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Documents citing Sattappa Gurusattappa Hukeri vs Mahomedsaheb Appalal Kazi on 15 August, 1935

Ganesh Ramchandra Thakur vs Gopal Lakshman Thakur on 27 February, 1942

3. Mr. Parulekar did not contend that the suit was barred by Article 11. He sought to argue the question of limitation from a new point of view altogether. He urged that the claim of Ramchandra and his son under the first mortgage was a claim for money only and that as their right was denied by Laxman in the suit of 1922 a suit in respect of it was barred under Article 120. It is not the practice of this Court to allow new points to be argued in Letters Patent appeals: Sattappa v. Mahomedsaheb. Anyhow there is no substance in the new argument. The co-mortgagee's right was to recover the money out of the property mortgaged or out of property substituted for the property mortgaged. It was not till March, 1926, when Laxman by compromise with the mortgagor allowed the first mortgage security to be released and acquired the Shirgaon property in lieu of the whole debt due, that he did anything openly and necessarily inconsistent with the rights of his co-mortgagee. The latter would have a period of twelve years, to enforce his right to a proportionate share of the Shirgaon land and the present suit was brought within twelve years.
Bombay High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Ramabai Govind vs Raghunath Vasudeo on 12 July, 1951

L.R. 1052 and Sattappa v. Mahomedsaheb, 60 Bom. 516 it was not open to Mr Bhalerao to urge any contention which bad not been urged by him before Chainani J., this being a Letters Patent appeal. Mr. Bhalerao, however, made a statement before us that he was really going to argue the point before Chainani J., and no doubt was seeking to develop it in the course of his reply, when he was stopped by Chainani J., from doing so in view of the fact that on the contention which was raised by him in the first instance and which had been dealt with by Chainani J. in his judgment, Chainani J. was in his favour, Mr. Dharap relied upon his notes which he had made at the time when the arguments proceeded before Chainani J., and pointed out to us the fact that this argument was not addressed by Mr. Bhalerao before Chainani J., in the first instance. There Mr Bhalerao is in agreement with Mr. Dharap. Bat if this particular aspect of the quastion was present before his mind's eye, as it should have been, and if regard be had to the grounds taken in the memo of appeal filed on behalf of his client, we would not really prevent him from arguing it before us. It was pointed out to us, however, that the passage from Chainani J.'s judgment which we have quoted above does not make any mention whatever of this argument which, if it had really been advanced even in embryo, would certainly have been noted by the learned Judge. Strictly speaking, we would not be entitled to take any statements from the bar if they were not supported by the judgment which has been delivered by Chainini J. conscientiously recording each any every argument which was advanced by the advocates before him and we would be quite right in rejecting this argument which is sought to be advanced by Mr. Bhalerao before us. It was, however, urged by Mr. Bhalerao that the ban was against the appellant's raising any new contention in this manner and not against the respondent because he argued that though the appellant could not impeach a judgment on any grounds which he had not taken, it was certainly open to the respondent to support the judgment on any grounds which were available to him. We are, however, of the opinion that in a Letters Patent Appeal it is not only the appellant but the respondent also who must be held in the arguments and the contentious which have been advanced before the Court of appeal, and Mr. Bhalerao would not, under the circumstances, be within his rights if he wanted to argue a point which he had not argued before Chainani J. We would have, therefore, prevented Mr. Bhalerao from taking up this contention but for the fast that even before us he stated that he was going to argue the point when he developed his argument on this contention of his, namely that the defendant being a transferee from a trustee, who had a right to sell the property, acquired a title thereto which was unimpeachable by anybody claiming to have an interest in the property. Even though in the argument, as it was first advanced before us, we had not the slightest inkling of Mr Bhalerao taking up this contention that his client was protected under Section 64, Indian Trusts Act, he told us that in the course of the discussion that point was brought out and ha really relied upon the same.
Bombay High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 11 - Full Document

Mansukhlal Kapurchand Sanghavi And ... vs Shushilaben Durlabhji Virani And Anr. on 22 September, 1972

We do not think so. If we look at the decision in AIR 1965 Guj 293 it will be found that the Division Bench in that case did not examine this question on principle but merely followed there decision of the High Court of Bombay, namely, Shripad v. Shivram, AIR 1934 Bom 466, Sattappa Gurasattappa v. Md. Appeal Kazi, AIR 1936 Bom 227 and Ramabai v. Raghunath, AIR 1952 Bom 106. It is, therefore, necessary to considered what exactly these decision of the Bombay High Court laid down and what is the principle on which they proceed. It will be apparent on a close suturing of these decision that what these decision laid down was that an appellant in a Letter Patent Appeal is not entitled as a matter fright to urge a new contention which has not been raised by him before the Judge hearing the Second Appeal and not that the Court hearing a Letter Patent Appeal has not power in a fit case to grant him permission to do so. The distinction made in these decision of the Bombay High Court is between right of an appellant to be heard on a new contention and the power of the Court to grant permission to the appellant Tories a new contention. The former cannot prevail in a Letter Patent Appeal but the letter is not excluded.
Gujarat High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Hussainbhai Mulla Fida Hussain vs Motilal Nathulal And Anr. on 24 July, 1962

7. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents that this point was not raised by the plaintiff before Mudholkar, J. and therefore be was not entitled to urge this point in an appeal under Clause (15) of the Letters Patent. The learned counsel relied on Shripad v. Shivram, AIR 1934 Bom 466; Sattappa Gurusattappa v. 'Mahomedsaheb Appalal Kazi, AIR J936 Bom 227 and Kanhaiyalal v. Jerome D'Costa, 1955 Nag LJ 710 : ((S) AIR 1955 Nag 302) (FB). In AIR 1934 Bom 466, the question was one of adverse possession and it was not allowed to be raised in the Letters Patent appeal for several reasons. The point was not seriously considered by either of the parties in the original Court. No issue was asked for on that point. In the District Court, it was not pressed nor was it pressed in second appeal, and therefore the Judges said:
Bombay High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Mohamed Isak Saheb And Ors. vs Najaruddin Shamansaheb Mulla And Ors. on 19 June, 1961

Tyabji, J., in Sattappa Furusattappa Hukeri v. Majomedsaheb Appalal Kazi, AIR 1936 Bom 227, while clearly stating this principle of Muslim Law, no doubt adds that in India these offices have tended to be hereditary in the sense that members of the same family held the same office generation after generation. But, such practice cannot, in our opinion, be elevated to the status of a regular rule of Muslim law in derogation of the principle stated above. On the contrary, such successive holding of office by members of the same family must, in the eye of the Muslim Law, be referred either to an appointment by the ruler or king or to a voluntary choice by the Jamat of a Mosque or the Muslim community of a village locality. Seeing that the grants in this case were by Muslim rulers of Bijapur it is impossible to presume that they would have acted in contravention of the Muslim Law and created a hereditary office of a Mulla. On the other hand, such indications as are available in the Takeeds summarised in Ex. 58 suggest individual appointments to the office of Mulla accompanied no doubt by the confirmation of the lands already granted to the appointee and his descendants male and female.
Karnataka High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Khazi Mohd. Abbas Ali vs Andhara Pradesh Wakf Board And Ors. on 28 August, 1978

From the observations of Fawcett, ~ in Kasamkhan v. Kaji Abdulla (supra), (A1H 1920 Bom 153) and Tyabji, J. in Sattappa Gurusattappa v.Md. Appalal Kazi (Supra) (AIR 1936 Bom 227) and of the privy Council in Md. Ismail Ariff v. Ahmed Moola Dawood (43 Ind App 127) : (AIR 1916 PC 132) it appears to me that a Kazi does perform some duties of a religious nature like performing marriages and leading prayers in Mosques.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 7 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Ebrahim Sherkhan Pathan vs Hajratkhan Mohiddinkhan on 28 July, 1939

In two cases this Court has recently held that in an appeal under the Letters Patent the appellant is not entitled to be heard on points which had not been raised before the Judge from whose judgment the appeal has been preferred see Shripad v. Shivram and Sattappa v. Mahomedsaheb (1935) 38 Bom. L.R. 221 As has been pointed out by Broomfield J. in the latter case that practice is a salutary one and there is no reason to depart from it. That would serve as an additional ground for rejecting this appeal.
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Krishnaji Dattambhat Joshi vs Parappa Datto Patil on 13 January, 1941

6. On the question, whether the property in suit is alienable, the Assistant Judge in my opinion was clearly wrong in holding that in spite of the terms of the sanad the subsequent resolutions of Government have enlarged the right of the grantee, rendering the inalienability "a thing of the past." The sanad in this case is similar in terms to that which this Court had to deal with in Sattappa v. Mahomedsaheb (1935) 38 Bom. L.R. 221, though the land there was a Kazi inam land.
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Ramrakh Bakshiram Marwadi vs Madhavrao Ganpatrao Bambale on 20 October, 1942

5. However, in my opinion the monies are not attachable on the ground of public policy. It is apparent from the terms of the extract of the Alienation Register that the monies are payable to the inamdar for services useful to Government, and if the monies due to the inamdar in the hands of Government can be attached before they are paid over to the inamdar, the object of the grant will be defeated because there will be nothing to ensure that the inamdar will be in a financial position to enable him to carry out his services. I think the general principle is that monies payable as reward for services to be rendered to the public are' not attachable before receipt (see Sattappa v. Mahomedsaheb (1935) 38 Bom. L.R. 221). On that ground the decisions of the lower Courts are right and the monies in the hands of the Collector cannot be attached.
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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