13 March, 1936

6. The ruling in Murugappa Naicker v. Thayammal 1923 16 MLW 662, which has been cited to the effect that if an ex parte order was made excusing the delay in the presentation of an appeal the respondent ought to apply to the Court by motion to have the order vacated is contrary to the procedure sanctioned by their Lordships in Krishnaswami Panikondar v. Ramaswami Chettiar 1917 45 IA 25. In my opinion the lower appellate Court rightly reconsidered the order excusing the delay, and rightly held that the appeal was out of time. The second appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. The appellant will pay the court-fee to the Government. Leave to appeal given.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Narayana Chettiar And Anr. vs P.C. Muthu Chettiar And Ors. on 5 March, 1926

7. The order of the Subordinate Judge restoring the appeal to file cannot be considered to be a final order and the opposite party on coming to know of the order could urge any objection which it was open to him to urge if he had notice of the petition for restoration. This was clearly laid down by the Privy Council in Krishnasami Pandikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar 43 Ind. Cas. 493 : 41 M. 412 : 34 M.L.J. 63 : 4 P.L.W. 54 : 16 A.L.J. 57 : 7 L.W. 156 : 23 M.L.T. 101 : 27 C.L.J. 253 : 2 P.L.R. 1918 : 22 C.W.N. 481 : 20 Bom. L.R. 511 : 11 Bur. L.T. 121 : (1918) M.W.N. 906 : 45 I.A, 25 (P.C.). In that case Sankaran Nair, J., without notice to the respondent excused the delay in filing the appeal and admitted it. When it came on for hearing after notice an objection was taken before' the Division Beach which heard it as being out of time. The Division Bench after an examination of the affidavits filed on both sides dismissed the appeal as provided by Section 4 of the Limitation Act. It was contended before the Privy Council that the order of Sankaran Nair, J., was final and that the Division Bench had no jurisdiction at the hearing of the appeal to re consider the question whether the delay was excusable. Their Lordships observe at page 416 Page of 41 M.--[Ed.]:--"This order of admission was made not only in the absence of Kamaswami Chettiar, the contesting respondent, but without notice to him. And yet in teroi3 it purported to deprive him of a valuable right, for it put in peril the finality of the decision in his favour so that to preclude him from questioning its propriety would amount to a denial of justice. It must, therefore, in common fairness be regarded as a tacit term of an order like the present that though unqualified in expression it should be open to re-consideration at the instance of the party prejudicially affected; and this view is sanctioned by the practice of the Courts in India."
Madras High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

M/S.A.D.Jeyaveerapandia Nadar vs The Government Of India on 17 June, 2009

In Krishnasami Panikondar vs. S.R.M.A.R. Ramasami Chetty and others (34 MLJ 63), the Privy Council held that the question of limitation should not be left open till the hearing of the appeal, although it was till then the usage in India. The Privy Council categorically ruled that the Courts in this Country should adopt a procedure which will secure at the stage of admission the final determination of any question of limitation affecting the competance of an appeal. It is pointed out that the admission of an appeal after the period of limitation deprives the respondent of a valuable right, for it puts in peril the finality of the decision in his favour and where such an order is made ex parte, it is open to reconsideration at the respondent's instance."
Madras High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - V Dhanapalan - Full Document

L.Ct.L.P.L. Palaniappa Chettiar And ... vs M.R. Krishnamurthy Chetty And Ors. on 1 July, 1966

482) and Krishnaswami Panikondar v. Ramaswami Chettiar (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 412 : 34 M.L.J. 63 : L.R. 45 I.A. 25. Rankin, C.J., then refers to Sections 3 and 5 of the Limitation Act of 1908, and points out that because Section 3 is subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25 inclusive, and Section 5 enables the Court to extend the period of limitation in the case of an appeal or application (though not in a suit), it is wrong to say that an order admitting an appeal under Section 5 deprives the respondent of a vested right granted to him by Section 3; in other words, that there is no vested right merely because of the lapse of the statutory period.
Madras High Court Cites 70 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

Vendhar Movies vs S.Mukundchand Bothra on 3 March, 2017

In Krishnasami Panikondar v. S.R.M.A.R. Ramasami Chetty and Ors. (34 MLJ 63), the Privy Council held that the question of limitation should not be left open till the hearing of the appeal, although it was till then the usage in India. The Privy Council categorically ruled that the Courts in this Country should adopt a procedure which will secure at the stage of admission the final determination of any question of limitation affecting the competence of an appeal. It is pointed out that the admission of an appeal after the period of limitation deprives the respondent of a valuable right, for it puts in peril the finality of the decision in his favour and where such an order is made ex parte, it is open to reconsideration at the respondent's instance.
Madras High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 1 - S Vimala - Full Document

Shoba Viswanathan vs D.P. Kingsley on 9 November, 1995

4. This position in law as laid down by the Privy Council is now recognised statutorily under Order XLI, Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, introduced by the Amendment Act 104 of 1976. Under that provision, if an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. Clause (2) provides that if the Court sees no reason to reject the application without the issue of a notice to the respondent, notice thereof shall be issued to the respondent and the matter shall be finally decided by the Court before it proceeds to deal with the appeal under Rule 11 or Rule 13, as the case may be. Hence also, the language is mandatory. Thus, it is the duty of the court to decide the question of condonation of delay before the appeal is taken on file. It following, therefore, that the order passed by the Bench on 24.6.1993 directing this petition to be posted for hearing along with the appeal as well as the order passed on 1.7.1993 that the petition was wrongly posted and directing it to be posted along with the appeal are per incurim. Those two orders are not valid in the eye of law. Hence, we have taken up this petition for condonation of delay for hearing before the appeal is posted for hearing.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 8 - Full Document
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