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Documents citing Shah Ambalal Chhotalal And Ors. vs Shah Babaldas Dayabhai And Ors. on 12 April, 1962

Chunilal Shivlal (By His General ... vs Chimanlal Nagindas on 10 August, 1966

3. When the Revision Application came up for hearing before Divan J. it was conceded on behalf of the plaintiff, as it is conceded before us now, that if the case of the defendant did not fall within Section 12(3)(a), the defendant was not liable to be evicted for he had complied with the conditions of Section 12(3)(b) and was entitled to protection under that section. But the argument of the plaintiff was that the case was covered by Section 12(3)(a) and the plaintiff was therefore, entitled to a decree for eviction against the defendant. Now there are four conditions which must be satisfied to attract the applicability of Section 12(3)(a) and they are: (1) the rent must be payable by the month; (2) there must be no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent and permitted increases; (3) such rent or increases must be in arrears for a period of six months or more; and (4) the tenant must have neglected to make payment thereof until the expiration of a period of one month after the notice under Section 12(2). There was no dispute that conditions (1), (3) and (4) were satisfied in the present case. The rent was admittedly payable by the month; the defendant had failed to pay rent from Kartak Sud 1, Samvat Year 2014, according to the finding of the lower appellate Court which finding being one of fact must be regarded as beyond challenge in revision and the rent was, therefore, in arrears for a period of over six months on 10th March, 1958 when the notice under Section 12(2) was given and despite the notice under Section 12(2) the defendant had neglected to make payment of such arrears within a period of one month from the date of service of such notice. The only dispute was as regards the fulfilment of the second condition. There was admittedly no dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases upto the date of the tiling of the written statement and the dispute was raised for the first time only in the written statement but the argument of the defendant was that the raising of the dispute in the written statement was sufficient to constitute non-fulfilment of the second condition so as to take the case out of Section 12(3)(a). This argument was clearly unsustainable in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) where it has been held that the dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases contemplated is the one which is in existence at the date of the notice under Section 12(2) or at any rate before the expiry of one month from the date of its service and not the one raised subsequently in a written statement with a view to avoiding the operation of Section 12(3)(a). It was apparent that if this decision was good law, the second condition would have to be held to be fulfilled and the case of the defendant would directly fall within Section 12(3)(a).
Gujarat High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 5 - P N Bhagwati - Full Document

Thakkar Ramanlal Shivlal vs Thakkar Himatlal Ranchhoddas And Anr. on 18 February, 1967

The validity of this view taken by the Division Bench in Ambalal v. Babaldas was questioned in the subsequent case of Chunilal v. Chimanlal on the strength of certain observations made in two subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court but on consideration of those decisions a Division Bench of this Court consisting of A. D. Desai J. and myself, held that the view taken in Ambalal v. Babaldas was not overruled and must still be regarded as good law and it must be held that the dispute in regard to standard rent or permitted increases contemplated by Section 12(3)(a) is a dispute which must be raised at the latest before the expiry of one month from the date of service of the notice under Section 12(2) and it is not enough to raise the dispute for the first time in the written statement. These decisions clearly lay down that the dispute regarding the standard rent or permitted increases referred to in Section 12(3)(a) is a dispute which must be in existence at the date of the notice under Section 12(2) or at any rate before the expiry of one month after the service of such notice. If such dispute is in existence at the date of the notice under Section 12(2) or at any rate before the expiry of one month after the service of such notice, the case would be taken out of Section 12(3)(a) for in that event it would be possible to say that the second condition is satisfied. The second condition of Section 12(3)(a) does not require that there should be a dispute regarding the standard rent or permitted increases at the date of the suit. What Section 12(3)(a) requires is that there should be no dispute right upto the expiration of one month from the date of service of the notice under Section 12(2) and if such dispute is raised at the latest before the expiry of one. month from the date of service of the notice under Section 12(2), it would be sufficient to take the case out of Section 12(3)(a). Once it is found that there is a dispute in regard to the standard rent or permitted increases in existence, at the date of the notice under Section 12(2) or at any rate before the expiration of one month after its service, the case would go out of Section 12(3)(a) and it would not fall to be governed by Section 12(3)(a) merely because the dispute which was in existence at the date of expiration of one month from the service of the notice under Section 12(2) was subsequently resolved before the suit could be instituted by the plaintiff.
Gujarat High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - P N Bhagwati - Full Document

Sureshchandra Bhulabhai Jariwala And ... vs Maganlal Lallubhai on 17 December, 1965

L.R. 972-a view subsequently overruled by this Court in Ambalal v. Babaldas (supra) that if deposits are made by the tenant and accepted by the Court, the acceptance of the deposits would be tantamount to an order having been passed by the Court fixing a date as contemplated in Section 12(3)(b). If this view were correct, no application for fixing a date was necessary and the respondent could be held to have complied with the requirements of Section 12(3)(b). But the legal position was not free from doubt and the respondent, therefore, made the application dated 4th September 1958 to fix a date under Section 12(3)(b), so that on such date being fixed, the full amount of standard rent and permitted increases deposited by the respondent could be said to have been tendered in Court by the respondent on or before such date fixed by the Court and the requirements of Section 12(3)(b) would be satisfied. The learned trial Judge, however, rejected the application on the view that the application could not be made after the first day of hearing of the suit. This was, for reasons which we have pointed out above, clearly wrong. The application was competent under Section 12(3)(b) and the learned trial Judge should have granted the application. If the learned trial Judge had granted the application and fixed any date prior to the date of delivery of the judgment, the respondent would have been within the protection of Section 12(3)(b). The learned District Judge was, therefore, right in according the protection of Section 12(3)(b) to the respondent.
Gujarat High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 2 - P N Bhagwati - Full Document

Civil Judge (Junior Division) vs 4 on 9 December, 2022

is held not to mean "the date fixed for return of summons or the returnable date which is the day of appearance" of the parties before the court. See the following observations of this Court in above respect: (SCC p. 226, para 11) "11. It appears that there is consensus in regard to the interpretation of the expression 'first day' in the context of the rent legislations of several other States, for instance, the Gujarat High Court in Shah Ambalal Chhotalal v. Shah Babaldas Dayabhai [AIR 1964 Guj 9 : (1962) 3 Guj LR 625] dealing with the identical question as to the meaning of the words 'the first day of the hearing of the suit' as provided in sub-section (3)(b) of Section 12 of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 has observed after considering several decisions that, 'the words "the first day of hearing" as meaning not the day for the return of the summons or the returnable day, but the day on which the court applies its mind to the case which ordinarily would be at the time when either the issues are determined or evidence taken'."
Uttarakhand High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 0 - M K Tiwari - Full Document

Mrudalsingh Murubha vs Ishwarlal Laxmidas Khakhar on 12 September, 2002

Mr.Shah has next contended that the defendant did raise dispute as regards the standard rent and therefore also Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act can not be attracted. In support thereof, he has relied upon the judgments of this Court in the matters of Naranbhai Nathabhai Koli V/S. Modhia Panalal Maganlal [23(2) G.L.R. 98] and of Rupaben Wd/O. Kaththu Dhanji & Anr. V/S. Babubhai Deojibhai [24(1) G.L.R. 263]. In both these judgments, this Court has held that the raising of dispute as regards the standard rent by raising necessary plea in the written statement would be sufficient to take out a case from out of the purview of Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act. However, be it noted that in view of the earlier judgments of this Court in the matters of Shah Ambalal Chottalal v. Shah Babaldas Dahyabhai [3 G.L.R. 625]; of Ramniklal Dwarkadas Modi V/S. Mohanlal Laxmichand & Ors. [18 G.L.R. 32]; of Rafikbhai Husainbhai Chauhan V/S. Soni Ghanshayambhai Popatlal [2001 (2) G.L.H. U.J. 3] and of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shah Dhansukhlal Chhaganlal v. Dalichand Virchand Shroff (Decd.) By His Legal Representatives [A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1109], I have, in the matter of Edward Washing Company V/S. Bai Ammaben Suleman [Civil Revision Application No.1670 of 1983, decided on 5th September, 2002] held that the above referred judgments in the matters of Naranbhai Nathabhai Koli V/S. Modhia Panalal Maganlal [23(2) G.L.R. 98] and of Rupaben Wd/O Kaththu Dhanji and Anr. V/S. Babubhai Deojibhai [24(1) G.L.R. 263] in so far as they lay down that a valid dispute as regards the standard rent can be raised by raising necessary plea in the written statement so as to attract the protection of Section 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act are per incurium.
Gujarat High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - R M Doshit - Full Document
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