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Documents citing Chanbasappa Gurushantappa Hiremath vs Baslingayya Gokurnaya Hiremath on 14 April, 1927

Penmetcha Subbaraju vs Penmetcha Venkatramaraju on 17 April, 1928

6. If an agreement to abide by the decision of an arbitrator can be held to be a compromise, the section is clearly applicable. It has been suggested that a mere agreement to be bound by a future award is not a compromise, whereas an agreement to accept an award that has been made is a compromise. It is difficult to see on what principle parties who agree to accept a certain fixed sum in satisfaction of a claim can be said to compromise that claim, whereas if they agree to accept a sum which is to be fixed by some one else, that does not amount to a compromise. The meaning of the word "compromise" has been elaborately discussed by Martin, C.J., in Chanbasappa v. Baslingayya (1927) I.L.R. 51 B. 908 : 29 Bom. L.R. 1254 (F.B.) and, with respect, I entirely agree with him that the agreement to abide by the decision of an arbitrator is a compromise of the claim.
Madras High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Malpati Sevasangh vs Gujarat State Khadi And Village ... on 15 April, 2004

"2. It is settled position of law that where in a suit the parties have referred their difference to the arbitration without an order of the Court and an award is made, a decree in terms of the award can be passed by the Court under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (vide Chambasappa Gurushantappa Hiremath v. Basadingayya Gokarmaya Hiremath [1927] 51 I.L.R. 903 and Modi Narandas Chhaganlal v. Jamnadas Maneklal [1969] 10 Guj. L.R. 210) Mr. Shah, learned Advocate for respondent Nos. 1(b) to 1(h) does not dispute this proposition of law. Mr. Shah has, however, tried to support the judgment of the learned District Judge on the ground that under proviso to Section 47 of the Arbitration Act the Court can accept the compromise only if the consent is given by the parties at the time when the Court is called upon to consider whether the award should be accepted as an adjustment or a compromise. He also supported the view of the learned District Judge that inasmuch as no permission was granted to Ajubai to sign this award as alleged by the plaintiff, the agreement, if at all there was any, is voidable as prescribed under Order 32 Rule 7(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, and since Ajubai avoided the agreement, the trial court was justified in dismissing the application of the petitioner herein, who was the original plaintiff.
Gujarat High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 0 - P Majmudar - Full Document

Tara Pada Ray vs Shyama Pada Ray And Ors. on 14 January, 1952

8. Under the then provisions of the Code, it was generally agreed that an award by the arbitrators under such circumstances could not be enforced as an award; it was however accepted as an adjustment under rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. Vide 'MANILAL MOTILAL v. GOKALDAS ROWJI', 45 Bom 245; 'CHANBASAPPA v. BASLINGAYYA' 51 Bom 908 F B; 'GAJENDRA SINGHA v. DURGA KUMARI', 47 All 637 F B and BASOO v. JAGANNATH', AIR 1931 Oudh 127.
Calcutta High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Hanmantagouda Nagangouda Hiregoudar ... vs Shivappa Dundappa Manwi on 27 September, 1937

6. The next question is as to whether an award requires registration. Under Act III of 1877, decrees and orders of Courts and awards were exempted from registration under Section 17. This Section was amended by the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929. The clause, as it stood before the amendment, provided that "nothing in clauses B and C of sub-Section (1) applies to any decree or order of a Court and any award ". The effect of the amendment is that an award is no longer exempted from registration, and an award which is of the nature referred to in clauses B and C of Section 17, sub-s(7), is not exempt from registration. It is now clear from sub-Section (2) (vi) of Section 17 of the Act that no registration is necessary in the case of any decree or order of a Court except a decree; or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding. It is argued by Mr. Desai that an award decree is registrable, as the term " compromise " is wider than an award and includes an award, and he referred to the observations of Sir Amberson Marten and Mr. Justice Crump in the full bench case of Chanbasappa v. Baslingayya , f.b.. The answer to that is, assuming that a compromise includes, an award, it must still be shown that it includes or refers to immoveabe property which was not the subject-matter of the suit. That, again, raises another question, for which there is no authority, and that question is : What is the suit in the case of an award made without the intervention of the Court and filed under paragraph 20 of the second schedule to the Civil Procedure Code ? Is it the reference, or is it the award, or is it the reference and the award together, which would constitute the suit ? Paragraph 20 of the second schedule of the Civil Procedure Code provides :
Bombay High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Mathuradas Maganlal vs Maganlal Parbhudas on 21 September, 1933

8. As regards the various Civil Procedure Codes which existed before the Code of 1882 and that Code itself, there are numerous decisions which were referred to in the abovementioned full bench case in which it is pointed out that the methods of enforcing awards therein provided were by no means exhaustive, and that parties were entitled to adopt methods of arbitration not contemplated by those Codes, although if they did so they could not take the benefit of the procedure laid down by the Codes for the purpose of enforcing awards.
Bombay High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Namdeo S/O Maroti Gabhane vs Monabai (Smt.) W/O Laxman Jadhao And ... on 3 February, 1989

17. What Mr. Mehadia contended before me was that, the intention of the parties thereto was not to refer the dispute to arbitration. But according to him, the parties all the while expressly stated before the Court that they want to compromise the suit. A compromise may be achieved in more than one ways. Parties may sit together, deliberate and patch up their differences and come to an agreement. There are also other methods when a matter can be compromised. Parties may appoint the persons of their confidence and accept the verdict given by them. This may not technically be called as arbitration, but it can be one of the modes of compromise. Crump, J., in A.I.R. 1927 Bombay 565 (supra) observed:
Bombay High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Parkash Chand Khurana Etc vs Harnam Singh & Ors on 28 March, 1973

The Full Bench decision in Chanbasappa Gurushantappa Hiremath v. Basalingayya Gokurnaya Hiremath & Ors., (4 ) can also have no application because that case is an authority for the limited proposition, prior to the enactment of the Arbitration Act, 1940, that where in a suit parties have referred their dispute to an arbitration without an order of the court and an award is made, a decree in terms of the award could be passed by the court under Order XXIII, Rule 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the instant case, parties agreed to refer their disputes to arbitration when no suit was pending and the award subsequently became a rule of the court.
Supreme Court of India Cites 10 - Cited by 25 - Y V Chandrachud - Full Document

Malek Bavaji Amarkhan vs Amirkhan Salimkhan And Ors. on 30 March, 1977

2.It is set-tied Position of law that where in a suit the parties have referred their difference to the arbitration without an order of the Court and an award is made, a decree In terms of the award can be passed by the Court under 0. 23, R. 3 of the Civil P. C. (Vide: Chanbas.;. appeal Gurushantappa Hiremath v. Basadingayya Gokurnaya Hiremath, ILR 51 Bom 908: (AIR 1927 Born 565) (FB) and, Modi Narandas Chhaganlal v. Jamnadas ManeMal, 10 Guj LR 210: (AIR 1969 GuJ 76). Mr. Shah, learned Advocate for respondents Nos. I (b) to I (h) does not dispute this proposition of law. Mr. Shah has, however, tried to support the judgment of the learned District Judge on the ground that under proviso to S. 47 of the Arbitration Act the Court can accept the comprondse only if the consent is given by the parties at the time when the Court is called upon to consider whether the award should be accepted as an adjustment or a compromise. He also supported the view of the learned District Judge that inasmuch as no permission was granted to Ajubai to sign Uds award as alleged by the plaintiff, the agreement, if at all there was any, is voidable as prescribed under 0. 32, R~ 7 (2) of the Civil P. C., and since Ajubai avoided the agreement, the trial Court was justified in dismissing the application of the petitioner herein, who was the original plaintiff.
Gujarat High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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