15. This Court is afraid that so far as the question involved in the present petition is concerned, the aforesaid decisions would have no application. Both the decisions, though dealing with the provisions of post-amendment Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, deal with the issue whether a second Revision would lie from an order, once revised before the Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 219(2) as amended by U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997, would appear to bar a second Revision prospectively. It was held that a Revision preferred from the Commissioner's order to the Board prior to the Amendment, would be maintainable notwithstanding the Amendment to the provisions of Section 219 by the Amendment Act, 1997. Likewise, in Madhav Pandey and others (supra), this Court held that in that case, the order of the Commissioner was passed on 07.02.1990, rejecting the Revisions. The Commissioner had exercised his jurisdiction under Section 218 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, filed by the revisionist before him. That was a Revision under Section 218, and not under Section 219, those powers not being available to the Commissioner at the relevant time. It was, therefore, held that Revisions which were filed before the Commissioner under Section 218, could not attract the provisions of Section 219(2) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, amended vide Act no.20 of 1997. Thus, the second Revision to the Board in those facts was held not barred. Thus seen, the two authorities, referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners, do not at all answer the question that is involved here.
9. Taking into consideration the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, as narrated above, it is a settled position that proceedings arising out of the mutation proceedings are summary in nature and a writ petition against the summary proceedings is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as has been held in the case of Madhav Pandey (supra). The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that so far as the paragraph 26 of the same categorically provides that there is no need to consider the question as to whether the revisional court has committed any error in exercise of the jurisdiction, the said order will not make the order without jurisdiction. The writ petition arising out of the summary proceedings can be entertained only when there is a lack of jurisdiction. It being not a case of lack of jurisdiction, no interference is called for under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The orders passed in the summary proceedings are always subject to the final adjudication by the competent court. The order and findings rendered in summary proceedings do not bind the competent court while adjudicating the title of the parties. It is always open to the aggrieved party to seek adjudication of rights by competent court and in that process of adjudication, the order passed in summary proceeding does not come in way.
In the case of Madhav Pandey (Supra); this Court has held that the mutation proceeding is summary in nature and a writ petition against the summary proceeding is not entertainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In para 26 of the said judgement, it has been very categorically held as under,
"26. The last submission of the counsel for the Petitioner is that the revenue court cannot interfere with the finding of fact and the revisional court i.e., the Board of Revenue has wrongly exercised the jurisdiction , hence this court may set aside the order of the board of revenue. As noticed above, there is difference between lack of jurisdiction and erroneous exercise of jurisdiction in a case. The present proceedings arising out of the mutation proceedings which is summary proceeding and the writ petitions against the summary proceedings are not entertained under Article 226 of Constitution of India. There is no need to consider the question as to whether the revisional court has committed any error in exercise of jurisdiction. Assuming for argument sake that there is some error in exercise of jurisdiction by the Board of Revenue, the said error will not make the order without jurisdiction. As held above, the writ petition arising out of the summary proceedings, can be entertained only when there is lack of jurisdiction. It being not a case of lack of jurisdiction, no interference is called for in the impugned order on the basis of the above submission of the counsel for the petitioners."
Secondly, regarding the entertainability of the writ petition against the summary proceedings by relying upon the judgment passed by this Court in the cases of Madhav Pandey and others versus Board of Revenue and others, reported in 2002(2) AWC 1311; in which this Court has held that mutation proceeding is summary in nature and writ petition against the summary proceedings is not entertainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph No. 26 of the said judgement, it has been categorically held as under:-
In the case of Madhav Pandey and others versus Board of Revenue and others, reported in 2002(2) AWC 1311; this Court has held that the mutation proceeding is summary in nature and writ petition against the summary proceedings is not entertainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph No. 26 of the said judgement, it has been categorically held as under:-
In the same context learned Counsel for the appellants also cited 2002(2)(2) AWC page 1311 Madhav Pandey and Ors. v. Board of Revenue and Ors. (Hiqh Court, Allahabad) and in this judgement also the same principle has been reiterated. I agree with the judgement of this Court to the effect that the proceedings Under Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act is summary proceedings and right title of the parties cannot be decided finally in this proceedings and that the judgement in this proceedings cannot be binding on the civil court in regular case. But in the present case it is not the controversial point that whether the order passed by Tahsildar in mutation proceedings is binding or not. Because the order was passed by Tahsildar in mutation proceedings in favour of the appellant. The controversy in the present case is that whether the statement of attesting witnesses recorded in the mutation proceedings are admissible in regular suit in the circumstances when the attesting witnesses had died. This position was most material to be considered in the case. This fact has not been challenged by the appellant counsel that Munshi Lal and Babu Ram were not alive at the time of recording the evidence. Under these circumstances certified copies of the statement could have been filed in the regular suit and no such judgement of this Court and Hon'ble Apex Court has been filed that such a statement are not admissible. In this context Section 33 of the Evidence Act is most relevant. It has been provided in the Section ;