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Vasanthi vs The Secretary To Government on 29 August, 2023

ii) Placing reliance on Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji case [Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. Stateof Tamil Nadu reported in (1979) 1 SCC 465] which continues to be a good law as Hon'ble Supreme Court has followed the same in Sushanta Kumar Banik's case [Sushanta Kumar Banik Vs. State of Tripura & others reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1333, learned counsel submitted that 'live and proximate link' between grounds of detention and purpose of detention has snapped as the date of arrest in the ground case is 28.05.2023 but the impugned preventive detention order has been made only on 30.06.2023.
Madras High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - M Sundar - Full Document

Anil Kumar Agarwal vs State Of Uttar Pradesh And Anr. on 11 March, 1991

In all the aforesaid cases it has been held that non-supply of certain document on facts existing in those cases would not vitiate the order of detention. The emphasis and ratio of these cases are that where the detention order is very specific and clear and there is no supply of any document, it is always open to the detenu to call for the said document from the respondent and the detenu not requiring those documents from the respondent and not making any request, could not make the detention order invalid. This point is very specifically made clear in the case of Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. The State of Tamil Nadu (1979 Cri LJ 462) (SC) (supra). In this case distinction has been made between two classes of cases, one where in the detention order there is no specific ground and the other where there is vagueness in the ground. Of course, where the grounds are vague, no question would arise of the detenu asking for better particulars. But where there is specific ground, and if the detenu wanted any particular, it should have asked for the same. However, the same principle could not apply when there is no specific ground in the detention order but there is vagueness in the detention order itself. The principle in all the aforesaid decisions are whenever the detaining authority recorded its satisfaction for passing the order of preventive detention and every fact which constituted foundation of drawing inference must be supplied to the detenu. It may be, if a document which may be classified as one which may be before the detaining authority, the detenu may ask for and the respondent is bound to supply the same and there may be other class of documents which may not be relevant as they do not form foundation for passing detention order though they might have been placed before the detaining authority. We are not concerned in respect of such class of cases. Whenever, the detaining authority formulates its opinion for passing the detention order and if a fact constitutes the basic fact, then that document constituting the basic fact must be supplied to the detenu in order to make proper defence. However, exception carved out on the basis of the authorities referred to above are cases where the ground is specific and the details may be lacking has been accepted and where no such request was made by the detenu, it may not be a case where the order of detention may vitiated on that ground. Coming to the facts of the present case we are concerned to the question whether the person enlarged on bail who was under detention, would be a basic fact for passing the order of detention. In our opinion, whenever question of preventive detention arise the fact whether the petitioner is in jail or if he is in jail, there is likelihood of his being enlarged on bail or he is already enlarged on bail, is the basic fact which constitutes formation of opinion for passing detention order. Unless those facts are found and existing on record, the exercise of passing order of detention may not be said to be proper. It is in this context it becomes necessary and relevant for consideration whether the detenu is already enlarged on bail or likely to be enlarged on bail. It is on these facts if it exists, the detaining authority may draw the inference whether there is likelihood of the detenu committing offence in future also and whether it is necessary or not to prevent reoccurrence by preventive detention.
Allahabad High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 7 - A P Misra - Full Document

M. Nirmala vs Government Of A.P. Rep. By Chief ... on 28 March, 2012

In Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu where the appellant had been evading arrest and surrendering after three years of the making of order of detention under the COFEPOSA Act, the order was held to be still effective as the detenu himself was to be blamed for the delay. This Court observed that there must be a live and proximate link between the 10 grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention, namely, the prevention of smuggling activities. In appropriate cases, it could be assumed that the link was snapped if there was a long and unexplained delay between the date of order of detention and the arrest of the detenu and in such a case the order of detention could be struck down unless the grounds indicated a fresh application of mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but also is found to be the result of the recalcitrant and refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the link not snapped but strengthened. In that case, the order of detention was made on 19.12.1974. The detenu was found to be absconding. Action was taken pursuant to S.7 of the COFEPOSA Act and he was proclaimed as a person absconding under S.82 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The proclamation was published in several leading English and local daily newspapers. Several other steps were taken despite which he could not be arrested until he surrendered himself on 1.02.1978.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 33 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Mrs. Safiyabanoo Mohammed Arif Rizvi vs The Union Of India (Uoi), Somnath Pal, ... on 5 September, 2007

12. With regard to the delay in execution of the order of detention Mr. Agarwal strongly relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamilnadu, which is quoted hereinabove, wherein the Supreme Court has very categorically held that only when the live link is snapped, that is to say when there is a long unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu, only in such cases the order of detention should be struck down. However, when the delay is not only adequately explained and the said delay was found to be as a result of recalcitrant and refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, then the live link not only does not snap but gets strengthened by this aforesaid conduct of evading arrest.

Subhash Popatlal Dave vs Union Of India & Anr on 16 July, 2013

In Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (1979) 1 SCC 463, this Court speaking through Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy held – “…… where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the ‘link’ not snapped but strengthened.” It was a case where the detenu evaded the arrest for a priod of more than 3 years but eventually surrendered himself before the Commissioner of Police, Madras and then challenged the order of detention. One of the submissions before this Court was that the detention order must be considered to have lapsed or ceased to be effective in the absence of the fresh application of mind of the detaining authority to the question of continuing necessity for preventive detention. This Court rejected the submission.
Supreme Court of India Cites 57 - Cited by 371 - A Kabir - Full Document

Shri Abdul Shakur Khan vs Shri R.D. Tyagi, Commissioner Of ... on 4 December, 1998

"Mr. Jethmalani lastly submitted that having regard to the fact that the order of detention was passed as far back as in 1990 and the maximum period of detention, which the appellant would have to undergo under the order was two years, was long over, his detention at this distant point of time would be punitive and not preventive. It is undoubtedly true that an unusual delay in execution of an order of detention if not satisfactorily explained, may persuade the Court to draw such an inference. There is, however, no scope for drawing such an inference in this case as the delay here has been occasioned not by any omission or commission on the part of the Detaining Authority. On the contrary, it is the appellant who has delayed the execution by first moving the Bombay High Court and then this Court. That apart, the respondents have asserted that though this Court had not passed any interim order against execution of the order, it could not be served as the appellant was absconding. It is pertinent to point out here that an identical contention raised by Mr. Jethmalani on similar facts was negatived by this Court in Bhawarlal v. State of T.N., ."
Bombay High Court Cites 28 - Cited by 0 - T K Das - Full Document

Mohd. Javed Siddiqui vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 17 September, 1998

Mr. Jethmalani lastly submitted that having regard to the fact that the order of detention was passed as far back as in 1990 and the maximum period of detention which the appellant would have to undergo under the order was two years, was long over, is detention at this distant point of time would be punitive and not preventive. It is undoubtedly true that an unusual delay in execution of an order of detention if not satisfactorily explained may persuade the Court to draw such an inference. There is, however no scope for drawing such an inference in this case as the delay here has been occasioned not by any omission or commission on the part of the detaining authority. On the contrary, it is the appellant who' has delayed the execution by first moving the: Bombay High Court and then this Court. That apart, the respondents have asserted that though this Court had not passed any interim order against execution of the order, it could not be served as the appellant was absconding. It is pertinent to point out here that an identical contention raised by Mr. Jethmalani on similar facts; was negatived by this Court in Bhawarlal v. State of T.N. .
Bombay High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 4 - V V Sahai - Full Document

N.K. Bapna vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 21 April, 1993

27. From the submissions made by the contending sides in this case, it appears that the ratio of the judgments referred to above is that there should be no unexplained delay in between the date of the detention order and the arrest of the detenu. Mere delay in terms of the months, weeks or days is not relevant. The Detaining Authority has to establish that there is no callousness, negligence or indolence on their part in executing the order of detention. In this particular case, no explanation is forthcoming to explain the delay between 6-1-92 and 5-2-92 as it has been stated in the affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the respondents in paragraph 13 that the order of detention was received by the Customs Office on 6-1-92. Secondly, some sort of explanation has been sought to be given for the dealy between 31st of July, 1992 and the date of surrender of the petitioner.
Calcutta High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Naushad Ali Through Perokar Sahajad Ali vs Uoi & Ors. on 20 February, 2024

54. From his own admission, it is further clear that the petitioner was aware about the detention order having been passed against him as he had applied for its copy through RTI on 20.07.2022, still he was not making himself available for submitting to the detention order for further procedure to be followed, to the contrary he compromised with the bail conditions and thereby absconded. Such a situation resounds the principles of law laid down in the case of Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) observing:-
Delhi High Court Cites 34 - Cited by 0 - S K Kait - Full Document

Ashok Kumar vs The State Of Maharashtra Through The ... on 5 April, 2003

21. This judgment of the Supreme Court was subsequently followed by this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 470 of 2002 which is an unreported judgment of the Division Bench where one of us was a party. In that case, the detention order was passed on 16.8.2000, but it was served on detenu on 12.3.2002 and there was delay of 19 months. There also the advocate for the petitioner has contended that if at all the detenu was absconding, the detaining authority should have applied for cancellation of bail. All these contentions were turned down by this Court because the proclamation under Section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act was issued against the detenu and, once the proclamation was issued, the burden was shifted on the detenu to satisfy and prove that it was not possible for him to comply with the requirements of attendance within stipulated period and, if he failed to discharge that burden he was liable to be punished. This Court relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhawarlal' case as referred to above and rejected the contention about the delay. In addition, we hold that the explanation given by the authorities in the affidavit is satisfactory, but we are rejecting the contention of the detenu about the delay in all respects on the basis of the Supreme Court judgment because of his recalcitrant and refractory conduct and on the principle that the detenu could not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.
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